While I doubt the FAA will wait for all international CAAs (for example, China is more based on politics) I would expect the FAA to coordinate with Europe, Brazil, UK or Canada. None of the other CAAs are particularly experienced in new aircraft certification anyways.

Perhaps it’s a coincidence but a check of a smattering of dates in August show Hawaii-mainland flights on 737Max pricing $150 cheaper than 753 flights taking off within an hour.

My neighbor, a 73 pilot says MCAS is crap. Normal procedure is rotate and start putting nose done trim in and fly the plane. He also says the much higher landing speeds of all of the 900 and longer 73’s shows the plane has reached the end of its expansion and the MAX is properly named. They haven’t had a tail strike in years and everybody knows how to fly the thing in whatever configurations BOEING has thrown at them; bottom line— the plane works and they’re ready to fly it again.

Former Boeing Engineers Say Relentless Cost-Cutting Sacrificed Safety - Bloomberg Businessweek (May 9)
"...As Boeing Co. developed the 737 Max, the newest version of its most profitable and now most infamous plane, engineers repeatedly invited FAA officials to look over their designs in one of the company’s Seattle simulators—an even more realistic mock-up incorporating pieces of actual aircraft. One purpose was to find out how to ensure that pilots switching to the new plane from previous 737 models never had to get inside one for what’s known as Level D training....Managers didn’t merely insist to employees that no designs should lead to Level D training. They also made their desires known to the FAA team in charge of 737 training requirements."

Boeing Believed a 737 Max Warning Light Was Standard. It Wasn’t. - New York Times (May 5)
"The warning light notifies pilots of a disagreement in the sensors that measure which direction the plane is pointed, a potential sign of a malfunction. This light could have provided critical information to the pilots on two flights that crashed shortly after takeoff in recent months."
"...After discovering the lapse in 2017, Boeing performed an internal review and determined that the lack of a working warning light “did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation,” it said in its statement.. As a result, Boeing said it did not inform airlines or the Federal Aviation Administration about the mistake for a year. Only after the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 last October did Boeing discuss the matter with the F.A.A."

FAA reviewing long-standing emergency procedures used in 737 Max crashes - CNN (May 10)
"A long-standing Boeing 737 emergency procedure that the pilots of two Max jets employed while attempting to avert fatal crashes is under review by the Federal Aviation Administration, according to the head of a major pilots union. The basic checklist for handling an issue known as runaway stabilizer trim has remained substantially unchanged since 1967, the earliest days of the 737 jetliner, according to Dennis Tajer of the Allied Pilots Association. He said FAA officials told airline safety officials and pilots unions in April of the review."

Boeing Max Failed to Apply Safety Lesson From Deadly 2009 Crash - Bloomberg (May 7)
"A fatal airplane crash a decade ago prompted a life-saving fix across thousands of Boeing 737 cockpits. So why wasn’t the same lesson applied to the design of the 737 Max, an upgraded version on which 346 people died in recent disasters?...Boeing ended up changing that throttle system to prevent one erroneous altitude reading from cascading into tragedy, changes the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration subsequently made mandatory."

And then you have this: Fliers plan to avoid Boeing 737 Max jets for a year or more, Barclays survey concludes - Washington Post (May 7)
"Barclays downgraded its rating for Boeing stock on the basis that “a large portion of fliers are likely to avoid 737 Max for an extended period beyond when the grounding is lifted,” Barclays analysts wrote in a note to investors. Boeing stock dropped by almost 4 percent Tuesday, tracking along with a broader market sell-off...Analysts at Barclays expect customer fears to be more than a momentary blip in Boeing’s business. They expect airlines to snap up about 200 fewer of the jets in 2019 and 2020 compared with what had been expected before the grounding, as airlines shy away from a jet associated with two deadly crashes."

The downgrade in $BA reflects an expectation of reduced earnings from fewer deliveries and higher costs in the near term.

An oversight, sure, but as multiple pilots on this thread have said, an AoA disagreement warning light, by itself, was unlikely to make any difference whatsoever. The procedure that was needed to save the aircraft does not depend upon that warning light, which is why airlines haven't paid for it. It would most likely have been ignored. The key to saving the plane was understanding that they had a runaway stabilizer -- something that has many potential causes, not just the MCAS, and certainly not just an AoA sensor malfunction.

If the procedure can be improved, by all means, let's improve it.

This -- the single point of failure for the MCAS -- is the core issue. Although the pilots are trained for runaway stabilizers, we can all agree that it's better if the stabilizers don't run away in the first place.

They don't know can't predict the future any better than anybody else. People may say that they will avoid the 737 MAX. Most people will continue to have no idea what kind of plane they're flying on and won't care.