Boggie Dog

Having a clearance doesn't necessarily indicate a Need To Know.

MacLeanBarrier

So if the flying armed Federal Air Marshals (FAM)--with TOP SECRET security clearances--do not have "a need to know" about their capabilities of stopping an attack on an unlocked cockpit, then who does have the need to read such a report marked as UNCLASSIFIED Sensitive Security Information (SSI)?

Boggie Dog

You know as well as I that release of any such information is made at a higher level than field employees. You might disagree with their decision but that's how it works. Having a clearance doesn't mean squat nor impresses anyone. 1,000's of people have or have had such clearances.

WillCAD

Ooh... out of context quotes specifically edited to say something different than their original meaning! I love it!

For the record, the parts that do not make sense are:
1) You're quoting the part of the report that talks about what the hijackers discussed while planning the attack in December 1999 - almost two years before the attack - not what they actually DID during the attack.
2) You're quoting the report incompletely and editing the sentences to substantially change the meaning.
3) You're quoting supposition from someone who wasn't actually there as if it were solid facts and using that to justify your argument (Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney were FA's in Coach on American 11; they did not actually see the hijacking nor how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit, but Ong heroically called the AA reservations center via airphone to report the hijacking and stayed on the phone for 25 minutes, calmly reporting what she could see and hear, which wasn't much because she was in Coach).

The full paragraph you mis-quoted from page 5 actually reads (bolding is strictly mine):

Xyzzy

Have you actually seen this? No. All you have are "reports". I've been on hundreds of flights and on each and every one of them the crew keeps passengers seated and away from the cart. But suffice it t say that the rules of engagement have changed considerably in the last 17+ years.

Boggie Dog

I wasn't aware that beverage carts were positioned to block the aisle pre-9/11. I guess the Flight Attendants weren't Ninjas then either. Must have been a heck of a training program getting all of those Flight Attendants up to Ninja status so quickly.

MacLeanBarrier

You said it yourself, everything on 9/11 was "speculative."

9/11 Commission Report — page 158:

Page 5:

https://youtu.be/Yu8ByQPhryc​​​​​​​

Wrong again...

https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/12/polit...-ig/index.html

nancypants

Boggie Dog

Think you are dead on. This discussion seems to have reach it's "BEST BY DATE".

cestmoi123

OK, two questions:

1. It's been over 17 years since 9/11. If this risk was so significant, why is there no evidence of anybody actually successfully using the "go over the drink cart while the cockpit door is open" approach to take down a plane in that time?
2. How much would this solution cost on a per flight basis (including installation and maintenance)? Even if we assume that (a) all four of the flights you cited above were actually brought down by hijackers who forced their way into the cockpit (in spite of the lack of evidence for any, and the strong evidence to the contrary for some), and (b) that this barrier would have prevented every one of those attacks, that would mean that the risk of a terrorist crashing a flight without a barrier is roughly 1 in 150 million. Assuming a $1B cost for a crashed plane (150 pax at $6M each, plus $100M for the plane), that would mean that the value per flight was around $7 (1000/150). This is a very generous number, given the very favorable assumptions of (a) and (b).

MacLeanBarrier

Nice attempt to throw shade. The 9/11 Report was poorly cooked by too many cooks in the kitchen. Page 158 was the best part of the meal.

Explain why TSA withheld--for 6 years--from the public's view the fact that in July 2003 al Qaeda plotted to again wait for the cockpit doors to unlock "shortly after takeoff" 4 months after the FAA publicly announced that the doors were now bullet and drink-cart proof?

Oh, are you going to invoke the tired old "they would taken hostages and coerce the pilots to voluntarily unlock the doors"? Beat you to it. If you're so worried about "dumb pilots" unlocking the doors because some idiot was dumb enough to sneak passed a gountlet of security a large hunk of steel and bullets--how about riveting this placard on the inside of every cockpit door:

"REMEMBER 9/11. DO NOT UNLOCK THIS DOOR IF YOU ARE UNDER DURESS DUE TO KILLERS BEHIND IT. SOME MAY DIE, BUT UNLOCKING IT WILL KILL YOU, EVERYONE IN THE CABIN, AND PEOPLE ON THE GROUND. EMERGENCY LAND RIGHT NOW."

Here's the DHS July 26, 2003 warning hidden from view for 6 years. But you all are OK with this, the 2011 RTCA, and 2017 USDOT-OIG reports--about lack of cockpit secondary barriers--being hidden. Again, "a piece of metal is a secret" and you all swallow it whole--"Thanks FAA and TSA, we trust you. We're so grateful for your genius: You keep guns from making the pilots scared and allowing the bad people into the cockpit"...

http://nebula.wsimg.com/8a826f0d4bf5...&alloworigin=1

cestmoi123

Did you actually read the document you FOIA'd? The interest in attacking "shortly after takeoff or shortly before landing" was so they wouldn't need to fly the planes long distances to get them to their targets, eliminating the need for flight-trained attackers. Also, the report them states that no equipment or operatives were known to have been deployed to conduct the operations.

At the end of the day, whether or not the TSA should have released this information earlier, the fact remains that these attacks didn't actually happen, even though there weren't the barriers you seem to think are so critical. If you think this goal is so important, I assume you'll put any patents in the public domain, in order to make it as easy and low-cost as possible for your barrier system to be installed. Right?

MacLeanBarrier

Elephant in the room: So explain to us how the hijackers were going to get the doors opened knowing that all of them were now impenetrable.

Boggie Dog

After the lessons learned from 9/11 I believe a hijacking attempt is a very remote probability. Could it happen, perhaps, but it would be much more difficult now. 9/11 was unique in that the hijackers had no demands of a political nature, all they wanted to do was take airplanes and use them as guided missiles, which they successfully accomplished with 3 of the 4 hijacked aircraft. The fourth aircraft crashed, but we know that the passengers and some crew fought back to overcome the hijackers, which is what will happen in all future hijacking attempts.

Where I think the threat lies today is just simple destruction of an aircraft while in flight. This would most easily be accomplished by a explosive device being loaded aboard the aircraft as baggage/cargo by an airport worker. TSA has steadfastly refused to deploy 100% screening of airport workers providing opportunity to introduce any manner of contraband.

Fighting last decades battle while new threats are evident seems a waste of resources. Cockpit barriers are a solution to an very unlikely problem while the real security threat goes unanswered.

cestmoi123

Coercion, maybe they thought they could breach the door? Nothing in this document points to trying to rush the cockpit while the door is open as clearly their chosen attack vector.

Again, if you think there's this big vulnerability that terrorists have known about for at least 15 years, why hasn't it been exploited? Also, no response to my question about patents. A cynical person might wonder if your professed concern about cockpit security was a driven by your interest in selling a solution to that perceived problem, rather than the other way around.