Hundreds, probably thousands, of things that were certified by analysis. Very normal part of aircraft cert, for all manufacturers, in all western countries.

I doubt the MAX had an evac test; they certify by analysis based on prior evac tests for most derivative aircraft. Etc, etc.

The world is not a perfect place and air travel is not exempt from that reality. Take a look at accidents from the past. They resulted in extensive analysis and, often, in significant design changes of aircraft. If the FAA was as good in the past as you allude to them then how did that MD-80 nose-dive into the ocean off the California coast? How did the US 737-300 roll over on approach to PIT? Those are just two examples where very thoroughly reviewed aircraft were later found to have design flaws (though in the case of the PIT accident, I'm not sure if the investigators every came to 100% certainty of what happened... maybe someone here knows).

An accident these days causes an even bigger reaction than in the past for the simple reason they've become so much more rare. That said, two accidents five month apart on a modified design is rightfully causing all kinds of alarms. The hoards of people involved with investigating this will figure it out and recommend how to go forward. Just like in the past.

https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/...frica-236.html

Post 4708 states: “Not a 737 driver so I have no vested interest in defending my plane/livelihood. Also neither American nor European, so I could not care less about defending my "team". What I am is a frequent traveller who would prefer not to become a smoldering crater in the ground -- preferably not even if I am flying on a plane flown by the most poorly trained, least-skilled and most sleep-deprived (but properly licensed) pilot.

I've read this whole thread and then some, and thus far my reading of the facts of these incidents is as follows:

1. (Fact) Boeing was caught with their pants down by the A320neo and needed to come up with a quick 737 update with better fuel economy (i.e. with minimal engineering changes).

2. (Fact) Rather than produce a clean-sheet design or update the 737 undercarriage/wings to incorporate an extended main landing gear, Boeing extended the nose gear and bolted on larger engines by moving the engines forward relative to COG, in spite of the negative impact that this had on aircraft stability/handling.

3. (Fact) The 737 stabilizer has much greater vertical authority than the elevator (I have seen estimates of about 3x as much)

4. (Fact) Due to the enlarged and forward-positioned engines, the Max exhibits poor aerodynamic/flight handling characteristics (tendency to pitch up) at high AOA when approaching stall. As communicated by at least one purported Boeing engineer much further up this thread (post 1000 or thereabouts?), this tendency to pitch up is so extreme that elevator input alone would not have been sufficient to make the aircraft adequately controllable, hence why a stick pusher was considered and rejected.

5. (Speculated) For the same reason, once in a stall, the 737 Max is quite likely to be extremely difficult to bring back under control through normal control surface inputs, without the rapid application of an extreme amount of stab trim (i.e. by MCAS). (Has anyone flown a Max into a stall at MTOW/rear COG and would they be able to provide input on whether it is possible to bring it back under control without trim input/MCAS?)
…….… ”

And that post then lists the remaining 37 very interesting alleged facts, opinions and speculations.

Well one fact is that the COG for the NG (and A320 family) was too far back leading to a tendency for tail tips if the airplane was not unloaded in a certain way. Is it that problematic to install larger engines in a more forward position on the MAX and Neo?

The usual 1-3, but goes completely off the rails at 4 and 5. The MAX does not tend to pitch up at high AoA. MCAS is not for when you're in a stall. Just utter garbage post.

I remain amazed at the number of people who refuse to listen to pilots who have repeatedly rejected #'s 4 & 5.

And in a few weeks, when the FAA clears the MAX, those same naysayers will accuse the FAA of colluding with Boeing.

For those interested in reading more about the technicalities of the MAX and MCAS, the MAX thread in TravelBuzz has a post with a link to an article that analyses the article from IEEE. It does a good job of putting many of the technical aspects into proper context.

https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/31058420-post205.html

Utter contempt is not helpful.

And directly from that article, here's some "utter garbage" about AoA:

Utterly baseless statement with no evidence the MAX has negative static pitch stability in any configuration.

IMO neither is repeatedly insinuating that other people have forgotten or simply don't care that 350 people lost their lives.

I can't find what you quoted in the article. Was it from this link or somewhere else?

https://abnormaldistribution.org/ind...liner-crashes/

Sorry, Larry, it was from the first of the two quoted articles in that post. I now see the second article refuting the first article.

From my dullard passenger point of view, y'all can argue about AoA vs. pitch to your heart's content. *I* care whether the nose of the plane is going too high. MCAS appears to try to correct this in supposedly "extremely rare" situations by forcing the nose down. And, apparently, IN ERROR in the two crashes.

You pilots can argue the nuances as much as you like. I just want my planes to get me there in one piece, and if I don't trust a particular model, I just won't fly on it.

The first article at least attempts to speak in layman's language.

I feel exactly the same way.

That is why I am glad someone posted upthread about the international joint review, although I am concerned that it is apparently not binding. There is extreme pressure on the FAA politically to get the MAX back in the air and the public statements by the Boeing CEO earlier this week tells me the absolute arrogance of Boeing in defending the aircraft is the direction this will be going but I hope I am wrong but cynical enough about the business and political process to believe it will go that way.

When I first started flying American airlines within the USA I would avoid all flights with a DC-10 due the the history. I ended up on one flight after a substitution and very petrified for the whole flight. It may be irrational, you can all tell me I am wrong, but my desire for self preservation is greater then my fear of being ridiculed.

I have worked in multinational businesses for close on 35 years. Been in senior leadership roles for committee decisions about product recalls where the bottom line of the decision is cost of recall vs cost of payouts for lives lost. It is truly all about the money and this is why you need truly independent government agencies providing oversight not "working in partnership with their customer".

I am hoping UA waits for the international agencies to clear the MAX, but if it goes back into the fleet sooner I will book away from flights with the MAX but we all know aircraft substitutions happen all the time so the only way to ensure I would not be on a MAX would be to book a flight with an airline that does not fly the MAX.

I, as an ignorant passenger, do not currently trust the FAA or Boeing. I wait to see what UA does with the MAX.