MacLeanBarrier

Not accurate I routinely consult with Virginia state and county government health officials and most disposable respirators are more than sufficient to protect from powered fentanyl or carfentanil. TSA has no limit to how much over-the-counter purchased naloxone Narcan doses you can bring with you. So if some opioid gets by your respirator, there's Narcan in your pocket to steer the jet to your target.

Virginia's largest police department--adjacent to Washington DC--issues such disposable respirators to its police officers in their opioid overdose kit that also has Narcan doses:

https://patch.com/virginia/kingstowne/officers-get-gear-protect-against-deadly-opioids

These 12 cables, i.e., "wire mesh", cannot stop opioid nor firearms attacks--PHOTO of one: https://photos.app.goo.gl/XXbNfGWU6QRqHCET8

Another knee-jerk reaction--to a pure anomaly--that makes problems exceptionally worse! Flight attendants cannot fly jets. They also may not have any clue what the suicidal pilot is doing while the other pilot is outside. It only takes a few moments to put the jet into a fatal dive. If they pilot is already planning to kill everyone and can bypass security screening with weapons--then just kill the pilot or the flight attendant before you take the jet down.

With regards to a pilot becoming incapacitated alone in the cockpit: Pilots do not leave the cockpit when the jet is descending, or when there are issues such as clear-air turbulence or other potentially dangerous factors. They are supposed to put the jet in auto-pilot mode before leaving the cockpit. In the case that a pilot goes unconscious, there are numerous hi-tech to low-tech measures to get back into the cockpit such as key-pad, biometric, and/or a standard key that's secured inside the cockpit.

The inane and dangerous October 2018 PUBLIC LAW only requires secondary barriers in aircraft BUILT AFTER the FUTURE DATE of October 2019. So this public law essentially tells terrorists to attack all jets before this date or any jet built before it. An absolutely reckless law written by people who don't have a clue:

​​​​​​​

https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/h...15hr302enr.pdf

I have several people in the aviation industry who are finding solutions right now. I simply designed my invention with the thought process of an air marshal, an airline executive who needs to mitigate costs (i.e., downtime to maintain barriers and retrofitting cabins to accommodate a barrier mandate), and a lone-wolf terrorist who does not want to risk sneaking on weapons and simply slam into an unlocked flight deck only protected with flight attendants and drink-carts, or with flight attendants alone.

Very thoughtful questions--thank you very much!

MacLeanBarrier

I can remember flight attendants mentioning that they will be "short one". Perhaps this has changed or a rule was violated such as the rule routinely violated when the cockpit gets unlocked without protection.

If I'm wrong about the rule, I stand corrected.

Whichever space would be mandated to free up if last week's bill gets passed into law. Again, a built-in barrier system would require significantly more space, money, and downtime to install and maintain.

Numerous airline cabin maintenance officials who told me so as I always ask where the secondary barriers are when I board aircraft. An unsubstantiated complaint was filed against me a year ago for conducting such investigations and inquiries.

United Airlines gives no reason at all here as to why IT PAID to REMOVE secondary barriers from an entire new fleet of B787 Dreamliners:

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...kpit-barriers/

Not to sound like a conspiracy theorist, but how do we definitely know this? We don't. There have been a number of aircraft disasters in which investigators have been unable to fully explain with the exception of some computer data not designed to detect cockpit breaches. The only people who would know about such a lone-wolf attack would be the attacker's and the passengers' makers--not every suicidal attacker leaves behind a suicidal message. Such a suicidal message can be intercepted before an attack, or in the case of a failed attack, i.e., attacker slips, hits his head, and falls unconscious...

Nevertheless, an arguable issue--unlike others posed here, i.e. "Germanwings hyperbole", "'unconscious pilots alone' hyperbole", "NINJA flight attendants," etc.

100% absolutely false!!! Such an attack would happen so fast, a belted-in seated pilots would have almost no time to don oxygen masks. Look up the US Airways Flight 1549 Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger emergency landing, or watch the movie: The investigators agreed that the pilots needed at 35 seconds to respond to the emergency--an emergency in which a suicidal attacker is not inside the cockpit...

If the public badly wants a flying armed law enforcement officer program, then it should go back to the similar 2003 to 2005 "surge/temporary duty" program. The program would recall trained U.S. immigration law enforcement officers to perform air marshal flight missions during elevated and specific threats. Federal regulations allow city, county, and state law enforcement officers to fly armed--so you can expand this to every cop in the land and only use it when absolutely needed. Instead, we have a manager-heavy Billion-dollar/year TSA Law Enforcement / Federal Air Marshal Service in which Federal Air Marshals have to not fly to perform administrative duties, or sit on "Recovery Status".

phltraveler

I've flown on 500+ flights in the past five years and I've never seen the FA rule count violated on a domestic flight.
On longer international flights I've seen enough FAs to cover the cabin, but usually on longer TATL/TPAC routes there are more FAs staffed than required (for better service in premium cabins and to allow for crew rest - FAs take turns resting).


Isn't this part of the huge resistance of requiring a retrofit barrier design in the first place and why the new rule goes against mandatory new aircraft orders, with time for the industry to adapt?

Other articles cite them as being standard on some pre-merger United flights before the merger, and not standard on Continental. The fleets were merged and inconsistent, Continental leadership took over. Between cost ($5,000+ per barrier) and consistency as cabin crew worked on different aicraft (some have barriers, some don't) those are potential reasons. (In other articles United denies that it was motivated by secondary barrier cost as the sole factor).

Which disasters specifically are you referencing, if any?

This assumes the pilot dons the oxygen mask in reaction to an attack in progress, and doesn't put on the oxygen mask before the cockpit door is opened as the regulations justify they should before the other pilot leaves the flight deck. Sullenberger's reaction time was in reaction to figuring out an unknown (birds spotted, engines stopped; unable to tell they were damaged, followed QRH to attempt to re-ignite engines).

Boggie Dog

The FAA regs on this hasn't changed. A pilot is not going to risk his career on flying without proper crew.


Your barrier system while mobile is still built in. A cart is about 24"w by 30" l by 40" H. It has to go somewhere and be secure.



So? Maybe United doesn't think they are needy too!



Ok, we don't know which means your barrier may not have made any difference. How many of these events happened on U.S. aircraft?

Quote:

100% absolutely false!!!

Stop moving the goalposts. The discussion was about one pilot in the cockpit who would be required to be on O2 prior to the other pilot leaving the controls. It took Sully that time to evaluate his instruments and determine the type of failure he was dealing with. Substantially different than a potential cockpit breech.



II think things would be fine without FAMS.

MacLeanBarrier

I've been on more flights and watching the cockpit door since I was hired in October 2001. I've seen it happen. Regardless, no one believes flight attendants can or should be tasked to stop a suicidal attacker. We're back with the "ninja flight attendants" argument/red herring...

With that: you win this "ninja flight attendants" argument.

It took 13 months to build bullet-proof cockpit doors and retrofit every jet from January 11, 2002 to April 11, 2003--four months before I disclosed the al Qaeda plot to take advantage of unlocked doors. H.R. 911 gives 24 months after enactment.

Would you please cite the articles? I cannot find them. Thank you.

I never was "specifically...referencing" any, but here's more red herrings for you to have everyone chase to support your arguments:

Malaysia Airlines Flight 370
EgyptAir Flight 804 (many conflicting conclusions from different investigations)
EgyptAir Flight 990
Helios Airways Flight 522

An attack inside a cockpit by a suicidal passenger would cause a more substantial delay than a bird-strike and the resulting non-deadly glide down. Your comparison is without merit.

Again, you're back to the tired old "a full staff of ninja flight attendants" will save the day argument.

So does a barrier--built permanently into the aircraft cabin--"to go somewhere and be secure."

The airlines would have us all standing like on a subway if they could get away with it...

From page 158 of the 9/11 Commission Report:

You're categorically wrong. A pilot's reaction to a suicidal passenger inside his/her cockpit would cause a delay in reaction exceptionally longer than a bird-strike.

Some former airline CEOs would agree:

https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/11/avia...ete-waste.html

Boggie Dog

It's a shame they are former.

Bearcat06

Thoughts on LEOSA qualified LEO's being allowed to fly armed on domestic flights and have FAMs worry more-so about Internationals..?

MacLeanBarrier

What I've been proposing for years (i.e., 2002-2005 ICE TDY-surge) but that's a threat to the Billion-dollar TSA fiefdoms... Regardless, it's no longer about airport locations, aircraft size, and/or routes anymore--"Datamaxx Group 2.0":

https://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-...ry?id=59974300

Boggie Dog

Your first link is dated 2006. Things might be the same but 12 years might also make a difference. However, people have long moved from government jobs to private sector jobs with government contractors. Nothing new about that.

You second link is just about FAM's being moved to the back of the bus. Should give a better opportunity to monitor what is happening forward.and get them out of the high dollar seats.

MacLeanBarrier

Especially ones that you've awarded $21 million worthless "paperweight" contracts to...

How do you stop a rush-attack of an unlocked cockpit with FAMs seated far behind? Oh wait, that's right, the "ninja flight attendants" got this...

phltraveler

We're talking numbers (which do count). I find your ninja flight attendants point dismissive, particularly when it's pointed out how that, post 9/11, passengers aren't just going to sit back and wait to be flown to $foreignDestination when they realize that an attacker could attempt to take down the jet.



I'm not sure how primary barrier and secondary barrier timelines are entirely comparable.

https://www.chicagotribune.com/busin...925-story.html

I'm not saying I 100% buy United's rationale at the time, particularly given other areas where they cut cost. I am just citing my point that United claimed it was not about cost alone.

Malaysia 370 in particular had issues beyond just merely determining what happened. CVR/FDR data ws never recovered. If a cockpit intrusion camera (or secondary barrier device) existed, it would have been recorded on the same (or a similar) medium. Unless you have a proposal on how a cockpit intrusion recorder would have been more recoverable than other recorders if separate, beyond what was already recorded?

804 had evidence of fire.

For 990 - the CVR is pretty damning.

Helios 522 had prior pressurization issues that matched with the CVR.

Again, it assumes the passenger is in the cockpit when the attack starts (e.g. door is open, pilot/copilot is at controlls unaware) when in-flight procedure would dictate when pilot #1 indicated a need to leave the cockpit, pilot #2 would put on an oxygen mask, and then the cockpit door would be opened. At the point where a theoretical attacker parkoured over the barrier, the pilot at the controls should already be wearing oxygen. As far as any hope to deflect or potential for other issues, you can argue that separately, but I'm not sure how you would compare that to a 35 second time to put on an oxygen mask.

Boggie Dog

I believe the cart barrier will provide time to close the flight deck door before a breech occurs.

MacLeanBarrier

Do you mean this "[standard drink] cart barrier"?

WillCAD

Okay, I think the discussion has gone a little off the rails, so maybe we should sum up:

Existing system:
1) Flight deck doors are locked and reinforced to prevent unauthorized flight deck access
2) Whenever the flight deck door is opened in flight
------------------->remaining pilot is required to go on oxygen BEFORE the door is unlocked
------------------->beverage cart provides a secondary physical barrier to prevent unauthorized flight deck access
------------------->FA stands with the beverage cart to provide human response and additional physical impediment to unauthorized flight deck access

Theoretical vulnerabilities with current system:
1) Bad Actor might jump/crawl over the beverage cart, overpower both the FA and the entering/exiting pilot OR bypass both of them in an extremely confined space, without being interdicted by nearby pax, and gain access to the flight deck (where he would still need to overpower the remaining pilot)
2) Bad Actor might deploy a chemical weapon while the flight deck door is open, incapacitating the crew and nearby pax to preventing the door from closing (but which would not affect the remaining pilot, who is on independent oxygen that would compromise the chemical weapon's effectiveness)

Proposed Mobile Barrier solution:
1) Mitigates theoretical vulnerability #1 (which is already darn near impossible anyway)
2) Does not address theoretical vulnerability #2 (because no matter how tight the seal on a secondary barrier, the air circulation system of the aircraft itself will still carry chemical weapons to the flight deck, and who cares because the remaining pilot is on oxygen BEFORE the door is open, every single time)

So, all of this talk of ninja flight attendants, is a load of swill. The FA doesn't need to be a ninja, he or she just needs to be a roadblock, filling up the empty space between the beverage cart and the flight deck door, and providing a trip hazard to the theoretical parkourist Bad Actor who will supposedly leap spectacularly over the cart, past both the FA and the exiting or entering pilot, sticking a landing inside the flight deck, and overpowering the remaining pilot. The Amazing Yen might be able to pull it off, but only if he had a great wireworks team, plenty of takes, and was working on a set that is significantly larger than an actual aircraft.**

Similarly, all the talk of opiod attacks (or other chemical attacks), and "respirators"* carried aboard by Bad Actors, is also a load of swill, because the proposed mobile barrier doesn't seal the flilght deck when it's in use, and it's only in use when the door is open, while the remaining pilot is on oxygen and won't be affected by the chemical weapon anyway.

This entire conversation is ludicrous on its face. This secondary barrier is nothing but an expensive solution to a problem that does not exist.

* NOTE: continuing to refer to disposable paper Home Depot dust masks as "respirators" completely undermines one's credibility.
** As does posting scenes from a cheesy action TV show - filmed on a SET, not on a real plane - as evidence that such parkour attacks are even remotely possible.

Boggie Dog

That's exactly what I mean. A scene from a movie is not evidence of real capabilities.