Boggie Dog

I'm thinking that not having this magical barrier won't impact the number of people who chose to fly.

MacLeanBarrier

The fact remains: the 9/11 and July 2003 plots were to simply wait for a pilot to routinely unlock the cockpit door. Since then, it's falsely believed that the problem was corrected with placing flight attendants and a galley cart in hopes to stop such a lone-wolf weaponless attacker. That's like two retired cheerleaders using a wheelchair to block Steeler Le’Veon Bell from diving for a touchdown to win his first Superbowl...

Let's just go through aahypothetical: A suicidal attacker sprints at an unlocked cockpit and slips on a banana peel, hits his head, and falls at flight attendant Bette Nash's feet unconscious--the aftermath of that will cripple the airline industry. Because now, a collective amount of ambitious politicians will finally read the 9/11 Commission, the 6-year redacted July 26, 2003 warning memo, the redacted $125 pay-per-view 2011 RTCA DO-329 study report, and the redacted and unpublished June 26, 2017 USDOT-OIG Audit Report--and then all tout that they discovered those plots were just to wait for the forward galley song and dance before the door swings open.

Flights will be cancelled and ticket prices will sky-rocket and no one will bat an eye due to still being in fear--just like when Iraq was invaded.

There's a good reason why police stations, prisons, banks, jewelry stores, schools, etc. have secondary barrier systems or also known as "salley ports," "air locks" or "people traps"--but I guess they are also are all "absurd" for installing them...

Nevertheless, I appreciate the emails I've received from others lurking in this thread who don't want to be attacked for these obvious security lapses being addressed.

I wish everyone here a Happy New Year!

Signing out.

Xyzzy

The fact remains that flight crews are acutely aware of who is standing, moving, in the lav, etc. well before they place their cart and open the door. Airplanes are very confining places with narrow corridors and low ceilings. The thought of someone jumping over a guarded 3 foot cart and landing in the relatively small space behind it and then magically entering the cockpit stretches credulity well into comic book territory.
Nbody wants to be attacked. Stoking fear to sell useless products in the name of "security" is pretty lame.

Boggie Dog

Highlighting above mine.

Isn't that how we ended up with TSA?

Xyzzy

Indeed it is. And we learn frm history that we learn nothing from history. SAD!

WillCAD

Not on a long-haul! It'd just make the pilots fill their diapers faster.

And I don't care how big the bonus, there ain't a flight attendant alive who'd change them.

Boggie Dog

Can look at past practices and install a relief tube in the cockpit.

TWA884

Due to the proliferation of ad hominem attacks - most of which have been deleted - and the OP having signed out, it it time to close this thread.

TWA884
Travel Safety/Security co-moderator

MacLeanBarrier

After TSA refused to provide me a copy of the unpublished 26-page June 26, 2017 U.S. Department of Transportation / Office of Inspector General (USDOT-OIG) Audit Report No. AV2017063, I requested one directly from the USDOT-OIG to transmit to me through a classified information network. Despite the fact that I'm a TSA Federal Air Marshal with an active TOP SECRET security clearance, USDOT-OIG also denied me a copy. I then requested a copy through the Freedom Of Information Act. USDOT-OIG finally provided me this heavily redacted copy--

It's noteworthy that the study used role-players who did not attack at full-speed and were naturally unwilling to hurt themselves. There was also a concern about injury liability. In real life, attackers are suicidal and will go at full-strength.

http://nebula.wsimg.com/96c84c2c2a64...&alloworigin=1

FliesWay2Much

One would think that you would have been briefed on the recommendations and the FAA's responses. Usually, IG reports (even classified ones) result in at least one congressional hearing with authorization committees. It would be worth your time to check with the TSA Office of Legislative Affairs to find out if a hearing was ever held or if the FAA OIG provided a copy to congress. Because the DOT (and DHS for that matter) both have statutory IGs, they are pretty much obligated to deliver every report to Congress. I'm also surprised that the report wasn't available on a wiki site on the high side, unless the FAA figured out how to add a code word to the document's classification just to limit distribution.

FlyingHoustonian

How invested are you in the company you are advertising in your profile that conveniently sells a "solution" for this phantom-problem?

Plenty of us have TS-SCI clearances, that is not special nor does it need to be mentioned regarding getting the info. If you really have a clearance you know if info is at that level you would have to have a 'need to know' before just randomly having it transmitted to you just because you have a clearance.

Seeing as how the door is not opened on many flights, and on others is not held open as noted on the report, you are proposing a costly solution to a problem that does not exist as a threat level compared to other publicly disclosed methods.

TWA884

Folks,

I'm going to reopen this thread on a trial basis.

Please keep in mind that personal and ad hominem attacks are in violation of the posting rules:
The next poster who gets personal with another will be suspended for a minimum of seven days.

Please consider this to be your only warning!

TWA884
Travel Safety/Security co-moderator

MacLeanBarrier

I do not own any company nor am I invested in any.

Boggie Dog

It's been well over 20 years since I was involved with government classified information so my memory may be faulty. Isn't it a security violation to disclose clearance information/level to anyone who has no need to know that fact?

I note that the letter linked in OP's post "OIG Audit Report No. AV2017063 titled, “FAA Has Taken Steps to Identify Flight Deck Vulnerabilities but Needs to Enhance Its Mitigation Efforts.” is not classified but only marked SSI. I'm guessing that the authority that so marked that document still can determine who has a "Need to Know". Perhaps that authority didn't want to disseminate the document to field employees. Face it, the more people who know something the less secure that information becomes.

TWA884

Folks,

The subject of this thread is the MOBILE Flight Deck Secondary Barrier Galley Cart System!

Please discuss the effectiveness of and the need for the system, NOT each other.

Arguing whether it is a security violation for the OP to disclose clearance information/level is a violation of FlyerTalk Rule 12.2, which I linked and quoted in my earlier post here today, and it is off topic for this thread and forum.

TWA884
Travel Safety/Security co-moderator