Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Sep 7, 2019, 9:37 am
#3196
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
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Posts: 645
A stall warning is not a stall, it's what happens before a stall. It's possible to maintain the conditions where the stall warning is active without the aircraft stalling. The fact that you're "still here to talk about it" doesn't mean anything except that the airplane didn't stall. There is no way to know whether that's because MCAS intervened or because the pilots just did not push the envelope far enough and / or long enough to ultimately cause a stall.
Sep 7, 2019, 12:23 pm
#3197
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If pilots ignore a legitimate stall warning, the consequences could be tragic.
A stall warning is not a stall, it's what happens before a stall. It's possible to maintain the conditions where the stall warning is active without the aircraft stalling. The fact that you're "still here to talk about it" doesn't mean anything except that the airplane didn't stall. There is no way to know whether that's because MCAS intervened or because the pilots just did not push the envelope far enough and / or long enough to ultimately cause a stall.
A stall warning is not a stall, it's what happens before a stall. It's possible to maintain the conditions where the stall warning is active without the aircraft stalling. The fact that you're "still here to talk about it" doesn't mean anything except that the airplane didn't stall. There is no way to know whether that's because MCAS intervened or because the pilots just did not push the envelope far enough and / or long enough to ultimately cause a stall.
But you literally said "There would be a stall warning anyway, at which point any competent pilot would take action to prevent the stall."
My pilots did not take action. Just inaction. They kept the plane at the same attitude for quite a while, the whole time the stall warning was audible in 1D.
Sep 7, 2019, 1:04 pm
#3198
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC E50K
Posts: 132
Sep 7, 2019, 1:27 pm
#3199
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
It was an E90, so I can guarantee MCAS didn't intervene.
But you literally said "There would be a stall warning anyway, at which point any competent pilot would take action to prevent the stall."
My pilots did not take action. Just inaction. They kept the plane at the same attitude for quite a while, the whole time the stall warning was audible in 1D.
But you literally said "There would be a stall warning anyway, at which point any competent pilot would take action to prevent the stall."
My pilots did not take action. Just inaction. They kept the plane at the same attitude for quite a while, the whole time the stall warning was audible in 1D.
If you're going to parse every single word that I post, then parse every single word. A stall warning is issued before a stall occurs, otherwise it would not be a very useful warning. Pilots are trained to use the audible stall warning, in addition to the stick-shaker, other instruments and the feel of the controls in order to keep the aircraft from departing from controlled flight. An aircraft could be in the stall warning part of the flight envelope without entering the stall regime for the entire climb-out. I'm not a pilot, so I have no opinion on the actions of the pilots in your case. However, since you are here to tell us about this incident, the aircraft obviously did not stall, so the pilots obviously kept the aircraft out of the stall regime. I think you already know what a stall warning means, in which case, your post is rather disingenuous.
Sep 7, 2019, 3:21 pm
#3200
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Since this thread is about the MAX, the fact that the incident occurred on an E90, not a MAX, is not a minor detail.
If you're going to parse every single word that I post, then parse every single word. A stall warning is issued before a stall occurs, otherwise it would not be a very useful warning. Pilots are trained to use the audible stall warning, in addition to the stick-shaker, other instruments and the feel of the controls in order to keep the aircraft from departing from controlled flight. An aircraft could be in the stall warning part of the flight envelope without entering the stall regime for the entire climb-out. I'm not a pilot, so I have no opinion on the actions of the pilots in your case. However, since you are here to tell us about this incident, the aircraft obviously did not stall, so the pilots obviously kept the aircraft out of the stall regime. I think you already know what a stall warning means, in which case, your post is rather disingenuous.
If you're going to parse every single word that I post, then parse every single word. A stall warning is issued before a stall occurs, otherwise it would not be a very useful warning. Pilots are trained to use the audible stall warning, in addition to the stick-shaker, other instruments and the feel of the controls in order to keep the aircraft from departing from controlled flight. An aircraft could be in the stall warning part of the flight envelope without entering the stall regime for the entire climb-out. I'm not a pilot, so I have no opinion on the actions of the pilots in your case. However, since you are here to tell us about this incident, the aircraft obviously did not stall, so the pilots obviously kept the aircraft out of the stall regime. I think you already know what a stall warning means, in which case, your post is rather disingenuous.
That is what you said. My competent pilots did not take action, unless "keep doing what we're doing" (i.e. inaction) is an "action".
There are many ways to handle situations, and they don't all require taking action.
Sep 7, 2019, 8:31 pm
#3201
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tcook052
Ac forum mod.
Sep 8, 2019, 1:29 am
#3202
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Posts: 23,808
While obviously EASA may have a political agenda, it's a bit too easy to dismiss anything on that basis. Surely EASA does not want to kill the cross-licencing agreements alltogether, so they do have to be careful. In addition I have not heard anyone questioning their statement, not even Boeing which previously argued the opposite but now seems to stay very quiet about this. Anyway, between the EASA even with political motivations, and an anonymous poster, who wins on credibility?
The MCAS as you admit "lowering the force required by the pilot on the yolk" by changing the trim is precisely doing the same as the MCAS counterbalancing the torque due to lift on more forward placed engines, which the pilot cannot do without resorting to a change of trim either. Which is needed to avoid the angle of attack moving into stall territory. Not sure what being "stall prone" means. There are many ways to end up in a stall, and the one under discussion and admittedly may not be the most usual. Bottom line remaining that having to change the trim to avoid stalling is sort of counterintuitive. BTW, not sure how the last sentence about ignoring stall warnings, more or less a motherhood thing, follows on what came earlier. To me these things look like orthogonal to each other.
The article linked by The Lev has graphs that show the difference in flying characteristics with and without MCAS. It also has a graph that shows what the characteristics would look like if the MAX was stall prone, which it is not. It's not spin to say MCAS is not for stall prevention.If pilots ignore stall warnings, the outcome could be catastrophic.
Sep 8, 2019, 9:57 am
#3203
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
While obviously EASA may have a political agenda, it's a bit too easy to dismiss anything on that basis. Surely EASA does not want to kill the cross-licencing agreements alltogether, so they do have to be careful. In addition I have not heard anyone questioning their statement, not even Boeing which previously argued the opposite but now seems to stay very quiet about this. Anyway, between the EASA even with political motivations, and an anonymous poster, who wins on credibility?The MCAS as you admit "lowering the force required by the pilot on the yolk" by changing the trim is precisely doing the same as the MCAS counterbalancing the torque due to lift on more forward placed engines, which the pilot cannot do without resorting to a change of trim either. Which is needed to avoid the angle of attack moving into stall territory. Not sure what being "stall prone" means. There are many ways to end up in a stall, and the one under discussion and admittedly may not be the most usual. Bottom line remaining that having to change the trim to avoid stalling is sort of counterintuitive. BTW, not sure how the last sentence about ignoring stall warnings, more or less a motherhood thing, follows on what came earlier. To me these things look like orthogonal to each other.
With regards to your comment about MCAS, I read it several times. If you're trying to make a point, I have no idea what it is.
Sep 8, 2019, 10:08 am
#3204
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Posts: 23,808
You say you have not heard anyone questioning the EASA statement. If this surprises you, it shouldn't. What EASA is proposing is a break from a way of working that could have significant long-term ramifications to the industry. I really doubt FAA would want to engage in a public debate about this, much less Boeing. I have come across a few articles that express disagreement with what EASA is proposing. Here is one: IATA: Multiple “Recertification” Efforts Concerning
So what? The entirety of that discussion deals with the fundamental issue of cross-certification, a pandora box which clearly the EASA and possibly/probably other authorities are touching upon, but probably would rather like ultimately to be closed again, which might depend upon the direction the FAA goes. That is discussion is not really about EASA calling the MCAS an anti-stall device. It is perfectly possible to disagree on the latter without getting involved in the former issue.
With regards to your comment about MCAS, I read it several times. If you're trying to make a point, I have no idea what it is.
I rest my case then.
Sep 8, 2019, 10:09 am
#3205
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
And here's another article: Aviation CEOs warn of U.S.-Europe split on Boeing Max return
Sep 9, 2019, 5:53 pm
#3206
Join Date: May 2015
Location: Vancouver
Programs: Aeroplan, Mileage Plus, WestJet Gold, AMEX Plat
Posts: 2,026
And here's another article: Aviation CEOs warn of U.S.-Europe split on Boeing Max return
The level of confidence that the US public has in an aircraft that is approved by the FAA but not the Europeans or Canadians is an open question.
Sep 9, 2019, 6:18 pm
#3207
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
Posts: 4,570
I overheard an AC FA just Sunday saying the MAX was on her won't-fly list "even before".
I don't know if the other carriers have chosen as poor a layout as AC did, but if it's even close, it's not an anyone friendly beast. Even before the murdering.
Sep 9, 2019, 7:03 pm
#3208
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
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Posts: 645
What is interesting is the article discusses three regulators, Europe, Canada and the US. We could potentially encounter the case where the FAA clears the aircraft however for a time it is not able to fly into Canadian airspace. Operationally that would be problematic for a host of domestic US routes. European airspace is a bit lower impact on an early entry to service in the US.
The level of confidence that the US public has in an aircraft that is approved by the FAA but not the Europeans or Canadians is an open question.
The level of confidence that the US public has in an aircraft that is approved by the FAA but not the Europeans or Canadians is an open question.
Sep 9, 2019, 8:32 pm
#3209
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It would be interesting to know if EASA blindsided FAA by making the announcement or whether the announcement was made after discussion and disagreement about the steps required to clear the MAX to return to service. By setting their own requirements, EASA is setting themselves up for the FAA to do the same for future Airbus aircraft. IMO, it would have been better for EASA to work with FAA, not unilaterally impose their own requirements for certification. That said, since EASA has taken this approach, I hope FAA clears the MAX on their timeline, not waiting for EASA.
In one of the Transport Canada press conferences they said they were in agreement with the FAA until the satellite tracking data showed a similar flight pattern to the previous crash and then they made the determination there is a systematic problem and grounded it. Ottawa and Washington is in the same time zone and the provides the ability for slightly better co-ordination when reaching that decision.
EASA being based out of Europe you would expect their decision making process to have everyone who needs to be in the room to make the decision happening several hours before the FAA.
Sep 10, 2019, 12:31 am
#3210
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The EASA told the FAA what steps were needed for it's approval of return to flight in a letter of April1, so the FAA shouldn't have been "blindsided". The FAA and Boeing has known the EASA's position for a long time.