Originally Posted by
spin88
You are missing the entire point. Yes, on the NG that was what the AoA indicators was for. But on the MAX Boeing tied a single AoA sensor to a system that would - unless the pilots figure out what the hell was going on - crash the plane as it overrode the pilots inputs, when as history shows they would, the AoA sensor had a bad reading. On the MAX this additional safety equipment was vital to address the flaw in Boeing's design of the MAX.
Again, I doubt that United (or any airline for that matter) knew how crappy of a design, and how dangerous of a design Boeing had for the MCAS system, a system designed to make up for flaws in the air-frames handling as Boeing over stretched the design, but a system - which was an "option" on the MAX, and a profit center for Boeing at $80K/plane - was vital on the MAX.
The presence of AOA indicators may have made no difference at all in either the JT or ET crashes. In fact, the presence of an additional indicator likely would have contributed even more to the crew’s task saturation and inability to correct a control issue. On no commercial aircraft is an AOA indicator an essential instrument.
In short, you’re mixing up two concepts: (1) what appears to be a poorly-designed system by Boeing with insufficient fail-safe architecture; and (2) an optional display that’s primarily relevant for airlines which conduct certain operational procedures.
AOA indicators are an Airbus
option as well.