Newman55

emcampbe

JimInOhio

This rubber stamp stuff is wrong, IMHO. Might there have been mistakes in the certification process? Possibly and we'll find out in due time. But to single out the FAA for this line of thinking ignores the certification of the A320 and the AF296 airshow crash. I doubt that was any kind of conspiracy, either, but simply highlights that you can't always think of absolutely everything when developing something new.

mozilla

It's impossible to say anything conclusively as long as the final investigation reports haven't been published. I'm mainly going on the fact that a very similar issue was seemingly remedied in an earlier flight on one of the involved airplanes, suggesting that there was a safety net. Why it wasn't applied in the subsequent flight is a question the investigators will hopefully solve. As is the question of why there were no pilot reports of the earlier incidents at the time - IIRC those reports were only made after the fatal incident. That could have resulted in the aircraft being pulled from service, another safety net that seemingly wasn't used. Not suggesting those pilots made a mistake, if there was a company culture preventing them from doing so, the company culture is the issue.

Then again, I'm not saying that you're wrong, it's definitely possible you're right and that there was no safety net, we'll have to await the final reports.

VegasGambler

Because there is no conspiracy, by the definition of "conspiracy". No one is conspiring. It's just that the FAA is not fulfilling their stated purpose.

This is not uncommon in government. If a lobbyist directs large campaign contributions and as a result is able to get legislation passed that benefits the industry represented by the lobby (rather than benfiting the people), that is not conspiracy. It happens out in the open on a daily basis. It's not even technically corruption (in the legal sense). It's just a government that does not properly represent the people.

There is a difference between an agency that is ineffective, and conspiracy. Actual conspiracy is rare. Incompetence is abundant.

spin88

Billions, if not tens of Billions of dollars are at issue. That kind of $$$ bends all kinds of things. No need for a "conspiracy" theory.

Boeing pushed the MAX as being just like a NG, telling airlines that they would not have to do anything but two hours of training on an iPad. The simulator was not even developed when the MAX stated flying, turns out the simulator for the MAX can't even replicate the conditions faced by these two crews. Boeing sold literally hundreds of billions. Let me repeat that, Boeing sold hundreds of Billions in aircraft based upon the representation that the MAX was just like an NG, with common pilot training.

The MCAS system - with its one sensor, and disconnected AoA disagree indicator - was the key to that "common" type certification. Two crashes later, the FAA said "all is fine, don't worry" as the rest of the world said the MAX was grounded.

Fast forward 6 months, each month the MAX is grounded is probably costing Boeing $1 Billion+. Boeing and the FAA are saying "oh, lets get flying, another two hours on an iPad, all is great!" Happy days are hear again.

Not a lot of "conspiracy" needed. If the FAA says that given the MAX's very clearly different handling characteristics, substantial simulator training is required before flying it, and that pilots must understand the differences in the aircraft, it will not be flying for at least another 3-4 months (as Boeing updates its simulators and airlines install them) and Boeing will be out another $5 Billion+. And oh, moving forward this will kick the teeth out of Boeing's sales pitch to existing NG operators.

Boeing is not acting altruistically, when the FAA is taking a line directly contrary to what every pilots organization that I know of is taking, not hard so see something else but the "public interest" at play....

mduell

In these cases a single AOA sensor failure did not lead to an unavoidable crash; see the prior lionair flight for an example of the safety nets that existed. Pilots electric trim controls were available, and the pilot can cut out electric trim entirely. Both need to be done expediently.

I call BS. Neither the single sensor at a time behavior, nor the absence of an AoA disagree light, have anything to do with a common type cert. The common type cert still applies for those airlines who selected the AoA disagree light.

spin88

I call BS on a lack of understanding of grammar.... My statement was that the MCAS was the key to a common type certification, which is clearly was. The rest of the phrase (between the - -s) described some of the issues with that system, but w/o the MCAS system, no way the MAX was going to be certified with a common type rating.

BF263533

Lion Air third pilot in the cockpit MCAS problem solver "safety net" "done expediently." As noted on other boards no known MCAS failure survival with only two pilots.

clubord

jsloan

mduell

Which really points to the lack of MCAS failures, well below the 10^-5/hr requirement for a DAL C system.

BF263533

If these statements are true, then without MCAS there would have been handling issues that had had to be addressed to avoid future pilot complaints:

“ ‘The 737 Max just felt right in flight, giving us complete confidence that this airplane will meet our customers’ expectations,’ he said.

But a few weeks later, Mr. Wilson and his co-pilot began noticing that something was off, according to a person with direct knowledge of the flights. The Max wasn’t handling well when nearing stalls at low speeds.

In a meeting at Boeing Field in Seattle, Mr. Wilson told engineers that the issue would need to be fixed. He and his co-pilot proposed MCAS, the person said.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/b...sultPosition=4

mduell

That article has a number of inconsistencies with other available information. Low speed stall is handled by the stick shaker, not the purpose of MCAS. The quotes attributed to Mr Wilson are third hand hearsay. I'd take it with a grain of salt.

LarryJ

I've seen conflicting information on this and don't know if that is true, or not.

Certification requirements are such that as AoA increases, all else being equal, the control forces in pitch must also increase. i.e. the amount of nose-up elevator pressure required to maintain the higher AoA must increase. I do not know if the MAX without MCAS met that certification requirement. If it did not, then it could not be certified at all without MCAS.

To have a common type certification with the existing 737 NGs, the handling will characteristics would have to be meet the applicable standards for consistency. If not, they would have to be separate type ratings or a fix, such as MCAS, would be needed.

I've seen reports that assume it was only needed for the common qualification and others that suggest it was required either way. The reporting on such technical details has been poor. I have not been able to find a definitive answer.