Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
READ BEFORE POSTING
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
B737MAX Recertification - Archive
#721
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: USA
Programs: UA Platinum, 1MM
Posts: 13,460
It looks terrible on United's part to be such a huge, international carrier and cheap out on some safety features that they probably could have bargained hard for to bring it under that $80K (assuming list price) especially since AA and WN ordered the warning light. Typical cheap United and typically bad PR/executive response.
I've flown on United's MAX 9 2x before the accidents.
I've flown on United's MAX 9 2x before the accidents.
#722
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: BNA
Programs: HH Gold. (Former) UA PP, DL PM, PC Plat
Posts: 8,184
The media keeps reporting that MCAS is a stall prevention system. It is not (though it might also have that affect). MCAS is Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. Due to the aerodynamic characteristics of the engine nacelles, and higher engine residual thrust, the pitch "feel" is lighter at high angles-of-attack on the MAX than it is on the 737 NGs. MCAS adds a nose-down bias, through the application of nose-down stabilizer trim, to produce a heavier "feel" in these situations which more closely matches the pitch "feel", or maneuvering characteristics, of an NG in similar situations.
The procedure is not the "MCAS deactivation procedure". It is the "runaway stabilizer" procedure. A variety of systems, and failures, can result in a runaway stabilizer; MCAS is only one of them. Because an unchecked runaway stabilizer can quickly lead to a loss of control, you don't waste time trying to diagnose the reason for the runaway. If you have a runaway, you disable the electric stab trim which stops it. Let the mechanics figure out the cause of the runaway after you land. The runaway stabilizer procedure is the correct actions regardless of the underlying cause of the runaway. Since the autopilot also operates the trim (when it is on), the procedure has you disconnect the autopilot as part of the procedure because a failure in the autopilot could potentially cause a runaway. We're talking here specifically about a runaway caused by MCAS so, in that case, the autopilot must already be off by definition.
It looks terrible on United's part to be such a huge, international carrier and cheap out on some safety features that they probably could have bargained hard for to bring it under that $80K (assuming list price) especially since AA and WN ordered the warning light. Typical cheap United and typically bad PR/executive response.
The 737 has two options for conduction low visibility landings--called CAT II and CAT III landings. One option is through the autoland feature which uses the airplanes two autopilots, working together, to land in visabilities as low as 600 feet. The other option is the installation of a heads-up-display (HUD). With the HUD the Captain hand-flies the aircraft to landing using the data display on the HUD as he's looking out the window. This HUD option requires the AoA indicator display option; autoland does not. The airlines that have the AoA display option are the airlines that opted for HUDs for CAT II/III landings while the airlines without it use autoland.
#723
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
Programs: UA, AA, DL, Hertz, Avis, National, Hyatt, Hilton, SPG, Marriott
Posts: 9,454
You are missing the entire point. Yes, on the NG that was what the AoA indicators was for. But on the MAX Boeing tied a single AoA sensor to a system that would - unless the pilots figure out what the hell was going on - crash the plane as it overrode the pilots inputs, when as history shows they would, the AoA sensor had a bad reading. On the MAX this additional safety equipment was vital to address the flaw in Boeing's design of the MAX.
Again, I doubt that United (or any airline for that matter) knew how crappy of a design, and how dangerous of a design Boeing had for the MCAS system, a system designed to make up for flaws in the air-frames handling as Boeing over stretched the design, but a system - which was an "option" on the MAX, and a profit center for Boeing at $80K/plane - was vital on the MAX.
Again, I doubt that United (or any airline for that matter) knew how crappy of a design, and how dangerous of a design Boeing had for the MCAS system, a system designed to make up for flaws in the air-frames handling as Boeing over stretched the design, but a system - which was an "option" on the MAX, and a profit center for Boeing at $80K/plane - was vital on the MAX.
In short, you’re mixing up two concepts: (1) what appears to be a poorly-designed system by Boeing with insufficient fail-safe architecture; and (2) an optional display that’s primarily relevant for airlines which conduct certain operational procedures.
AOA indicators are an Airbus option as well.
#724
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Iowa, USA
Programs: Delta KM, United 1K, SPG plat
Posts: 415
I will not fly on a MAX because it’s clear the aircraft was not well vetted due to sweetheart deals between Boeing and the FAA. This probably applies to other aircraft and as I learn about them I will avoid them as well.
I hope the free market punishes Boeing harshly to discourage taking time to market shortcuts that put lives at risk.
#725
Join Date: May 2010
Location: AVP & PEK
Programs: UA 1K 1.9MM
Posts: 6,358
Something tells me that when all the dust eventually settles and some changes are [likely] made either voluntarily or mandated, the MAX might well be one of the safest planes out there.
The thorough scrutiny the MAX will now face will probably lead to exaggerated safety features and supplement pilot training not necessarily found in other planes.
Just my unscientific prediction.
#726
Join Date: May 2013
Posts: 3,361
I will not fly on a MAX because it’s clear the aircraft was not well vetted due to sweetheart deals between Boeing and the FAA. This probably applies to other aircraft and as I learn about them I will avoid them as well.
I hope the free market punishes Boeing harshly to discourage taking time to market shortcuts that put lives at risk.
Not to dismiss the lives that were lost, but the FAA has an enviable safety record and the additional scrutiny will certainly make it better.
#728
Join Date: May 2017
Posts: 2,280
I think there's at least a not-entirely-irrational "So, did they miss anything else?" fear here. I'd be inclined to recommend some mix of switching to (similarly-sized) 757s where possible and moving any shorter-term 737 MAX orders down to "standard" 737 planes.
This isn't a full-blown cancellation, but I think a demand of "You will go back, review everything, and assure us that there's not another disaster lurking in the wings and we'll go from there" isn't unreasonable, even if it fouls up fleet replacement timetables. However, something else coming along and grounding the plane again in a year or two (even if it is a preemptive catch)? That's gonna be a problem for everyone.
This isn't a full-blown cancellation, but I think a demand of "You will go back, review everything, and assure us that there's not another disaster lurking in the wings and we'll go from there" isn't unreasonable, even if it fouls up fleet replacement timetables. However, something else coming along and grounding the plane again in a year or two (even if it is a preemptive catch)? That's gonna be a problem for everyone.
With everything that has come out the past couple weeks. I think the consensus for grounding should have shifted; at least outside the USA. It doesn't matter if MCAS was at fault for these crashes, there are serious questions about the regulatory approval process for the MAX airplanes. It's already known the FAA was given incorrect information for at least one system they used in their analysis and Boeing was given lattitude to do the analysis of numerous other systems. There's also been numerous statements by FAA engineers who were concerned about the amount of analysis being deferred to Boeing. This really raises the concern whether the FAA was focused on minimizing risk or was in bed with Boeing to try and promote their business interests even if it unintentionally impacts safety. IMO this plane is getting significant reevaluation by the FAA in order to allay concerns other countries may have.
#730
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Denver, CO, USA
Programs: Sometimes known as [ARG:6 UNDEFINED]
Posts: 26,704
Not ones that kill 350 people every five months. @:-)
Unacceptable in the 21st Century. That logic works in the days before today's computers and the complex simulations we can create to test, re-test, and hazard test BEFORE we put passengers on planes. "Tombstone mentality" indeed.
And I don't want Donald Rumsfeld anywhere near the testing and certification process either. @:-)
The entire point of the design, testing and certification process is to minimize risk. You can’t eliminate risk, otherwise it would be uneconomical to build airplanes. All you can do is apply learnings to improvements. Unfortunately, some lessons come from fatal crashes.
What the investigations need to uncover is whether the contributors to the incidents were known risks, known unknowns or unknown unknowns.
#731
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Denver, CO, USA
Programs: Sometimes known as [ARG:6 UNDEFINED]
Posts: 26,704
I see this quite differently.
Something tells me that when all the dust eventually settles and some changes are [likely] made either voluntarily or mandated, the MAX might well be one of the safest planes out there.
The thorough scrutiny the MAX will now face will probably lead to exaggerated safety features and supplement pilot training not necessarily found in other planes.
Just my unscientific prediction.
Something tells me that when all the dust eventually settles and some changes are [likely] made either voluntarily or mandated, the MAX might well be one of the safest planes out there.
The thorough scrutiny the MAX will now face will probably lead to exaggerated safety features and supplement pilot training not necessarily found in other planes.
Just my unscientific prediction.
But I'd rather you be the guinea pig than me. And, given the relative rarity of the MAX for the next few years domestically, I think I can avoid it and let others "test" it for a while. @:-)
#732
Join Date: Oct 2018
Location: Bay Area, CA
Posts: 223
I read on another forum that Southwest is sending their MAX planes to Victorville for storage. VCV is generally known for long term storage, so I guess WN knows they won't be flying these birds for a while.
#733
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Aug 2015
Posts: 11,469
MCAS is operational only when the autopilot is OFF. You don't takeoff with the autopilot on. The minimum autopilot engagement altitude on takeoff is 800' and it's actually easier to continue to hand fly it through the acceleration and clean up (gear and flaps).
The media keeps reporting that MCAS is a stall prevention system. It is not (though it might also have that affect). MCAS is Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. Due to the aerodynamic characteristics of the engine nacelles, and higher engine residual thrust, the pitch "feel" is lighter at high angles-of-attack on the MAX than it is on the 737 NGs. MCAS adds a nose-down bias, through the application of nose-down stabilizer trim, to produce a heavier "feel" in these situations which more closely matches the pitch "feel", or maneuvering characteristics, of an NG in similar situations.
No. MCAS is only active when the autopilot is disengaged. Since, as you note, the purpose of MCAS is to match the MAX's maneuvering characteristics to those of the NG it is only necessary when the pilots are hand-flying. The autopilot doesn't care if it "feels" the same as other 737 models.
The procedure is not the "MCAS deactivation procedure". It is the "runaway stabilizer" procedure. A variety of systems, and failures, can result in a runaway stabilizer; MCAS is only one of them. Because an unchecked runaway stabilizer can quickly lead to a loss of control, you don't waste time trying to diagnose the reason for the runaway. If you have a runaway, you disable the electric stab trim which stops it. Let the mechanics figure out the cause of the runaway after you land. The runaway stabilizer procedure is the correct actions regardless of the underlying cause of the runaway. Since the autopilot also operates the trim (when it is on), the procedure has you disconnect the autopilot as part of the procedure because a failure in the autopilot could potentially cause a runaway. We're talking here specifically about a runaway caused by MCAS so, in that case, the autopilot must already be off by definition.
More bad reporting. The reporters are trying to report technical information that don't fully understand. The AoA display isn't a "safety feature" and it would not be helpful in dealing with an invalid MCAS activation.
The 737 has two options for conduction low visibility landings--called CAT II and CAT III landings. One option is through the autoland feature which uses the airplanes two autopilots, working together, to land in visabilities as low as 600 feet. The other option is the installation of a heads-up-display (HUD). With the HUD the Captain hand-flies the aircraft to landing using the data display on the HUD as he's looking out the window. This HUD option requires the AoA indicator display option; autoland does not. The airlines that have the AoA display option are the airlines that opted for HUDs for CAT II/III landings while the airlines without it use autoland.
The media keeps reporting that MCAS is a stall prevention system. It is not (though it might also have that affect). MCAS is Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. Due to the aerodynamic characteristics of the engine nacelles, and higher engine residual thrust, the pitch "feel" is lighter at high angles-of-attack on the MAX than it is on the 737 NGs. MCAS adds a nose-down bias, through the application of nose-down stabilizer trim, to produce a heavier "feel" in these situations which more closely matches the pitch "feel", or maneuvering characteristics, of an NG in similar situations.
No. MCAS is only active when the autopilot is disengaged. Since, as you note, the purpose of MCAS is to match the MAX's maneuvering characteristics to those of the NG it is only necessary when the pilots are hand-flying. The autopilot doesn't care if it "feels" the same as other 737 models.
The procedure is not the "MCAS deactivation procedure". It is the "runaway stabilizer" procedure. A variety of systems, and failures, can result in a runaway stabilizer; MCAS is only one of them. Because an unchecked runaway stabilizer can quickly lead to a loss of control, you don't waste time trying to diagnose the reason for the runaway. If you have a runaway, you disable the electric stab trim which stops it. Let the mechanics figure out the cause of the runaway after you land. The runaway stabilizer procedure is the correct actions regardless of the underlying cause of the runaway. Since the autopilot also operates the trim (when it is on), the procedure has you disconnect the autopilot as part of the procedure because a failure in the autopilot could potentially cause a runaway. We're talking here specifically about a runaway caused by MCAS so, in that case, the autopilot must already be off by definition.
More bad reporting. The reporters are trying to report technical information that don't fully understand. The AoA display isn't a "safety feature" and it would not be helpful in dealing with an invalid MCAS activation.
The 737 has two options for conduction low visibility landings--called CAT II and CAT III landings. One option is through the autoland feature which uses the airplanes two autopilots, working together, to land in visabilities as low as 600 feet. The other option is the installation of a heads-up-display (HUD). With the HUD the Captain hand-flies the aircraft to landing using the data display on the HUD as he's looking out the window. This HUD option requires the AoA indicator display option; autoland does not. The airlines that have the AoA display option are the airlines that opted for HUDs for CAT II/III landings while the airlines without it use autoland.
It sounds to me that, from the pilot's perspective in the moment, the thinking is, 'I have a runaway stabiliser — let me get the aircraft back under control manually now,' and that figuring out if it's the MCAS or XYZ or ABC isn't immediately important.
And extending that — while it certainly is hazardous to have an aircraft design that creates a runaway stabiliser condition with regularity, at least as things appear so far, it theoretically should have been possible for a pilot to rescue both of the crashed flights?
#734
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Boston MA
Programs: UA 1K/1.5 million miler, SU Gold, JL Sapphire
Posts: 529
Back in the days, Mitsubishi was told to start their certification process from scratch regarding software, which involved software rewrite, because they did not correctly obeyed DO-178 requirements...
I am sure that this won't happen to Boeing. This what should happen logically - maybe not redesign, but at least go through certification from scratch since there is a strong doubt this was done properly. But it won't happen because just like Airbus 320 program the Boeing 737 program is way, way too big and way, way too critical to the world's economy. It is simply too big to fail.
So the FAA will let them get away with a patch, training, perhaps a small redesign for newly built airframes. Other jurisdictions like Europe and China will take more time as they have national champion to "help". But they will relent...
I am sure that this won't happen to Boeing. This what should happen logically - maybe not redesign, but at least go through certification from scratch since there is a strong doubt this was done properly. But it won't happen because just like Airbus 320 program the Boeing 737 program is way, way too big and way, way too critical to the world's economy. It is simply too big to fail.
So the FAA will let them get away with a patch, training, perhaps a small redesign for newly built airframes. Other jurisdictions like Europe and China will take more time as they have national champion to "help". But they will relent...