Jan 4, 2021, 1:37 am
Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
READ BEFORE POSTING
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
B737MAX Recertification - Archive
May 31, 2019, 4:20 pm
#1576
Join Date: Jun 2016
Posts: 233
Clearly, some don't want to understand the issue and that's ok, but this forum isn't a therapist office. We're here to discuss issues and ignoring the facts isn't really a discussion.
May 31, 2019, 4:56 pm
#1577
Join Date: Feb 2008
Programs: 6 year GS, now 2MM Jeff-ugee, *wood LTPlt, SkyPeso PLT
Posts: 6,526
I don't understand why people that are concerned and may be driven by their feelings are given answers based on facts. IME that has never worked. That seems to be happening in this thread quite a bit. Do you really expect everyone to be an aerospace engineer or pilot and then to base their decision on whether to fly it or not on facts?
The basic issue with the MAX's design ought to be clear (too low to the ground, moving engines forward, caused increasing lift with climb, which is not a permissible aerodynamic response, and even if approved by regulators, would have required training, so Boeing put on the hidden MCAS system to mask the airplane's actual aerodynamic, and then did not tell anyone about it, that caused two accident event initiations, due to having a single malfunctioning sensor).The fix is also clear: tie a modified MCAS system, that overrides pilot input only once, to two sensors, provide some type of training.
However, what we have learned about the MAX has not exactly instilled confidence. E.g. Boeing claims it did not even know that the AoA sensor disagree warning no longer worked, and was now only working with an optional instrument package. Boeing is either telling the truth (and really sloppy) or lying to cover up a clearly ugly $$$ grab. Neither instill confidence.
The debate appears to be over whether a pilot should have had no issues preventing a crash, i.e. whether pilot error was at fault in part or whole, not MCAS.
It seems to me that there are two types of experts the "I know all, I would have prevent this crash" and people who have more of a "there but by the grace of god go I" approach. I've now talked to 6 pilots about this, the five commercial pilots (one 737, one A359, three A320) I talked about expressed not only serious alarm about the MAX, but indicated that they - particularly with the EK crash - saw little chance any pilot could have recovered. The sixth, a space scientist, who is the most careful guy I know, is just flabbergasted, and says he will not fly on the MAX period, thinking that any company that would come out with what he feels is a criminally negligent system MCAS did not make other short cuts.
As I noted above, I will avoid the MAX (because I prefer the Airbus, because Y is better, and because I hate the Barbey-sized bathrooms on the MAX, even in First) but would fly it, my assumption is that it will be safe. But I can certainly see people who have a different risk threshold than I do, there is no set of "facts" that can really address the safety of a plane like the MAX where Boeing and the FAA did so many things wrong.
May 31, 2019, 6:48 pm
#1578
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: DAY
Programs: UA 1K 1MM; Marriott LT Titanium; Amex MR; Chase UR; Hertz PC; Global Entry
Posts: 10,159
There does seem to be a bit of "blame the victim (Pilot)" in some of the discussion. Mostly a defense mechanism.
On a different topic, how are airlines (specifically United) structured when it comes to insurance coverage on the planes? I believe that most are leased, and the leasing company would require insurance against loss? I have always thought that if there was a valid concern about airworthiness, the insurance companies would step in and decline to cover...or establish criteria to mitigate the risk? Or are they too also relying on the FAA sign-off?
Or is United large enough that they basically self-insure against these types of loss?
On a different topic, how are airlines (specifically United) structured when it comes to insurance coverage on the planes? I believe that most are leased, and the leasing company would require insurance against loss? I have always thought that if there was a valid concern about airworthiness, the insurance companies would step in and decline to cover...or establish criteria to mitigate the risk? Or are they too also relying on the FAA sign-off?
Or is United large enough that they basically self-insure against these types of loss?
May 31, 2019, 7:49 pm
#1579
Join Date: Nov 2014
Location: USA
Programs: UA Gold, Marriott Gold
Posts: 1,195
No, it's not a defense mechanism. From the information made public so far, the pilots commanded the plane to the excessive speeds ad allowed the runaway trim to grow. All that occurred BEFORE the electrics were ra-activated. Something else may be wrong and the cockpit environment was clearly too confused but the falderal about the MAX being too low to the ground, engines too far forward, etc. is utter hogwash spewed repetitively to justify an emotional response.
I don't blame people for being afraid of a situation they don't understand but let's at least be consistent. Avoiding the MAX to flee to Airbus aircraft when the very thing you claim you fear about MCAS (overriding the pilot) is one of the central design philosophies distinguishing Airbus from prior Boeing aircraft? There is indeed a set of facts that addresses the safety of the MAX: the basic design has a 50+ year track record with outstanding safety. The runaway stab and excessive speed should have been controllable by the pilots before MCAS became a factor.
The first airline that crashed the MAX had a rather poor reputation to start. The second apparently has crashed 10% of their 737 inventory in as many years, had a previous anomaly on the very same plane the day before, and committed multiple errors on take-off that had nothing to do with the engine placement or MCAS software. I still have questions about the crash and so should you -- but you should also be questioning the basic safety of the maintenance and flight operations preceding activation of MCAS.
IF there's a defense mechanism at work here, it's blaming he aifcraft design to avoid questioning the wisdom of having FOs with low hundreds of hours of flight experience when the very time you NEED a second pilot is when you want one with some experience. It's claiming to b troubled by the safety of a design when the real reasons appear to be a preference for the seats and IFE in other models.
I don't blame people for being afraid of a situation they don't understand but let's at least be consistent. Avoiding the MAX to flee to Airbus aircraft when the very thing you claim you fear about MCAS (overriding the pilot) is one of the central design philosophies distinguishing Airbus from prior Boeing aircraft? There is indeed a set of facts that addresses the safety of the MAX: the basic design has a 50+ year track record with outstanding safety. The runaway stab and excessive speed should have been controllable by the pilots before MCAS became a factor.
The first airline that crashed the MAX had a rather poor reputation to start. The second apparently has crashed 10% of their 737 inventory in as many years, had a previous anomaly on the very same plane the day before, and committed multiple errors on take-off that had nothing to do with the engine placement or MCAS software. I still have questions about the crash and so should you -- but you should also be questioning the basic safety of the maintenance and flight operations preceding activation of MCAS.
IF there's a defense mechanism at work here, it's blaming he aifcraft design to avoid questioning the wisdom of having FOs with low hundreds of hours of flight experience when the very time you NEED a second pilot is when you want one with some experience. It's claiming to b troubled by the safety of a design when the real reasons appear to be a preference for the seats and IFE in other models.
May 31, 2019, 8:03 pm
#1580
Join Date: May 2013
Posts: 3,361
I think part of the problem is that the "facts" are not all facts.... The basic issue with the MAX's design ought to be clear (too low to the ground, moving engines forward, caused increasing lift with climb, which is not a permissible aerodynamic response, and even if approved by regulators, would have required training, so Boeing put on the hidden MCAS system to mask the airplane's actual aerodynamic, and then did not tell anyone about it, that caused two accident event initiations, due to having a single malfunctioning sensor).
The fix is also clear: tie a modified MCAS system, that overrides pilot input only once, to two sensors, provide some type of training.
However, what we have learned about the MAX has not exactly instilled confidence. E.g. Boeing claims it did not even know that the AoA sensor disagree warning no longer worked, and was now only working with an optional instrument package. Boeing is either telling the truth (and really sloppy) or lying to cover up a clearly ugly $$$ grab. Neither instill confidence.
The debate appears to be over whether a pilot should have had no issues preventing a crash, i.e. whether pilot error was at fault in part or whole, not MCAS.
It seems to me that there are two types of experts the "I know all, I would have prevent this crash" and people who have more of a "there but by the grace of god go I" approach. I've now talked to 6 pilots about this, the five commercial pilots (one 737, one A359, three A320) I talked about expressed not only serious alarm about the MAX, but indicated that they - particularly with the EK crash - saw little chance any pilot could have recovered. The sixth, a space scientist, who is the most careful guy I know, is just flabbergasted, and says he will not fly on the MAX period, thinking that any company that would come out with what he feels is a criminally negligent system MCAS did not make other short cuts.
As I noted above, I will avoid the MAX (because I prefer the Airbus, because Y is better, and because I hate the Barbey-sized bathrooms on the MAX, even in First) but would fly it, my assumption is that it will be safe. But I can certainly see people who have a different risk threshold than I do, there is no set of "facts" that can really address the safety of a plane like the MAX where Boeing and the FAA did so many things wrong.
The basic issue with the MAX's design ought to be clear (too low to the ground, moving engines forward, caused increasing lift with climb, which is not a permissible aerodynamic response, and even if approved by regulators, would have required training, so Boeing put on the hidden MCAS system to mask the airplane's actual aerodynamic, and then did not tell anyone about it, that caused two accident event initiations, due to having a single malfunctioning sensor).The fix is also clear: tie a modified MCAS system, that overrides pilot input only once, to two sensors, provide some type of training.
However, what we have learned about the MAX has not exactly instilled confidence. E.g. Boeing claims it did not even know that the AoA sensor disagree warning no longer worked, and was now only working with an optional instrument package. Boeing is either telling the truth (and really sloppy) or lying to cover up a clearly ugly $$$ grab. Neither instill confidence.
The debate appears to be over whether a pilot should have had no issues preventing a crash, i.e. whether pilot error was at fault in part or whole, not MCAS.
It seems to me that there are two types of experts the "I know all, I would have prevent this crash" and people who have more of a "there but by the grace of god go I" approach. I've now talked to 6 pilots about this, the five commercial pilots (one 737, one A359, three A320) I talked about expressed not only serious alarm about the MAX, but indicated that they - particularly with the EK crash - saw little chance any pilot could have recovered. The sixth, a space scientist, who is the most careful guy I know, is just flabbergasted, and says he will not fly on the MAX period, thinking that any company that would come out with what he feels is a criminally negligent system MCAS did not make other short cuts.
As I noted above, I will avoid the MAX (because I prefer the Airbus, because Y is better, and because I hate the Barbey-sized bathrooms on the MAX, even in First) but would fly it, my assumption is that it will be safe. But I can certainly see people who have a different risk threshold than I do, there is no set of "facts" that can really address the safety of a plane like the MAX where Boeing and the FAA did so many things wrong.
- Permissible aerodynamic responses and tolerance for certification.
- How MCAS masks the plane’s aerodynamics.
- How Boeing is engaged in money grab when the optional features referenced came at minimal cost.
For what it is worth, I’ve talked to more than double the number of pilots you claim to have spoken with and they all expressed full confidence in the MAX once the changes are implemented and training is completed. I guess I win.
May 31, 2019, 10:03 pm
#1581
Join Date: Jun 2016
Programs: UA 1K, National Executive Elite, Marriott Gold, Hertz President's Circle
Posts: 65
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/boei...ilots-say.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKCN1S40IA
May 31, 2019, 10:21 pm
#1582
Join Date: Feb 2008
Programs: 6 year GS, now 2MM Jeff-ugee, *wood LTPlt, SkyPeso PLT
Posts: 6,526
Neither of your anecdotes mean anything but in this case, it sounds like his are more in line with what the majority feel than yours.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/boei...ilots-say.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKCN1S40IA
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/boei...ilots-say.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKCN1S40IA
The reality is that there are a HUGE number of "pilots" (or if we are old school "binders of") who are not "wink wink" connected to the Hunter Keays of the world and have nothing to do with Boeing, or airline management, who are just rip roaring to get the MAX back in the air.... if only the pilot associations would just get out of the way...
Jun 1, 2019, 12:21 am
#1583
Join Date: Dec 2004
Posts: 2,866
Questions for Discussion
It is alleged on paper, MCAS was only supposed to move the horizontal stabilizer 0.6 degrees at a time. In reality, it could move the stabilizer as much as 2.5 degrees at a time, making it significantly more powerful when forcing the nose of the airplane down. If yes, was the FAA notified of this change?
Was MCAS activated by a single AOA sensor?
Was MCAS designed to repeatedly engage?
Would AOA disagree warning lights have notified pilots more quickly of a faulty AOA sensor?
Is the FAA examining the runaway stabilizer procedure for all 737 models?
On the 737-200, the engine & nacelle were round, & engine was long & thin, but because the aircraft was low to the ground, was the 737-300 designed to have a more oval shaped nacelle, because the 737 was too low to the ground?
On the 737 MAX because of the large size of the LEAP engines they had to be placed more forward & higher for ground clearance? If this is true, did it have any aerodynamic impact on the MAX?
Was MCAS activated by a single AOA sensor?
Was MCAS designed to repeatedly engage?
Would AOA disagree warning lights have notified pilots more quickly of a faulty AOA sensor?
Is the FAA examining the runaway stabilizer procedure for all 737 models?
On the 737-200, the engine & nacelle were round, & engine was long & thin, but because the aircraft was low to the ground, was the 737-300 designed to have a more oval shaped nacelle, because the 737 was too low to the ground?
On the 737 MAX because of the large size of the LEAP engines they had to be placed more forward & higher for ground clearance? If this is true, did it have any aerodynamic impact on the MAX?
Jun 1, 2019, 12:32 am
#1584
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: Austin, TX
Posts: 21,419
If you get rid of the a priori assumption that Boeing is corrupt, it’s possible that Boeing suggested this training, and that the FAA went along with it, because the plane is so similar to the 737NG that all that’s needed is supplemental training — which is exactly what’s been said from the beginning.
I understand that I’m not going to change your mind, and that’s fine. I just want everyone else reading the thread to understand that there are reasonable explanations for all of these things that you (and others) think are massive signs of some huge cover-up.
It’s possible that I’m wrong, and you’re right: but your POV basically assumes that Boeing is run by suicidal sociopaths. You’re making the company (or, at least, the decision-makers) out to be not only completely unmoved by the safety of their passengers, but by their own safety and that of their families. After all — you know who flies on a lot of Boeing airplanes? Boeing employees, management, and their families.
Yes.
Yes.
Hindsight being 20/20, it would have been great if the option had been standard and if Boeing had added a specific bit of training that said “an AoA Disagree situation may result in an automatic nose-down activation of the horizontal stabilizer.” However, this is just one way that the stabilizer can fail, and they all present the same way — the plane repeatedly goes out of trim after the pilots bring it into trim. AFAIK, none of the other failure modes have specific warning lights either. The pilot is expected to identify that situation and to cut out the automatic stabilizer.
Last edited by jsloan; Jun 1, 2019 at 12:40 am
Jun 1, 2019, 8:03 am
#1585
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: BNA
Programs: HH Gold. (Former) UA PP, DL PM, PC Plat
Posts: 8,185
There's been a lot of 'my experts are better than your experts' in recent posts. That is an example of the Appeal to Authority logical fallacy and is why I don't say, "I'm a 737 pilot so you should believe me".
The media does this all the time. They find an expert that will support their point of view and they put him up as THE authority on the topic.
Instead of counting experts, compare their arguments to see which ones are most compelling.
The media does this all the time. They find an expert that will support their point of view and they put him up as THE authority on the topic.
Instead of counting experts, compare their arguments to see which ones are most compelling.
Jun 1, 2019, 1:26 pm
#1586
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Houston
Programs: UA Plat, Marriott Gold
Posts: 12,694
Jun 1, 2019, 3:34 pm
#1587
Join Date: Jul 2012
Posts: 1,115
While it is desirable that everything works right all the time, aviation is particularly good at covering scenarios where everything is not working right all the time, as is the case in real life. For example, for any commercial plane, the MMEL identifies items which individually may legally be unserviceable at the commencement of a flight, without affecting flight safety. There are several safety nets - always more than one - that prevent one issue from becoming a disaster. Aviation and elevators are the only modes of transportation that have this, and they have #2 and #1 positions in the safest modes of transportation respectively, with others lagging way behind. When everything fails and a disaster does happen - which is ALWAYS a chain of events - aviation is one of the very few, if not the only industry, where the findings of the investigation are shared publicly to the benefit of all. It doesn't keep everything hush-hush behind closed doors as is the case in other industries.
What the B38M saga does seem to point out is that we are getting too complacent in the safety of aviation and the regulatory overview after a record period of near-perfect safety statistics in our domestic aviation. This is inevitable, complacency is a human failure for which there is simply no durable fix - whatever you do, complacency will always re-appear sooner or later. I, therefore, believe the answer is to continue reducing human involvement in various aspects of aviation safety so the room for complacency shrinks. I'm fully aware that goes against the popular train of thought, but then again, that train doesn't have a particularly good record of making the right calls.
What the B38M saga does seem to point out is that we are getting too complacent in the safety of aviation and the regulatory overview after a record period of near-perfect safety statistics in our domestic aviation. This is inevitable, complacency is a human failure for which there is simply no durable fix - whatever you do, complacency will always re-appear sooner or later. I, therefore, believe the answer is to continue reducing human involvement in various aspects of aviation safety so the room for complacency shrinks. I'm fully aware that goes against the popular train of thought, but then again, that train doesn't have a particularly good record of making the right calls.
Jun 1, 2019, 6:27 pm
#1588
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Oct 2014
Posts: 10,904
I don't think it's fair to write this off as a conspiracy theory. The AA pilots have released statements saying that they feel that iPad training is insufficient. European pilots have gone even further and accused the FAA of not being independent from Boeing (saying that the Max was approved with "no independent oversight").
This is not a question of conspiracy. It's a question of incompetence. There is no intent here. The FAA is not conspiring with Boeing to approve a plane that will kill more people; they are just unable to provide proper oversight so they are letting Boeing call the shots. In other words, they are useless as a regulatory agency.
Even if the plane is safe, we have no way of knowing this. The FAA has devolved into a rubber stamp agency; their approval is irrelevant. Boeing tells them what to approve and they approve it. Their main role is to sell the approval to foreign regulators. They are advocates for Boeing, not regulators.
This is not a question of conspiracy. It's a question of incompetence. There is no intent here. The FAA is not conspiring with Boeing to approve a plane that will kill more people; they are just unable to provide proper oversight so they are letting Boeing call the shots. In other words, they are useless as a regulatory agency.
Even if the plane is safe, we have no way of knowing this. The FAA has devolved into a rubber stamp agency; their approval is irrelevant. Boeing tells them what to approve and they approve it. Their main role is to sell the approval to foreign regulators. They are advocates for Boeing, not regulators.
Jun 1, 2019, 6:43 pm
#1589
Join Date: Jun 2016
Posts: 233
I don't think it's fair to write this off as a conspiracy theory. The AA pilots have released statements saying that they feel that iPad training is insufficient. European pilots have gone even further and accused the FAA of not being independent from Boeing (saying that the Max was approved with "no independent oversight").
This is not a question of conspiracy. It's a question of incompetence. There is no intent here. The FAA is not conspiring with Boeing to approve a plane that will kill more people; they are just unable to provide proper oversight so they are letting Boeing call the shots. In other words, they are useless as a regulatory agency.
Even if the plane is safe, we have no way of knowing this. The FAA has devolved into a rubber stamp agency; their approval is irrelevant. Boeing tells them what to approve and they approve it. Their main role is to sell the approval to foreign regulators. They are advocates for Boeing, not regulators.
This is not a question of conspiracy. It's a question of incompetence. There is no intent here. The FAA is not conspiring with Boeing to approve a plane that will kill more people; they are just unable to provide proper oversight so they are letting Boeing call the shots. In other words, they are useless as a regulatory agency.
Even if the plane is safe, we have no way of knowing this. The FAA has devolved into a rubber stamp agency; their approval is irrelevant. Boeing tells them what to approve and they approve it. Their main role is to sell the approval to foreign regulators. They are advocates for Boeing, not regulators.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dict...iracy%20theory
Jun 1, 2019, 6:54 pm
#1590
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Oct 2014
Posts: 10,904
This post is the definition of a conspiracy theory.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dict...iracy%20theory