MOBILE Flight Deck Secondary Barrier Galley Cart System
Dec 25, 2018, 9:54 am
#106
Join Date: Nov 2010
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Posts: 4,332
End the ridiculous practice of the pilots notifying everyone that one of them is going to unlock the door, and then needlessly switch out with a flight attendant—leaving the door wide-open four-times too long.
Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix.
Equip the cockpits and aircraft medical kits with NARCAN doses in the case some synthetic opioid leaks past the solid IPSB.
Please open the 9/11 Commission report and Control+F “cockpit,” “door,” and “jammed themselves into” — the hijackers simply “jammed themselves” into the cockpits when the pilots unlocked them within 30 minutes after take-off.
The movie “United 93” also hints this after minute 46 into it.
In July 2003, the plot was the same: wait for the post-April 4, 2003 “reinforced” cockpit doors to open—
Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix.
Equip the cockpits and aircraft medical kits with NARCAN doses in the case some synthetic opioid leaks past the solid IPSB.
Please open the 9/11 Commission report and Control+F “cockpit,” “door,” and “jammed themselves into” — the hijackers simply “jammed themselves” into the cockpits when the pilots unlocked them within 30 minutes after take-off.
The movie “United 93” also hints this after minute 46 into it.
In July 2003, the plot was the same: wait for the post-April 4, 2003 “reinforced” cockpit doors to open—
“either shortly after takeoff or shortly before landing”
TSA withheld this intelligence from Freedom Of Information Act requests for six years:
www.maclean-scotus.info]2006 and 2009 FOIA responses to July 26, 2003 hijacking plot warning[/url]
TSA withheld this intelligence from Freedom Of Information Act requests for six years:
www.maclean-scotus.info]2006 and 2009 FOIA responses to July 26, 2003 hijacking plot warning[/url]
Besides equipping aircraft FAKs with the drug, there would also be a tremendous cost in training flight crews how to recognize when it's needed and how to administer it - all for an attack vector that could possibly be countered by existing means.
Dec 25, 2018, 10:07 am
#107
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 28,129
End the ridiculous practice of the pilots notifying everyone that one of them is going to unlock the door, and then needlessly switch out with a flight attendant—leaving the door wide-open four-times too long.
Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix.
Equip the cockpits and aircraft medical kits with NARCAN doses in the case some synthetic opioid leaks past the solid IPSB.
Please open the 9/11 Commission report and Control+F “cockpit,” “door,” and “jammed themselves into” — the hijackers simply “jammed themselves” into the cockpits when the pilots unlocked them within 30 minutes after take-off.
The movie “United 93” also hints this after minute 46 into it.
In July 2003, the plot was the same: wait for the post-April 4, 2003 “reinforced” cockpit doors to open—
Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix.
Equip the cockpits and aircraft medical kits with NARCAN doses in the case some synthetic opioid leaks past the solid IPSB.
Please open the 9/11 Commission report and Control+F “cockpit,” “door,” and “jammed themselves into” — the hijackers simply “jammed themselves” into the cockpits when the pilots unlocked them within 30 minutes after take-off.
The movie “United 93” also hints this after minute 46 into it.
In July 2003, the plot was the same: wait for the post-April 4, 2003 “reinforced” cockpit doors to open—
“either shortly after takeoff or shortly before landing”
TSA withheld this intelligence from Freedom Of Information Act requests for six years:
www.maclean-scotus.info]2006 and 2009 FOIA responses to July 26, 2003 hijacking plot warning[/url]
TSA withheld this intelligence from Freedom Of Information Act requests for six years:
www.maclean-scotus.info]2006 and 2009 FOIA responses to July 26, 2003 hijacking plot warning[/url]
You're suggesting having enough NARCAN aboard for all souls and an air barrier from the forward galley forward.
I've never heard a pilot announce to the cabin that they were opening the cockpit door.
NARCAN has a shelf life of 18 to 24 months. Have you even considered expense in your suggestions, not to mention the FAA approval process for each model of aircraft in service for each required modification?
Dec 25, 2018, 10:08 am
#108
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 28,129
Duplicate
Last edited by Boggie Dog; Dec 25, 2018 at 6:04 pm
Dec 25, 2018, 10:13 am
#109
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Location: Leesburg, Virginia
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There are relatively cheap measures to fix this within days, but instead, TSA is going full speed ahead to blow hundreds of millions of dollars on computed tomography (CT) machines in a myth that a suicidal passenger thinks he can hijack a 150+ passenger jet with a firearm—a big hunk of metal—and a mazagine of 19 rounds—powder residue. Meanwhile, we allow unscreened minimum-wage airport workers the ability to avoid law enforcement surprise "open and look" checks in which they can now plant explosives and be out of the country before someone realizes they didn’t show up for their next shift.
This is why TSA obsessively posts social media photos of firearms—guns accidentally left by forgetful passengers with lawful permits to carry-conceal them.
Then there's the problem of greedy unbeknownst airport workers—"mules"—who think they're just harmlessly sneaking a package of drugs:
46 people indicted in drug-smuggling bust at Dallas-Fort Worth airport
A CT machine operator is more than likely to miss a suicidal passenger trying to smuggle a hidden explosive—"a needle in a hackstack."
We have a Billion-dollar a year air marshal program 95% focused on an operational response to perfectly shoot a suidical attacker diving into an unlocked cockpit...
We need to focus more on potential unwittingly or homicidal airport workers rather than treating all passengers as suicidal threats.
Last edited by MacLeanBarrier; Dec 25, 2018 at 10:56 am
Dec 25, 2018, 11:05 am
#110
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: Baltimore, MD USA
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Posts: 4,332
There will won't be a need to use a larger amount of synthetic opioid on all of the passengers when you only need a lesser amount to simply throw at and unconscious the pilots—and then take control of the aircraft.
There are relatively cheap measures to fix this within days, but instead, TSA is going full speed ahead to blow hundreds of millions of dollars on computed tomography (CT) machines in a myth that a suicidal passenger thinks he can hijack a 150+ passenger jet with a firearm—a big hunk of metal—and a mazagine of 19 rounds—powder residue. Meanwhile, we allow unscreened minimum-wage airport workers the ability to avoid law enforcement surprise “open and look” checks in which they can now plant explosives and be out of the country before someone realizes they didn’t show up for their next shift.
This is why TSA obsessively posts social media photos of firearms—guns accidentally left by forgetful passengers with lawful permits to carry-conceal them.
Then there’s the problem of greedy unbeknownst airport workers—“mules”—who think they’re just harmlessly sneaking a package of drugs:
46 people indicted in drug-smuggling bust at Dallas-Fort Worth airport
A CT machine operator is more than likely to miss a suicidal passenger trying to smuggle a hidden explosive—“a needle in a hackstack.”
We have a Billion-dollar a year air marshal program 95% focused on an operational response to perfectly shoot a suidical attacker diving into an unlocked cockpit...
We need to focus more on potential unwittingly or homicidal airport workers rather than treating all passengers as suicidal threats.
There are relatively cheap measures to fix this within days, but instead, TSA is going full speed ahead to blow hundreds of millions of dollars on computed tomography (CT) machines in a myth that a suicidal passenger thinks he can hijack a 150+ passenger jet with a firearm—a big hunk of metal—and a mazagine of 19 rounds—powder residue. Meanwhile, we allow unscreened minimum-wage airport workers the ability to avoid law enforcement surprise “open and look” checks in which they can now plant explosives and be out of the country before someone realizes they didn’t show up for their next shift.
This is why TSA obsessively posts social media photos of firearms—guns accidentally left by forgetful passengers with lawful permits to carry-conceal them.
Then there’s the problem of greedy unbeknownst airport workers—“mules”—who think they’re just harmlessly sneaking a package of drugs:
46 people indicted in drug-smuggling bust at Dallas-Fort Worth airport
A CT machine operator is more than likely to miss a suicidal passenger trying to smuggle a hidden explosive—“a needle in a hackstack.”
We have a Billion-dollar a year air marshal program 95% focused on an operational response to perfectly shoot a suidical attacker diving into an unlocked cockpit...
We need to focus more on potential unwittingly or homicidal airport workers rather than treating all passengers as suicidal threats.
So, Bad Actor boards an aircraft as a passenger, bringing aerosolized opiods aboard, and somehow - SOMEHOW - delivers the aerosol to just the pilots and not himself, then somehow - SOMEHOW - manages to take over the flight deck after the pilots are unconscious.
And no, the "he might take the dose himself and administer his own NARCAN" thing won't wash, because getting a dose of opiod and counteracting it with NARCAN has enough potential side effects to incapacitate a Bad Actor, so there's no way they would take that bullet themselves and risk mission failure.
So, questions, then:
1) What are the pax doing while Bad Actor disperses an unknown aerosol substance into the flight deck?
2) What are the FAs doing while Bad Actor disperses an unknown aerosol substance into the flight deck?
3) What are the pax and FAs doing while Bad Actor forces his way into the locked flight deck after the pilots are rendered unconscious?
4) If Bad Actor is not suicidal, why is he going to such elaborate lengths to hijack an aircraft when there are far easier and more available targets that can be taken with a few pistols and some yelling?
Dec 25, 2018, 11:22 am
#111
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Location: Leesburg, Virginia
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Posts: 132
Repeating my earlier post:
"Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix."
NARCAN inside the forward galley and cockpit in the case any amount of synthetic opioid gets passed an impermeable IPSB—sealing the forward galley--and affecting the pilots ability to emergency land: now the primary objective.
In the meantime, the pilots will drop the oxygen masks. Most, if not all, of the passengers will survive any residual synthetic opioid thrown at the impermeable IPSB deployed before a pilot opens the cockpit.
Great discussion—that DHS and TSA are not having with rank-and-file Federal Air Marshals and all other representatives in the aviation community who may be affected.
Last edited by MacLeanBarrier; Dec 26, 2018 at 2:27 pm
Dec 25, 2018, 1:17 pm
#112
Join Date: Feb 2014
Location: Frensham, Lincolnshire
Programs: RFC
Posts: 5,099
Resources are limited. They should be directed towards actual threats, not the Space Nazi Moon Lasers level "threats".
Repeating my earlier post:
"Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix."
"Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix."
NARCAN inside the forward galley and cockpit in the case any amount of synthetic opioid gets passed an impermeable IPSB—sealing the forward galley—and affecting the pilots ability to emergency land: now the primary objective.
In the meantime, the pilots will drop the oxygen masks. Most, if not all, of the passengers will survive any residual synthetic opioid thrown at the impermeable IPSB deployed before a pilot opens the cockpit.
In the meantime, the pilots will drop the oxygen masks. Most, if not all, of the passengers will survive any residual synthetic opioid thrown at the impermeable IPSB deployed before a pilot opens the cockpit.
Last edited by TWA884; Feb 26, 2019 at 12:28 pm Reason: Merge consecutive posts by the same member
Dec 25, 2018, 1:54 pm
#113
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https://my.rtca.org/NC__Product?id=a1B36000001IcfmEAC
Last edited by MacLeanBarrier; Dec 26, 2018 at 2:26 pm
Dec 25, 2018, 4:30 pm
#114
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: Baltimore, MD USA
Programs: Southwest Rapid Rewards. Tha... that's about it.
Posts: 4,332
"Bad actor" will have his own disposable respirator and NARCAN doses.
Repeating my earlier post:
"Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix."
NARCAN inside the forward galley and cockpit in the case any amount of synthetic opioid gets passed an impermeable IPSB—sealing the forward galley—and affecting the pilots ability to emergency land: now the primary objective.
In the meantime, the pilots will drop the oxygen masks. Most, if not all, of the passengers will survive any residual synthetic opioid thrown at the impermeable IPSB deployed before a pilot opens the cockpit.
Great discussion—that DHS and TSA are not having with rank-and-file Federal Air Marshals and all other representatives in the aviation community who may be affected.
Repeating my earlier post:
"Deploy Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) that enclose the forward galley. Just reinforcing the cockpit doors was a sloppy fix."
NARCAN inside the forward galley and cockpit in the case any amount of synthetic opioid gets passed an impermeable IPSB—sealing the forward galley—and affecting the pilots ability to emergency land: now the primary objective.
In the meantime, the pilots will drop the oxygen masks. Most, if not all, of the passengers will survive any residual synthetic opioid thrown at the impermeable IPSB deployed before a pilot opens the cockpit.
Great discussion—that DHS and TSA are not having with rank-and-file Federal Air Marshals and all other representatives in the aviation community who may be affected.
I remind you that the two most famous cases of passenger-initiated attacks aboard aircraft over the last 17 years - the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber - were both thwarted by passengers alone, not by intel, not by passenger screening, not by physical security barriers, not by armed pilots, and certainly not by armed FAMs.
Also, assuming that the regular Liquids, Gels, and Aerosols screening doesn't turn it up, would the existence of respirators in Bad Actor's carry-on not trigger a hand search of his bag that would turn up the liquid or aerosolized opiod compound?
And in conclusion, let me repeat both of my earlier posts which contained questions you ignored:
Um... that's not exactly what you're warning against.
That was a case of the Russian government using carfentanyl as a chemical weapon against terrorists - irresponsibly killing 120 of the people they were supposedly trying to rescue.
Are there any other cases in history where aerosolized carfentanyl has been used as a weapon? Is there a case where an unauthorized person or group has used aerosolized carfentanyl as a weapon? Like, ever? Or is this another one of those wild theoretical attack vectors that people have seen in movies and are utterly convinced are imminent and inevitable? Like suitcase nukes and binary liquid explosives and electromagnetic railguns with x-ray scopes...
That was a case of the Russian government using carfentanyl as a chemical weapon against terrorists - irresponsibly killing 120 of the people they were supposedly trying to rescue.
Are there any other cases in history where aerosolized carfentanyl has been used as a weapon? Is there a case where an unauthorized person or group has used aerosolized carfentanyl as a weapon? Like, ever? Or is this another one of those wild theoretical attack vectors that people have seen in movies and are utterly convinced are imminent and inevitable? Like suitcase nukes and binary liquid explosives and electromagnetic railguns with x-ray scopes...
You're getting farther afield with your scenario.
So, Bad Actor boards an aircraft as a passenger, bringing aerosolized opiods aboard, and somehow - SOMEHOW - delivers the aerosol to just the pilots and not himself, then somehow - SOMEHOW - manages to take over the flight deck after the pilots are unconscious.
And no, the "he might take the dose himself and administer his own NARCAN" thing won't wash, because getting a dose of opiod and counteracting it with NARCAN has enough potential side effects to incapacitate a Bad Actor, so there's no way they would take that bullet themselves and risk mission failure.
So, questions, then:
1) What are the pax doing while Bad Actor disperses an unknown aerosol substance into the flight deck?
2) What are the FAs doing while Bad Actor disperses an unknown aerosol substance into the flight deck?
3) What are the pax and FAs doing while Bad Actor forces his way into the locked flight deck after the pilots are rendered unconscious?
4) If Bad Actor is not suicidal, why is he going to such elaborate lengths to hijack an aircraft when there are far easier and more available targets that can be taken with a few pistols and some yelling?
So, Bad Actor boards an aircraft as a passenger, bringing aerosolized opiods aboard, and somehow - SOMEHOW - delivers the aerosol to just the pilots and not himself, then somehow - SOMEHOW - manages to take over the flight deck after the pilots are unconscious.
And no, the "he might take the dose himself and administer his own NARCAN" thing won't wash, because getting a dose of opiod and counteracting it with NARCAN has enough potential side effects to incapacitate a Bad Actor, so there's no way they would take that bullet themselves and risk mission failure.
So, questions, then:
1) What are the pax doing while Bad Actor disperses an unknown aerosol substance into the flight deck?
2) What are the FAs doing while Bad Actor disperses an unknown aerosol substance into the flight deck?
3) What are the pax and FAs doing while Bad Actor forces his way into the locked flight deck after the pilots are rendered unconscious?
4) If Bad Actor is not suicidal, why is he going to such elaborate lengths to hijack an aircraft when there are far easier and more available targets that can be taken with a few pistols and some yelling?
Dec 25, 2018, 4:47 pm
#115
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At the risk of repeating myself, my earlier suggestion of a brick wall will provide a far more permanent solution to this additional non-problem that MacLeanBarrier has br
ught up.
ught up.
Dec 25, 2018, 5:48 pm
#116
Original Poster
Join Date: Nov 2017
Location: Leesburg, Virginia
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RE: "aircrew cooperation" — again, not true:
Watch the scenes after minute-46 of "United 93" and Control+F the 9/11 Commission report for "cockpit," "door," and "jammed themselves into"—the hijackers didn't need rely on aircrew cooperation—they simply waited for the pilots to routinely unlock and open the doors. Once the hijackers were inside the cockpit, the pilots were 100% defeated. The pilots were then killed because had they been allowed in the back of the jet, they would have convinced the dozens of passengers to overpower the 2-3 "muscle hijackers"—protecting the two "hijacker pilots"—and retake the jet and land safely.
This was the exact same plot (July 26, 2003 DHS warning memorandum) that I got fired for and which the Supreme Court cited in its decision rejecting the TSA's appeal of my two lower appellate court decisions. TSA's Freedom Of Information Act responses—withheld for 6 years—prove it.
Merry Christmas to you too!
Last edited by MacLeanBarrier; Dec 25, 2018 at 6:19 pm
Dec 25, 2018, 6:27 pm
#117
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Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 28,129
There will won't be a need to use a larger amount of synthetic opioid on all of the passengers when you only need a lesser amount to simply throw at and unconscious the pilots—and then take control of the aircraft.
There are relatively cheap measures to fix this within days, but instead, TSA is going full speed ahead to blow hundreds of millions of dollars on computed tomography (CT) machines in a myth that a suicidal passenger thinks he can hijack a 150+ passenger jet with a firearm—a big hunk of metal—and a mazagine of 19 rounds—powder residue. Meanwhile, we allow unscreened minimum-wage airport workers the ability to avoid law enforcement surprise "open and look" checks in which they can now plant explosives and be out of the country before someone realizes they didn’t show up for their next shift.
This is why TSA obsessively posts social media photos of firearms—guns accidentally left by forgetful passengers with lawful permits to carry-conceal them.
Then there's the problem of greedy unbeknownst airport workers—"mules"—who think they're just harmlessly sneaking a package of drugs:
46 people indicted in drug-smuggling bust at Dallas-Fort Worth airport
A CT machine operator is more than likely to miss a suicidal passenger trying to smuggle a hidden explosive—"a needle in a hackstack."
We have a Billion-dollar a year air marshal program 95% focused on an operational response to perfectly shoot a suidical attacker diving into an unlocked cockpit...
We need to focus more on potential unwittingly or homicidal airport workers rather than treating all passengers as suicidal threats.
There are relatively cheap measures to fix this within days, but instead, TSA is going full speed ahead to blow hundreds of millions of dollars on computed tomography (CT) machines in a myth that a suicidal passenger thinks he can hijack a 150+ passenger jet with a firearm—a big hunk of metal—and a mazagine of 19 rounds—powder residue. Meanwhile, we allow unscreened minimum-wage airport workers the ability to avoid law enforcement surprise "open and look" checks in which they can now plant explosives and be out of the country before someone realizes they didn’t show up for their next shift.
This is why TSA obsessively posts social media photos of firearms—guns accidentally left by forgetful passengers with lawful permits to carry-conceal them.
Then there's the problem of greedy unbeknownst airport workers—"mules"—who think they're just harmlessly sneaking a package of drugs:
46 people indicted in drug-smuggling bust at Dallas-Fort Worth airport
A CT machine operator is more than likely to miss a suicidal passenger trying to smuggle a hidden explosive—"a needle in a hackstack."
We have a Billion-dollar a year air marshal program 95% focused on an operational response to perfectly shoot a suidical attacker diving into an unlocked cockpit...
We need to focus more on potential unwittingly or homicidal airport workers rather than treating all passengers as suicidal threats.
i share your concerns over unscreened airport workers and believe TSA's security solutions miss the boat on many fronts. However, I think your aerosol drug scenario is pretty far fetched. What you think is an inexpensive quick fix is anything but. Seems like it would be more productive to find ways to stop this attack vector before it makes it to the aircraft.
Last edited by Boggie Dog; Dec 25, 2018 at 6:33 pm
Dec 25, 2018, 6:46 pm
#118
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RE: synthetic opioid attacks >>> The TSA Law Enforcement / Federal Air Marshal Service (LE/FAMS) Washington Field Office Focus Group, the national LE/FAMS Advisory Group, the TSA Sensitive Security Information Program, and the U.S. Office of Special Counsel all concurred that this threat was real and substantive.
Dec 25, 2018, 6:53 pm
#119
Join Date: Nov 2010
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And my point still stands - no security procedure or equipment stopped either bomber from boarding the aircraft with an explosive device or attempting detonation.
RE: "aircrew cooperation" — again, not true:
Watch the scenes after minute-46 of "United 93" and Control+F the 9/11 Commission report for "cockpit," "door," and "jammed themselves into"—the hijackers didn't need rely on aircrew cooperation—they simply waited for the pilots to routinely unlock and open the doors. Once the hijackers were inside the cockpit, the pilots were 100% defeated. The pilots were then killed because had they been allowed in the back of the jet, they would have convinced the dozens of passengers to overpower the 2-3 "muscle hijackers"—protecting the two "hijacker pilots"—and retake the jet and land safely.
This was the exact same plot (July 26, 2003 DHS warning memorandum) that I got fired for and which the Supreme Court cited in its decision rejecting the TSA's appeal of my two lower appellate court decisions. TSA's Freedom Of Information Act responses—withheld for 6 years—prove it.
Merry Christmas to you too!
Watch the scenes after minute-46 of "United 93" and Control+F the 9/11 Commission report for "cockpit," "door," and "jammed themselves into"—the hijackers didn't need rely on aircrew cooperation—they simply waited for the pilots to routinely unlock and open the doors. Once the hijackers were inside the cockpit, the pilots were 100% defeated. The pilots were then killed because had they been allowed in the back of the jet, they would have convinced the dozens of passengers to overpower the 2-3 "muscle hijackers"—protecting the two "hijacker pilots"—and retake the jet and land safely.
This was the exact same plot (July 26, 2003 DHS warning memorandum) that I got fired for and which the Supreme Court cited in its decision rejecting the TSA's appeal of my two lower appellate court decisions. TSA's Freedom Of Information Act responses—withheld for 6 years—prove it.
Merry Christmas to you too!
In point of fact, killing the pilots would have been counterproductive to the hijackers, since the flight crew would have been trained to keep the passengers calm and discourage any physical action against the hijackers. Most likely the pilots - and at least one flight attendant, if I recall - were murdered as a show of force, to terrify the passengers into immediate compliance. There was no need to keep the passengers calm or controlled for more than a couple of hours, since the planes were going to be crashed anyway. The only reason United 93's passengers tried to fight back was that they were in sporadic contact with the ground via air phones, and knew they had nothing to lose by trying to retake the plane.
Dec 25, 2018, 7:15 pm
#120
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Fox News:
"There is a new crackdown on powder substances in carry-on bags...a TSA official tells me they're worried about...fentanyl...making [its] way on board...to hurt passengers and the flight crew"
USA Today:
"TSA is also concerned about fentanyl"
https://www.usatoday.com/story/trave...ags/715386002/
Last edited by MacLeanBarrier; Dec 25, 2018 at 7:38 pm