Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Nov 11, 2019, 4:29 pm
#3452
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
After reading this article, Lion Air Report Details MAX Design And Airline Operational Failures, I can't help but marvel at how so many in this thread continue to apologize and make excuses for the pilots. Here are some excerpts:
Clearly they did not run out of time to get control of the aircraft. They failed to follow basic procedures to maintain control and get the aircraft safely on the ground. Neither of them belonged in the cockpit of an airliner. The FO had training deficiencies that were known since 2016!!!!! This aircraft did not need to crash.
“The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous [air traffic control] ATC communications were not able to be effectively managed,” the report says. “This was caused by the difficulty of the situation and performance in manual handling, [non-normal checklist] NNC execution, and flight crew communication, leading to ineffective [crew resource management] application and workload management. These performances had previously been identified during training and reappeared during the accident flight.”
The captain countered the MCAS repeatedly, using control-column-mounted electric trim inputs because the force on the control yoke was increasing as the stabilizer moved. He also asked the first officer (FO) to complete the airspeed unreliable NNC.
Nearly 2 min. later, the FO responded that “there was no airspeed unreliable checklist,” the report says. The FO soon found the checklist, but the pilots, distracted by the worsening scenario and ancillary issues such as ATC communications, never completed it.
About 10 min. into the 11-min. flight, the captain transferred control of the aircraft to the FO. The MCAS—still receiving faulty AOA data—continued to activate, leading to a final, fatal dive into the Java Sea.
“The FO was unable to control the aircraft as the repetitive MCAS activations were not countered by adequate trim-up input,” the report says. “The common flight crew reaction to a heavy control column is by providing adequate trim. This suggests that while the captain’s training or experience enabled him to recognize the need for sustained nose-up trim, the FO’s training and experience did not.”
Investigators found multiple indications of deficiencies in the FO’s training records, including “difficulties to control aircraft during manual flight” on a 2016 instrument landing system approach proficiency check, and “application exercise for stall recovery is difficult due to wrong concept of the basic principle for stall recovery in high or low level” during a 2017 observation.
“The Lion Air policy for such deficiencies was that the flight crew would be treated with additional briefings or rehearsal,” the report says. “The reappearance of difficulty in aircraft handling indicated that the treatment was not effective.”
A lack of communication created more problems on JT610’s flight deck. When transferring control to the FO, the captain did not explain that he was keeping the aircraft’s nose up with the repeated trim inputs.
“It could not be determined why the captain did not communicate this critical piece of information: whether he was unaware that he was trimming to the extent he was, that high workload led him to shed the importance of communicating the state of the aircraft, or that he believed the FO would naturally recognize the need to trim the aircraft,” the report says. “Subsequently, the FO was not able to anticipate the need for repeated pitch corrections . . . and did not use adequate electric trim to counter repetitive MCAS activations.”
Nearly 2 min. later, the FO responded that “there was no airspeed unreliable checklist,” the report says. The FO soon found the checklist, but the pilots, distracted by the worsening scenario and ancillary issues such as ATC communications, never completed it.
About 10 min. into the 11-min. flight, the captain transferred control of the aircraft to the FO. The MCAS—still receiving faulty AOA data—continued to activate, leading to a final, fatal dive into the Java Sea.
“The FO was unable to control the aircraft as the repetitive MCAS activations were not countered by adequate trim-up input,” the report says. “The common flight crew reaction to a heavy control column is by providing adequate trim. This suggests that while the captain’s training or experience enabled him to recognize the need for sustained nose-up trim, the FO’s training and experience did not.”
Investigators found multiple indications of deficiencies in the FO’s training records, including “difficulties to control aircraft during manual flight” on a 2016 instrument landing system approach proficiency check, and “application exercise for stall recovery is difficult due to wrong concept of the basic principle for stall recovery in high or low level” during a 2017 observation.
“The Lion Air policy for such deficiencies was that the flight crew would be treated with additional briefings or rehearsal,” the report says. “The reappearance of difficulty in aircraft handling indicated that the treatment was not effective.”
A lack of communication created more problems on JT610’s flight deck. When transferring control to the FO, the captain did not explain that he was keeping the aircraft’s nose up with the repeated trim inputs.
“It could not be determined why the captain did not communicate this critical piece of information: whether he was unaware that he was trimming to the extent he was, that high workload led him to shed the importance of communicating the state of the aircraft, or that he believed the FO would naturally recognize the need to trim the aircraft,” the report says. “Subsequently, the FO was not able to anticipate the need for repeated pitch corrections . . . and did not use adequate electric trim to counter repetitive MCAS activations.”
Nov 11, 2019, 4:38 pm
#3453
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
Posts: 4,570
Clearly they did not run out of time to get control of the aircraft. They failed to follow basic procedures to maintain control and get the aircraft safely on the ground. Neither of them belonged in the cockpit of an airliner. The FO had training deficiencies that were known since 2016!!!!! This aircraft did not need to crash.
Alas, humans are dumb sacks of mostly water and should be kept far away from providing real time input to any life critical system.
Nov 11, 2019, 5:09 pm
#3454
Join Date: Nov 2017
Posts: 3,359
Clearly they did not run out of time to get control of the aircraft. They failed to follow basic procedures to maintain control and get the aircraft safely on the ground. Neither of them belonged in the cockpit of an airliner. The FO had training deficiencies that were known since 2016!!!!! This aircraft did not need to crash.
I think the 737 MAX Saga has shown that automation can err and the usefulness of having humans be able to over ride these railing systems is crucial. When human judgement is needed it is more of than not correct be it WN 737 engine incident last year or The miracle on the Hudson sometime back. Humans can and always will play a key oversight role in the cockpit. You cannot teach a machine common sense nor taste.
Nov 11, 2019, 5:27 pm
#3455
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: YYC
Programs: BA bronze, Aeroplan peon
Posts: 4,746
I agree they were not the best crew out there, but they had flown plenty before and they were always able to land safely. If they were in any plane other than a MAX they probably would have also landed safely. They were not dealing with severe weather, bird strike, engine failure, explosive decomression or fire, they were fighting the plane itself. No other plane would have done what the MAX did.
Nov 11, 2019, 5:42 pm
#3456
Join Date: Mar 2019
Programs: AC, DL
Posts: 29
I haven't done particularly much reading about the issues with the Max, but I have a slightly different take on the issue.
To me a significant part of the problem was a management decision that became a design decision - to continue pushing the fundamental 737 design further down the road rather than starting from a clean sheet. Sure, the idea appeals to Southwest's fleet commonality, but they would come around. The problem is that it forced a lot of other design decisions surrounding engine, landing gear, flight controls, passenger comfort, everything.
It's a tough decision to decide to spend the money to go with a completely clean slate. But there are also limits to incremental design. And yes, they had to work around around the issues with the -300 in the '80's, and with the NG in the '90's. But how far down the road can they go before they are simply better off with a new platform? Whether all of the aspects of the A320 are better is open to debate, but it is a more adaptable platform for development. How much more efficiency can be wrung out of a CSeries is open to debate, but it avoided some fundamental issues from stretch and pull design. Flight controls have hurt them here, but I'd say it was a high-level decision to squeeze the lemon a bit more that is the root cause. Which I find odd for their #1 seller...
To me a significant part of the problem was a management decision that became a design decision - to continue pushing the fundamental 737 design further down the road rather than starting from a clean sheet. Sure, the idea appeals to Southwest's fleet commonality, but they would come around. The problem is that it forced a lot of other design decisions surrounding engine, landing gear, flight controls, passenger comfort, everything.
It's a tough decision to decide to spend the money to go with a completely clean slate. But there are also limits to incremental design. And yes, they had to work around around the issues with the -300 in the '80's, and with the NG in the '90's. But how far down the road can they go before they are simply better off with a new platform? Whether all of the aspects of the A320 are better is open to debate, but it is a more adaptable platform for development. How much more efficiency can be wrung out of a CSeries is open to debate, but it avoided some fundamental issues from stretch and pull design. Flight controls have hurt them here, but I'd say it was a high-level decision to squeeze the lemon a bit more that is the root cause. Which I find odd for their #1 seller...
Nov 11, 2019, 7:23 pm
#3457
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,167
After reading this article, Lion Air Report Details MAX Design And Airline Operational Failures, I can't help but marvel at how so many in this thread continue to apologize and make excuses for the pilots.
You yourself provided a summary of the actual Indonesia air safety board report, here
Contributing Factors Contributing factors defines as actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the accident or incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the accident or incident. The presentation is based on chronological order and not to show the degree of contribution.
1. During the design and certification of the Boeing 737-8 (MAX), assumptions were made about flight crew response to malfunctions which, even though consistent with current industry guidelines, turned out to be incorrect.
2. Based on the incorrect assumptions about flight crew response and an incomplete review of associated multiple flight deck effects, MCAS’s reliance on a single sensor was deemed appropriate and met all certification requirements.
3. MCAS was designed to rely on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable to erroneous input from that sensor.
4. The absence of guidance on MCAS or more detailed use of trim in the flight manuals and in flight crew training, made it more difficult for flight crews to properly respond to uncommanded MCAS.
5. The AOA DISAGREE alert was not correctly enabled during Boeing 737-8 (MAX) development. As a result, it did not appear during flight with the mis-calibrated AOA sensor, could not be documented by the flight crew and was therefore not available to help maintenance identify the mis-calibrated AOA sensor.
6. The replacement AOA sensor that was installed on the accident aircraft had been mis-calibrated during an earlier repair. This mis-calibration was not detected during the repair.
7. The investigation could not determine that the installation test of the AOA sensor was performed properly. The mis-calibration was not detected.
8. Lack of documentation in the aircraft flight and maintenance log about the continuous stick shaker and use of the Runaway Stabilizer NNC meant that information was not available to the maintenance crew in Jakarta nor was it available to the accident crew, making it more difficult for each to take the appropriate actions.
9. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous ATC communications were not able to be effectively managed. This was caused by the difficulty of the situation and performance in manual handling, NNC execution, and flight crew communication, leading to ineffective CRM application and workload management. These performances had previously been identified during training and reappeared during the accident flight.
Or we could look at the Full Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) report: https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attac...A_Oct_2019.pdf
That report includes 12 overall categories of recomendations, for everything from the cerification process to human factors and training - and it includes the suggestion that the original 737 MAX certification be re-reviewed.
And of course there's that annoying fact that a full year after the Lion Air crash, the collective aviation community has still not agreed that the plane type is safe to fly yet.
Or, if you wish, you could keep banging the drum that the real problem was those darn third world pilots - and presumably, if only some good first world pilots had been flying, then none of the other problems would have surfaced. Is that your argument?
Nov 11, 2019, 9:48 pm
#3458
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: YYC
Programs: BA bronze, Aeroplan peon
Posts: 4,746
Bimmerdriver, why no mention of the shop in Florida that improperly assembled the AoA sensor, and then since they didn't own the proper calibration machine; used a non-FAA approved machine and a non-approved calibration method, and then self-certified that they were equivalent? The shop now no longer repairs AoA sensors.
There seems to have been a lot of improper and wrong self certification in this whole chain of events.
There seems to have been a lot of improper and wrong self certification in this whole chain of events.
Nov 12, 2019, 8:11 pm
#3460
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I would hope that the pilots in the cockpit of any airliner are more than "dumb sacks of mostly water". They are supposed to be highly trained and proficient for a reason, which is to ensure the safety of the public when things go wrong.
Nov 13, 2019, 12:02 am
#3461
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: YXE
Posts: 3,050
Unfortunately, (and this is what's particularly disturbing to me), a lot of the behind-the-scenes engineering test and evaluation function in the airline industry has disappeared from the airlines themselves, with airlines being forced to rely upon regulators and upon the self-interested representations of vendors. A firm like AC saves a bunch of money on salaries, but at what cost -- they lose the flexibility to do in-house due-diligence and engineering test and evaluation of the products and services that are pitched to the company. I believe operators of the 737Max had incredibly few people on-staff with sufficient in-depth avionics systems engineering knowledge to even ask the hard and tough questions required of the 737Max. And even if the questions were asked, there is little evidence that suggests management would have rejected the purchase of the 737Max on the basis of an in-house engineering report alone, especially since there were millions of dollars to be "saved" by purchasing the 737Max over competitive products. Actually management deliberately would not want reports of such nature produced as the existence of such research and its memorandum-ized reporting would diminish their catalogue of potential legal defenses if they overrode the professional engineering advice received and proceeded with the purchase of flawed products that ultimately caused loss.
Nov 14, 2019, 5:54 pm
#3462
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
A big part of the job is to make sure that things never really end up in the situation that safety is imperiled if something mechanical/electrical does fail. In this instance, that means simply refusing to be the pilot of a design (737Max) that was clearly not sufficiently fault tolerant to withstand the sort of faults that would reasonably arise -- and still won't be with the latest batch of software-only fixes which do not address the lack of fault tolerance inherent to a dual AoA instrumention-based design. There are many situations in which a pilot has to diagnose a problem, arrange to have a system disabled, and then use tools of the profession, such as MEL's, to determine if an aircraft is airworthy and reasonably capable of performing the tasked sortie. Unless you're literally a one-time-only flyer, you more than likely have been on a flight for which there was a malfunction, either in-service or on the ground, of a system, process, or procedure for which the professional skill and judgement of the pilot(s) was necessary to operationally resolve to complete the sortie. Most of which, unless you have very specific knowledge of the workings of those systems, aircraft noises, etc., would have been completely transparent to you and occurred "before things went wrong".
Unfortunately, (and this is what's particularly disturbing to me), a lot of the behind-the-scenes engineering test and evaluation function in the airline industry has disappeared from the airlines themselves, with airlines being forced to rely upon regulators and upon the self-interested representations of vendors. A firm like AC saves a bunch of money on salaries, but at what cost -- they lose the flexibility to do in-house due-diligence and engineering test and evaluation of the products and services that are pitched to the company. I believe operators of the 737Max had incredibly few people on-staff with sufficient in-depth avionics systems engineering knowledge to even ask the hard and tough questions required of the 737Max. And even if the questions were asked, there is little evidence that suggests management would have rejected the purchase of the 737Max on the basis of an in-house engineering report alone, especially since there were millions of dollars to be "saved" by purchasing the 737Max over competitive products. Actually management deliberately would not want reports of such nature produced as the existence of such research and its memorandum-ized reporting would diminish their catalogue of potential legal defenses if they overrode the professional engineering advice received and proceeded with the purchase of flawed products that ultimately caused loss.
Unfortunately, (and this is what's particularly disturbing to me), a lot of the behind-the-scenes engineering test and evaluation function in the airline industry has disappeared from the airlines themselves, with airlines being forced to rely upon regulators and upon the self-interested representations of vendors. A firm like AC saves a bunch of money on salaries, but at what cost -- they lose the flexibility to do in-house due-diligence and engineering test and evaluation of the products and services that are pitched to the company. I believe operators of the 737Max had incredibly few people on-staff with sufficient in-depth avionics systems engineering knowledge to even ask the hard and tough questions required of the 737Max. And even if the questions were asked, there is little evidence that suggests management would have rejected the purchase of the 737Max on the basis of an in-house engineering report alone, especially since there were millions of dollars to be "saved" by purchasing the 737Max over competitive products. Actually management deliberately would not want reports of such nature produced as the existence of such research and its memorandum-ized reporting would diminish their catalogue of potential legal defenses if they overrode the professional engineering advice received and proceeded with the purchase of flawed products that ultimately caused loss.
Nov 16, 2019, 8:29 pm
#3463
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,167
Interesting news, and a related video from the FAA chief.
- Reports by The New York Times and Reuters suggest that Boeing has pushed FAA officials to speed up testing and permit early deliveries of the plane.
- In response, FAA chief Stephen Dickson posted a video to staff where he acknowledged "pressure" to accelerate to process, but encouraged them to resist.
- This week, airline pilots accused Boeing of "arrogance" for pushing for a swift return, while American Airlines flight crew begged union officials to stop them being assigned to the plane.
- Boeing said Saturday morning that the FAA and other regulators have sole control of the timetable for the jet's return.
Nov 17, 2019, 3:58 pm
#3465
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: YVR
Programs: Bottom feeder Star Gold
Posts: 2,652
Likely a function of the global tour the new Boeing head cheese, Stanley Deal, is conducting. He is addressing the issue head on. He’s spent time with Lion Air, Ethiopian and families of both crashes, has been contrite and apologetic, and is recognizing the impact of the grounding on the Max customers and suppliers. He’s taking heat from Canadian Max operators (WS publicly, AC more mutely) and this ad in a national paper is probably timed to coincide with visits to Canadian stations along his worldwide whistlestop campaign.