Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Oct 31, 2019, 7:51 pm
#3436
Join Date: Aug 2010
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Posts: 3,543
Oct 31, 2019, 8:17 pm
#3437
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
If you haven't read the Indonesia NTSC report, you should. The report lists 9 contributing factors:
I thought the report was reasonably balanced and thorough.
Here is another take on the report: Indonesia’s MAX Report: Why Separate Man From Machine?
Here are the last three paragraphs:
Contributing Factors Contributing factors defines as actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the accident or incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the accident or incident. The presentation is based on chronological order and not to show the degree of contribution.
1. During the design and certification of the Boeing 737-8 (MAX), assumptions were made about flight crew response to malfunctions which, even though consistent with current industry guidelines, turned out to be incorrect.
2. Based on the incorrect assumptions about flight crew response and an incomplete review of associated multiple flight deck effects, MCAS’s reliance on a single sensor was deemed appropriate and met all certification requirements.
3. MCAS was designed to rely on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable to erroneous input from that sensor.
4. The absence of guidance on MCAS or more detailed use of trim in the flight manuals and in flight crew training, made it more difficult for flight crews to properly respond to uncommanded MCAS.
5. The AOA DISAGREE alert was not correctly enabled during Boeing 737-8 (MAX) development. As a result, it did not appear during flight with the mis-calibrated AOA sensor, could not be documented by the flight crew and was therefore not available to help maintenance identify the mis-calibrated AOA sensor.
6. The replacement AOA sensor that was installed on the accident aircraft had been mis-calibrated during an earlier repair. This mis-calibration was not detected during the repair.
7. The investigation could not determine that the installation test of the AOA sensor was performed properly. The mis-calibration was not detected. 8. Lack of documentation in the aircraft flight and maintenance log about the continuous stick shaker and use of the Runaway Stabilizer NNC meant that information was not available to the maintenance crew in Jakarta nor was it available to the accident crew, making it more difficult for each to take the appropriate actions.
9. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous ATC communications were not able to be effectively managed. This was caused by the difficulty of the situation and performance in manual handling, NNC execution, and flight crew communication, leading to ineffective CRM application and workload management. These performances had previously been identified during training and reappeared during the accident flight.
1. During the design and certification of the Boeing 737-8 (MAX), assumptions were made about flight crew response to malfunctions which, even though consistent with current industry guidelines, turned out to be incorrect.
2. Based on the incorrect assumptions about flight crew response and an incomplete review of associated multiple flight deck effects, MCAS’s reliance on a single sensor was deemed appropriate and met all certification requirements.
3. MCAS was designed to rely on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable to erroneous input from that sensor.
4. The absence of guidance on MCAS or more detailed use of trim in the flight manuals and in flight crew training, made it more difficult for flight crews to properly respond to uncommanded MCAS.
5. The AOA DISAGREE alert was not correctly enabled during Boeing 737-8 (MAX) development. As a result, it did not appear during flight with the mis-calibrated AOA sensor, could not be documented by the flight crew and was therefore not available to help maintenance identify the mis-calibrated AOA sensor.
6. The replacement AOA sensor that was installed on the accident aircraft had been mis-calibrated during an earlier repair. This mis-calibration was not detected during the repair.
7. The investigation could not determine that the installation test of the AOA sensor was performed properly. The mis-calibration was not detected. 8. Lack of documentation in the aircraft flight and maintenance log about the continuous stick shaker and use of the Runaway Stabilizer NNC meant that information was not available to the maintenance crew in Jakarta nor was it available to the accident crew, making it more difficult for each to take the appropriate actions.
9. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous ATC communications were not able to be effectively managed. This was caused by the difficulty of the situation and performance in manual handling, NNC execution, and flight crew communication, leading to ineffective CRM application and workload management. These performances had previously been identified during training and reappeared during the accident flight.
Here is another take on the report: Indonesia’s MAX Report: Why Separate Man From Machine?
Here are the last three paragraphs:
The safety committee issued a long list of recommendations related to oversight of certification and human factors such as training manuals, crew behavior in emergencies and the effect of multiple alarms and how pilots deal with them. While it dinged Lion Air for suboptimal hazard reporting methods and record keeping, it was curiously silent on the lack of an overall safety culture and on pilot training.
If there’s a shortcoming in the investigation, that might be it. I’ve heard professionals argue—some themselves MAX pilots—that the crew should have been able to handle the MCAS runaway and that if they had, neither of the 737s would have crashed. I think this is undeniable. But also undeniable is that through a series of bad decisions and lack of regulatory oversight, Boeing built an airplane that confronted the pilots with a confusing abnormal. The fact that it happened twice in six months shows that Boeing was wrong in its understanding of how improbable such an event could be, regardless of what ignited it and irrespective of what acceptably skilled pilots should be able to handle.
In that sense, I think it’s wrong to separate what the pilots knew, didn’t know or did from what Boeing knew, didn’t know or did. By design and with great success, we’ve lumped everything into one internationally approved safety-driven system. And in this case, the system failed.
If there’s a shortcoming in the investigation, that might be it. I’ve heard professionals argue—some themselves MAX pilots—that the crew should have been able to handle the MCAS runaway and that if they had, neither of the 737s would have crashed. I think this is undeniable. But also undeniable is that through a series of bad decisions and lack of regulatory oversight, Boeing built an airplane that confronted the pilots with a confusing abnormal. The fact that it happened twice in six months shows that Boeing was wrong in its understanding of how improbable such an event could be, regardless of what ignited it and irrespective of what acceptably skilled pilots should be able to handle.
In that sense, I think it’s wrong to separate what the pilots knew, didn’t know or did from what Boeing knew, didn’t know or did. By design and with great success, we’ve lumped everything into one internationally approved safety-driven system. And in this case, the system failed.
Oct 31, 2019, 10:06 pm
#3438
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: YVR
Programs: Bottom feeder Star Gold
Posts: 2,652
Well they all seem to be going somewhere. Last week, there were 4 Max aircraft residing outside at YVR (2 WS, 2 AC), and now from the best I can tell, just the example I showed earlier today remains. Not sure where the other AC plane went (Marana? Mirabel? the back bay of the cavernous hangar?) but I suspect the teal examples contributed to the sudden influx of WestJet Max-8s in CYXX over the past couple days.
Today's jaunt was a simple hour-long engine run-up at the western hold bay, and then back to the company north hangar.
Today's jaunt was a simple hour-long engine run-up at the western hold bay, and then back to the company north hangar.
Nov 1, 2019, 7:45 pm
#3440
Join Date: Jan 2012
Programs: AC E50K, MM, BA, Delta, PriorityClub Platinum, Marriott Gold.
Posts: 468
I did read it. Boeing isn't in the business of transporting people, airlines are. Boeing's goal is to make money, and while the MAX was obviously a bad miscalculation on their part that will affect their profitability, some altruistic sense of responsibility for your family isn't their primary concern. Whether this is good or bad is a different discussion, the reality is they are profit driven first and foremost.
You all are apologists for a murderous company! They put SHORT TERM profits and bottom line FIRST, safety LAST, they could have re-designed the wing, the landing gear and the wing to accommodate the engine correctly and make a much better product that would stand the test of time! The current 737 Max is ONLY an option because of duopoly and backlog at Airbus, otherwise they'd be dead!
Not sure why you think the designation of the aircraft has even the slightest bearing on passengers. After the aircraft has been recertified (and I think this is a matter of "when", not "if"), the only thing that matters is that the recertification process has been conducted in a thorough and objective manner - that it truly reflects on the safety of the aircraft. Everything else you mention may be a consideration for the airlines that operate the MAX, but it's irrelevant for passengers. As a passenger, if you don't wish to fly the MAX, you can and should take your money elsewhere.
If someone feels so strongly that they don't want to fly on a particular aircraft, then they should be informed about the particular aircraft is called, even if a dumb marketing moron changed the name. If someone can't see through a superficial move like renaming an aircraft, they aren't smart enough to hold a passport.
The reason I think it may have an impact on the passengers is the association I fear passengers may now have with the MAX and lack of safety. We've never in recent memory had a grounding of this length and severity of a major aircraft like the MAX.
Chances are, for Joe and Jill public, they have been touched in some way by this grounding and may have this negative association.
On the other hand, such a response could be seen as being flat footed. I would be curious what Transport Canada has to say about passengers who feel uncomfortable flying the MAX initially. Will they require all Canadian operators to allow passengers to rebook away from the bird free of charge? Renaming the bird solves these problems, since most kettles only look as far as the bird type when reviewing their itinerary (if at all). I doubt few kettles would go so far as to record the tail number and look it up whilst travelling.
What would happen to such passengers who thought they would be flying on a Airbus A320 only to be told they got MAX'd at the last minute?
Safe Travels,
James
Chances are, for Joe and Jill public, they have been touched in some way by this grounding and may have this negative association.
On the other hand, such a response could be seen as being flat footed. I would be curious what Transport Canada has to say about passengers who feel uncomfortable flying the MAX initially. Will they require all Canadian operators to allow passengers to rebook away from the bird free of charge? Renaming the bird solves these problems, since most kettles only look as far as the bird type when reviewing their itinerary (if at all). I doubt few kettles would go so far as to record the tail number and look it up whilst travelling.
What would happen to such passengers who thought they would be flying on a Airbus A320 only to be told they got MAX'd at the last minute?
Safe Travels,
James
What I find so crazy is that Boeing is still stubbornly clinging to the idea that the problems in their aircraft can be fixed with a mere software update and perhaps some training. When one's flying a Cat III ILS into YYT and picking up a bit of ice on approach at night, waiting for the lights at the end of the runway to appear, the last thing that's tolerable is a less than fully redundant system inadvertently activating or even showing a discrepancy error that requires a checklist. And a system cannot determine if its malfunctioning with only 2 sensors. Boeing would have had a lot more credibility if they actually started planning for a triple redundant implementation instead of cheaping out, yet again, and deluding that they can achieve a 'fix' in software.
The length of the grounding and the number of flights that have been cancelled are secondary issues for passengers. The only issue that matters for passengers when the MAX is recertified is whether they accept the work of the respective authorities (FAA and TC). After that, as a passenger, you will either fly on the MAX or not as you choose. If someone claims to be concerned about this it's on them to determine if a potential flight is on a MAX or some other aircraft. If you think Transport Canada is going to obligate AC and Westjet to belabor the matter, you will probably be disappointed.
Boeing is not using 3 or more AOA sensors on any of it's aircraft. That includes the 777 and 787 as well. The AOA is verified using the data from the ADIRU's on these aircraft. I don't think it would be possible on the 737 though.
That said, I don't think the third AOA sensor would necessarily to make the MCAS safer. In the unlikely case of two of the three sensors failing high indicating the same value, the computer would vote out the sensor indicating the correct value (already happened on Airbus) and activate MCAS. The only way to make the MCAS safer is to get rid of it. I don't think Boeing is ready to do that.
That said, I don't think the third AOA sensor would necessarily to make the MCAS safer. In the unlikely case of two of the three sensors failing high indicating the same value, the computer would vote out the sensor indicating the correct value (already happened on Airbus) and activate MCAS. The only way to make the MCAS safer is to get rid of it. I don't think Boeing is ready to do that.
Last edited by tcook052; Nov 2, 2019 at 5:45 am Reason: merge multiple separate posts
Nov 2, 2019, 10:52 am
#3441
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
alexbc I have yet to hear anyone who thinks Boeing did a good job of designing MCAS and no one is apologizing for Boeing.
If you bothered to read the NTSC report and the commentary about it that I linked above, you would understand that this issue is much bigger than Boeing. There were issues not only in the MCAS design, but also in the certification process, the airline's maintenance procedures, the airlines supplier's maintenance procedures, the pilot's documentation of mechanical problems, the pilot's gross inability to follow from memory check lists, the airline's pilot certification and training procedures and the industry's required skill levels for pilots.
If you bothered to read the NTSC report and the commentary about it that I linked above, you would understand that this issue is much bigger than Boeing. There were issues not only in the MCAS design, but also in the certification process, the airline's maintenance procedures, the airlines supplier's maintenance procedures, the pilot's documentation of mechanical problems, the pilot's gross inability to follow from memory check lists, the airline's pilot certification and training procedures and the industry's required skill levels for pilots.
Nov 8, 2019, 9:42 am
#3442
Join Date: Jul 2019
Location: YFC
Programs: Air Canada/Aeroplan E50K, Mariott Gold Elite, Hotels.com Gold, Best Western Diamond Select,
Posts: 288
Nov 8, 2019, 9:46 am
#3443
A FlyerTalk Posting Legend
Join Date: May 2002
Location: YEG
Programs: HH Silver
Posts: 56,449
The end of which year? 2019 or 2020?
Nov 8, 2019, 10:39 am
#3444
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: YYC
Programs: BA bronze, Aeroplan peon
Posts: 4,746
Nov 8, 2019, 10:49 am
#3445
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Mississauga Ontario
Posts: 4,105
---> Must have been one of those third-world pilots in the simulator, I suppose. Because we've all been told in here that First World Pilots are not a problem.
Womp womp
Last edited by InTheAirGuy; Nov 8, 2019 at 10:49 am Reason: typo
Nov 8, 2019, 2:03 pm
#3446
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,805
Story gives no detail. Anyway, it's a simulator thing, not a real plane, and simulators will only simulate real planes if (1) the plane behavior is known and understood, and (2) if the simulator is properly programmed. This said, issue that the MCAS is meant to deal with (possibly among others) is a scenario in which the nose moves *up* until the plane stalls. So if the MCAS is triggered when the scenario where it's needed is actually not happening, it might well push the nose down and down into the ground.... Sounds familiar?
Nov 8, 2019, 7:04 pm
#3449
Join Date: Dec 2002
Posts: 8,005
Story gives no detail. Anyway, it's a simulator thing, not a real plane, and simulators will only simulate real planes if (1) the plane behavior is known and understood, and (2) if the simulator is properly programmed. This said, issue that the MCAS is meant to deal with (possibly among others) is a scenario in which the nose moves *up* until the plane stalls. So if the MCAS is triggered when the scenario where it's needed is actually not happening, it might well push the nose down and down into the ground.... Sounds familiar?
..... in June ......some pilots hopped into a simulator to test a few things.
It didn’t go well.
.....................That led to an extensive redesign of the plane’s flight computers that has dragged on for months and repeatedly pushed back the date of its return to service,
Nov 10, 2019, 7:33 pm
#3450
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: YAM, CIU, CGN
Programs: AC FOTSG, DL WM
Posts: 190
Haven't seen this story in English-language media yet...
https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle...e-aeronautique
Two aeronautical engineers claim that there may be further design problems with the 737 MAX's horizontal stabilizer and the jackscrew that controls it. In particular, in the case of flight ET302, analysis of the black box data points to the horizontal stabilizer making nose-down movements (slippage) even when not commanded by either the pilots or MCAS.
https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle...e-aeronautique
Two aeronautical engineers claim that there may be further design problems with the 737 MAX's horizontal stabilizer and the jackscrew that controls it. In particular, in the case of flight ET302, analysis of the black box data points to the horizontal stabilizer making nose-down movements (slippage) even when not commanded by either the pilots or MCAS.