Boggie Dog

Re: Synthetic Opioid Attacks >>> I'll risk it!

Boggie Dog

If a TSA screener should accidentally find fentanyl they would most likely expose themselves and the entire checkpoint because they tend to open things trying to determine if it is a prohibited item. With about 2 million travelers per day in the U.S., with this threat vector not being used, tells me that pouring a lot of money into this possible threat is not needed. I think a better use of funds would be screening airport workers going on and off the clock.

WillCAD

Wait, I thought we were discussing aerosolized carfentanyl, not powdered fentanyl. Once again, you're going even FURTHER afield by bringing up powder-based threats, which are, for all practical intents and purposes, impossible to deliver selectively to the pilots due to the existing barriers, and are far less effective because they are harder to dose by sheer inhalation than an aerosolized substance.

The threat you're using to justify your new barrier is simply not likely enough to warrant the expense and imposition on travelers (and the industry) that you're advocating. You keep digging into the what-if realm, but the further you dig, the more your threat becomes like a Rube Goldberg machine of if-then-if-then-if-then. You've got to admit, the more complex and multi-step a plan of attack is, the more easily it fails if any one step, participant, or component fails or is countered. The more complex your theoretical opiod attacks become, the easier they are thwarted by security and safety measures that are already in place.

Even 9/11, one of the most successful aviation-based terrorist attacks in history, was only successful because of its basic simplicity, nearly failed several times along the way, and was only 75% successful due to timing and the element of chance; United 93 pax learned of what was happening via airphones, which the hijackers had failed to plan for, and successfully thwarted the attack, albeit at the cost of their own lives.

I'm not saying there is zero risk. But zero risk is simply impossible to achieve, and throwing billions of dollars and millions of hours at every theoretical risk is simply not sustainable, and in fact increases the danger, because spreading resources around to address every conceivable potential threat leaves those resources thinner at the points of most likely penetration.

US aviation security resources are better spent on improving the cognitive capabilities of the rank and file TSOs with better training, more consistent practices, improved efficiency, and most of all, narrowed focus on the most likely and possible threat vectors instead of wasting time searching for water bottles, cupcakes, lightsabers, and apple pies. And additional physical security barriers on the aircraft themselves are simply not needed at this time, no matter how many Escher-inspired, Mobius strip threat matrices you might see that claim the contrary.

TWA884

Folks,

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TWA884
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MacLeanBarrier

From the Merriam-Webster dictionary:

"definition of aerosol (noun) 1: a suspension of fine solid or liquid particles in gas"

WillCAD

Okay, then - so you're saying that the danger is that Bad Actor will bring powdered opiods through security, mix them up in a Deer Park bottle he gets at Hudson News, then somehow pressurize that, then spray the resulting mixture in an aircraft cabin in sufficient quantities to adversely affect the pilots in the cockpit - either by saturating the cabin to the point that the concoction travels through the aircraft ventilation system or by somehow - SOMEHOW - standing outside the locked flight deck and feeding the concoction directly into the flight deck through that locked door, while donning a gas mask of his own that he brought through security unmolested to protect himself from the opiods, or administering a dose of NARCAN and hoping really, really hard that the side effects are not so debilitating that he can't complete the mission once the pilots are out of commission.

And somehow - SOMEHOW - neither the other pax nor the FAs nor the pilots notice a passenger dispersing some unknown substance into the air in time to stop him and have the pilots go on oxygen and declare an emergency.

Okay, I think I get it. And I think you better buy a really long set of tongs, because you're REALLY reaching here. This scenario just gets further and further into the ridiculous with every layer you pile on. I'll say it again - this is a solution in search of a problem. Existing safeguards are sufficient to combat this theoretical, Hollywood-esque, ludicrous threat vector, and millions of additional dollars in equipment, medication, and training for flight crews is simply not needed.

MacLeanBarrier

Unnecessary. Donning a disposable respirator and having his own NARCAN doses, the bad actor just throws a baby powder container full of fentanyl or carfentanil at the cockpit when the pilots unlock and open it to switch out with the flight attendants, sleep, eat, and/or use the lavatory throughout the flight.

Here's a photo posted on the U.S. Department of Justice / Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) official website showing a lethal dose of fentanyl, 2 milligrams:

https://www.dea.gov/galleries/drug-images/fentanyl

Here is a recent DEA press release stating that carfentanil is 100 times more potent than fentanyl--so a lethal dose of it cannot be seen with the naked eye:

https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2018/05/11/first-dea-seizure-carfentanil-new-york-acts-public-service-announcement

Last year in Canada, Maisum Ansari was arrested with 33 firearms, and enough carfentanil to kill tens of millions of people. The case has since been declassified by Canadian law enforcement and reported in these 2018 articles--Toronto Sun:https://torontosun.com/news/local-news/danforth-killer-twisted-trail-that-led-to-deadly-rampage

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation:https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toron...ords-1.4764742

Here's a CBS News article about how easy it is to obtain using the dark web and purchasing with cryptocurrency. It's being mass-manufactured in China and Mexico due to being highly addictive thus exceptionally profitable--unlike nerve agents like A-234, RICIN, or VX that simply kills people without a high so there's little to no incentive to make it because the end-user is no longer alive to buy more:

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/opioid-fentanyl-darknet-drugs-fbi/

A Nebraska highway patrol officer pulled over a vehicle that had enough fentanyl to kill 26 million people:

https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/25/health/nebraska-fentanyl-bust/index.html

Again, you are also arguing against a former CIA chief, a former DHS undersecretary, and the TSA's own June warnings provided to the media.


U.S. Department of Justice / Drug Enforcement Administration: "2 milligrams of fentanyl, a lethal dose in most people"

Boggie Dog

If a lethal does of carfentanil is so small as to be invisible to the naked eye the barrier is going to have to be completed sealed around the edges. I can see that failing in a matter of weeks on an airplane that has many cycles each week. Also, I cannot envision exactly how this barrier would be installed to give both a security screen and an air barrier between the cabin and cockpit. Interdiction is going to have to take place before a bad guy gets to the aircraft.

WillCAD

Vewy scawy.

But so small a lethal dose can not only be inhaled, it can also be absorbed through the eyes and other mucus membranes, so I guess Bad Actor will need to pack some swim goggles along with his respirator, dose of NARCAN, and baby powder container full of fentanyl in order to survive his own attack. And pray, pray, pray that he has no open wounds through which the fatal dose could be absorbed, and hope beyond hope that such a lethal substance isn't accidentally released prior to the attack, and that his respirator is fine enough to filter out the weapon he's using.

The greater the lethality of the weapon, the more chance that Bad Actor himself, or one of his compatriots, will accidentally send themselves on an all-expense-paid cruise down the River Styx.

And of course, despite the generally low opinion of TSAs competence that prevails here in TS&S, we must admit that anyone bringing a baby powder container through security has a fair chance of a TSO opening it up and looking into it, which brings up the very real possibility of the chemical weapon being accidentally released at the checkpoint instead of inside an aircraft.

Again I reiterate - this particular threat is far too iffy, maybe, far-fetched, Rube Goldberg, house-of-cards, Jenga chancy to be worried about, at least not to the tune of millions of dollars in physical changes, perishable medications, and flight crew training needed to MAYBE prevent it.

Such resources would be far better expended on improvements in rank and file TSO training, streamlined procedures, and better consistency and reliability.

And again I ask:

MacLeanBarrier

​​​​​​That's why you need to use a mobile secondary barrier system: If it breaks, the captain radioes ahead, and a new one is in the jetway ready to swap out--no downtime for the jet.

There's a very good reason why you don't have FULL kitchens in jets.

WillCAD

But a mobile secondary barrier doesn't seal the forward galley against Bad Actor tossing a baby powder container of carfentanyl into the flight deck when a pilot exits for a lav break, so I guess you're advocating either a secondary physical barrier to prevent Bad Actor from storming the flight deck, OR an entirely new airtight secondary barrier that will prevent both entry and chemical attacks, right? Or am I getting confused?

Boggie Dog

I don't know about anyone else but I am certainly confused. A physical security barrier that prevents movement of an aerosol vapor from passing through, one that doesn't require a complete redesign of the forward cabin area, can be deployed in seconds, and will not present a safety issue by blocking the two forward emergency exits. A design that must be adapted to every make and model of aircraft used in commercial passenger service and be approved by the FAA.

Maybe I'm not the only one who is a bit confused.

WillCAD

Maybe an airbag would work. Mount it to the outside of the flight deck door and when it auto-inflates, it'll fill the forward galley and form an airtight seal that prevents air from moving into the flight deck.

Wait, that won't work. The air system in the flight deck is not isolated from the main cabin, so even an airtight seal won't prevent a chemical weapon from penetrating the flight deck. Also an airbag would block access from the flight deck to the lav, so it would only be good in emergencies, such as when Bad Actor throws his J&J container into the flight deck after the door is open...

Argh, all of these potential theoretical threat scenarios are giving me a headache. Let's just hermetically seal the flight deck and give the pilots diapers and IV NARCAN for the duration of each flight.

Boggie Dog

And a Mr. Coffee!

Xyzzy

This entire thread is so patently absurd. But I'm glad we have it - so we knw about some of the crap that is being trotted out by charlatans in the hopes that they can get ahold of some of our tax (and airport fee) dollars.