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Old Jan 4, 2021, 1:37 am
FlyerTalk Forums Expert How-Tos and Guides
Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html

Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
READ BEFORE POSTING

Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.

Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...

As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.

The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.

Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).

However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.

The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.

Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.

The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).

Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator



United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.

How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:

View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.

The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.

For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.

All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.




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Old Jun 8, 2019, 1:03 pm
  #1636  
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Originally Posted by J.Edward
When a system(s) supporting critical flight functions fail in-flight, all souls onboard are in peril. Consider the loss of hydraulics resulting in the control surface failure suffered by UA232. The a priori critical importance of the control surfaces was reflected by them being supported up by three independent hydraulic systems. When all three systems failed due to the no. 2 engine fan blade separation, the pilots lost the ability to effectively command the control surfaces of the DC10. Only by the grace of God and the 3 + 1* pilots (* interestingly enough Capt. Finch, a passenger on UA232, was a Training Check Airman for UA AND had practiced simulations of controlling aircraft after a total loss of hydraulics with just throttles) in the cockpit to help manage the situation appears to have been a material asset in both the case of UA232 and the penultimate flight of PK-LQP, the Lion Air 737.
Your UA232 comparison completely misses the point that was a failure impacting the primary flight controls; MCAS has no affect on primary flight controls, only secondary flight controls. The third world crews crashing the MAX had more options and control authority available to them than the UA232 crew did.

Originally Posted by J.Edward
So to the point of "all the time, every time" I'd agree nothing is 100% foolproof/failproof, and the costs to make it so are impractical, BUT one can use foresight and common sense to ID critical aspects relating to flight where the function requires a 100% uptime record even if one of the supporting sub-systems fails...i.e. the control surfaces MUST work ALL the time, EVERY time; to ensure this three independent and redundant hydraulic systems are in place meaning as long as one remains operational, the other two can fail, without a catastrophic loss of control.
I think you've completely missed the point of my reply. There were a whole series of failures during the flight leading to these MAX crashes. The assertion that everything has to work perfectly or disaster happens is what I was disagreeing with, aside from a few systems with a catastrophic impact on safety (the level A systems), a single failure doesn't bring the airplane down. Neither MCAS nor the secondary flight controls are such a system.

Originally Posted by spin88
Wow! If so, it suggests the FAA has given up on trying to ram Boeing's "plan" - a few extra hours on an iPad - as additional training through.. Unless some other issues we don't know of was uncovered, hard for me to see what the additional delay would be for, other than requiring more intense, and possibly simulator, training.
Originally Posted by spin88
Well that was not the original Boeing/FAA pitch. They were just going to flash on some new software and roll-out a few hours of iPad training. Guess that is not gonna work....
The delay implies no such change to training. You're just making up conjecture to suit your narrative.

Originally Posted by HNLbasedFlyer
Or, more importantly, more qualified pilots at those airlines.....
Yea, but it costs a lot to get better than a 300 hour wonderkid up there.

Perhaps the CAAs in the countries where these crashes are happening should take a page from the FAA regarding pilot qualifications?
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 1:14 pm
  #1637  
 
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Originally Posted by mduell
Your UA232 comparison completely misses the point that was a failure impacting the primary flight controls; MCAS has no affect on primary flight controls, only secondary flight controls. The third world crews crashing the MAX had more options and control authority available to them than the UA232 crew did.



I think you've completely missed the point of my reply. There were a whole series of failures during the flight leading to these MAX crashes. The assertion that everything has to work perfectly or disaster happens is what I was disagreeing with, aside from a few systems with a catastrophic impact on safety (the level A systems), a single failure doesn't bring the airplane down. Neither MCAS nor the secondary flight controls are such a system.



The delay implies no such change to training. You're just making up conjecture to suit your narrative.



Yea, but it costs a lot to get better than a 300 hour wonderkid up there.


Perhaps the CAAs in the countries where these crashes are happening should take a page from the FAA regarding pilot qualifications?
If you're going to call out others for making stuff up, you shouldn't do it yourself. You have no idea how skilled the ET flight crew was. For all we know, they may have been better than most in the US... or not.
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 1:19 pm
  #1638  
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Originally Posted by J.Edward
The concern expressed here is with regards to the MAX and I'd argue the MAX represents a material differentiation from the original 737's of the late 1960s.
It isn't, though. That's why it was able to be certified under the same type certificate. (And, incidentally, the fact that it's not materially different has been driving certain posters nuts, because it's allegedly an indication of Boeing's pursuit of profits over safety -- the implication being that a clean sheet design would have been safer). The fact of the matter is, the 737 MAX, under the covers, is a 737, meaning that it has a full set of manual (hydraulic) flight systems. For the purposes of controlling the aircraft, you can turn a 737 MAX into a classic 737 by turning off the various automated systems. Now, it won't handle exactly like a previous 737, which is why the MCAS was built in the first place. But you can fly it.

Originally Posted by J.Edward
At the risk of making an analogy to software (where I also have no training, experience, etc.) this strikes me as being akin to an enterprise customer who refuses to let go of their legacy software they've since outgrown...they're using excel to manage their inventory when they really need a purpose-built database. Or maybe they refuse to let go of QuickBooks when the accounting complexities of the business have grown to demand a more complex solution. This is NOT to say there's anything wrong with Excel or Quickbooks BUT it is to say there's a natural limit to what these two programs can offer and a customer demanding more than what they can offer is just setting themselves up for failure.
If the legacy systems no longer meet the business requirements, it's not wrong to throw them out. However, that doesn't mean that all old systems should automatically be thrown out, which is something that happens all too often in software, and, more to the point, is something that some people seem to be doing with regards to the MAX.

Originally Posted by J.Edward
Thus the 737 as it was 51 years ago, and its subsequent evolutions, can only go so far. The classics and NG 737s strike me as being winners for all involved. But in designing the MAX, I fear Boeing demanded too much of the 737 leaving us the traveling public to pay the price.
Boeing expected the pilots to be able to recover from a failure of this system, just as they've been able to recover from the failure of the electric stabilizer in the past. It doesn't necessarily follow that they've pushed the 737 design too far, because you can still turn the systems off and fly the plane by hand. At the end of the day, it's quite possible that a runaway stabilizer in a 737NG would have led to the same disaster if it had failed in the same way that the MCAS did.
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 1:20 pm
  #1639  
 
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Originally Posted by JimInOhio
If you're going to call out others for making stuff up, you shouldn't do it yourself. You have no idea how skilled the ET flight crew was. For all we know, they may have been better than most in the US... or not.
Skilled may not be the most appropriate word in this situation. But we do know exactly how “experienced” the ET crew was.

Many here don’t get the value of flight experience for pilots. 300 hours is extremely, extremely low to be operating an aircraft of that size and complexity.

Last edited by clubord; Jun 8, 2019 at 1:28 pm
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 1:26 pm
  #1640  
 
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Originally Posted by clubord


Skilled may not be the most appropriate word in this situation. But we do know exactly how “experienced” the ET crew was.

Many here don’t get the value of flight experience for pilots. 350 hours is extremely, extremely low to be operating an aircraft of that size and complexity.
IIRC, the ET captain had several thousand hours. Also, let's not make the simple correlation of hours = experience. Experience is far more complex than that.
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 1:30 pm
  #1641  
 
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Originally Posted by JimInOhio
IIRC, the ET captain had several thousand hours. Also, let's not make the simple correlation of hours = experience. Experience is far more complex than that.
Respectfully, you are only as good as your weakest link. I’ve been in the cockpit for multiple in-flight emergencies in my career; both in the left and right seat. It’s not a one man show by any means.

Hours = Experience. I’m not sure how this cannot be correlated.

Last edited by clubord; Jun 8, 2019 at 1:51 pm
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 2:04 pm
  #1642  
 
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Originally Posted by spin88
I think that you (DB and VG) point out the problem with Newman55's reasoning. We do not look at things as just direct cause, but as a chain of events more generally.

Had Boeing done an updated design (back in the late 2000s when the Board decided not to) neither of these crashes would have occurred. Instead, Boeing moved late, compromised the plane's aerodynamics out of need due to the limits of the low stance of the 737 and then (either to make it certifiable, or just needing them fixed) MCAS was the "fix". Lots of design issues with the "fix" (single sensor, taking the disagree system off-line absent a special add on instrument package). At a whole host of decision points, had Boeing gone a different way, these accidents would not have happened.

So a chain of errors, which lead to earlier decisions, but (a) not doing a new clean sheet design, and (b) then having to move the engine's forward and up so they could fit under the wing, are good places to look as the initiation of a series of events leading to these crashes.
I agree the whole thing was a such a complex set of things, any one of which if only just "one" or series could have likely negated the two tragic accidents. We could have worked backwards from 1) Deciding to leverage an old design for TTM 2) deciding to move the engines forward as the solution 3) adding software to compensate for a flight envelope risk 4) Not forcing extensive training and simulation for all new MAX pilots 5) redundancy for sensors 6) sensor warning 7) throttling the software and on and on.

In the end it is a failure of comprehensive program management at BA, the FAA simply isn't in a position to see and be at every decision point and understand the complexity made in a plane, software, etc. etc. Boeing and its management team bear full responsibility for this and the lives lost, hopefully no more and lessons learned for both airbus and BA going forward.
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 2:05 pm
  #1643  
 
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Originally Posted by clubord
Hours = Experience. I’m not sure how this cannot be correlated.
Especially in the cockpit.
BTW, the 29 year old captain had 8000 hours, and the copilot had just finished flight school, so only 200 hours.
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 2:09 pm
  #1644  
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Originally Posted by spin88
I think that you (DB and VG) point out the problem with Newman55's reasoning. We do not look at things as just direct cause, but as a chain of events more generally.

Had Boeing done an updated design (back in the late 2000s when the Board decided not to) neither of these crashes would have occurred. Instead, Boeing moved late, compromised the plane's aerodynamics out of need due to the limits of the low stance of the 737 and then (either to make it certifiable, or just needing them fixed) MCAS was the "fix". Lots of design issues with the "fix" (single sensor, taking the disagree system off-line absent a special add on instrument package). At a whole host of decision points, had Boeing gone a different way, these accidents would not have happened.

So a chain of errors, which lead to earlier decisions, but (a) not doing a new clean sheet design, and (b) then having to move the engine's forward and up so they could fit under the wing, are good places to look as the initiation of a series of events leading to these crashes.
Are you an aeronautical engineer or a commercial airline pilot?
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 2:50 pm
  #1645  
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So how then does a pilot get "experience" if hours=experience? What's the magic number? And how does a pilot get hours if not by sitting in an aircraft of that type, taking off, landing, and flying the airplane?
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 2:56 pm
  #1646  
 
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Originally Posted by DenverBrian
So how then does a pilot get "experience" if hours=experience? What's the magic number?
In the US, the minimum is 1,500 hours. The magic minimum.

Points Guy summed it up....

https://thepointsguy.com/news/how-mu...o-pilots-need/
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 3:54 pm
  #1647  
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Originally Posted by HNLbasedFlyer
In the US, the minimum is 1,500 hours. The magic minimum.

Points Guy summed it up....

https://thepointsguy.com/news/how-mu...o-pilots-need/
Whether a pilot is on his first day or his last, it isn’t going to fix an airplane that was flawed from its inception.
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 4:04 pm
  #1648  
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Originally Posted by cmd320
Whether a pilot is on his first day or his last, it isn’t going to fix an airplane that was flawed from its inception.
A more experienced pilot may be able to avoid getting into that situation.

However, I'd still prefer not to fly on a plane where it's so easy to get into an unrecoverable situation. Other planes have pilots with the same experience requirements and the were not being crashed at the same rate.

It is mathematically possible that this plane is no more likely to crash than any other, and 2 crashes so close together were nothing more than coincidence. But that's not something that I'd like to risk my life on. If I'm wrong and I go out of my way to avoid the plane for no good reason, it costs me very little.
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 4:10 pm
  #1649  
 
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Originally Posted by HNLbasedFlyer
Or, more importantly, more qualified pilots at those airlines.....
Some very qualified pilots here in the US notified the FAA that the lack of disclosure of the MCAS was dangerous.

They also should be telling pilots to get hours in the gym as the force required to jack the stabalizer back up (which is what the hand crank does) can be extreme and is not simulated properly in training.

Training does matter of course. But the FAA emergency notice after Lion made it clear the recovery procedure is NOT the same on the MAX, and pilots were never trained on that.

EDIT: By the way, would that false light be of any value for pilots diagnosing the issue quickly if it actually worked?

Last edited by exwannabe; Jun 8, 2019 at 4:18 pm
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Old Jun 8, 2019, 5:13 pm
  #1650  
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Originally Posted by JimInOhio
If you're going to call out others for making stuff up, you shouldn't do it yourself. You have no idea how skilled the ET flight crew was. For all we know, they may have been better than most in the US... or not.
I didn't make anything up, I pointed to the factual lack of experience in the right seat of the Ethiopian cockpit. Show me the 300 hour pilots flying 737s for scheduled passenger ops in the US.

Originally Posted by DenverBrian
So how then does a pilot get "experience" if hours=experience? What's the magic number? And how does a pilot get hours if not by sitting in an aircraft of that type, taking off, landing, and flying the airplane?
The most common path would be doing other commercial flying without 100+ passengers in the back. Time in type isn't nearly as important as total time when it comes to aeronautical decision making.

Originally Posted by exwannabe
EDIT: By the way, would that false light be of any value for pilots diagnosing the issue quickly if it actually worked?
No amount of lights is going to change the need to expeditiously run the trim runaway procedure when the trim runs away.

Originally Posted by exwannabe
Some very qualified pilots here in the US notified the FAA that the lack of disclosure of the MCAS was dangerous.
And some very qualified pilots here have pointed out that no amount of disclosure on MCAS is going to change their response when they have a trim runaway, regardless of triggering mechanism.
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