Same airline was crashing the NG even when the trim worked fine:

"the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control and their failure to abide by CRM [Crew Resource Management] principles of mutual support and calling deviations"

Their training is not delivering basic airmanship and CRM.

7,657'. I don't know the exact maximum altitude of the flight but ~3,000' is about right.

I'm not avoiding the 737MAX over misunderstanding of what MCAS is or isn't. I'm avoiding the 737MAX because it was involved in two fatal crashes in five months, both hauntingly similar in how they played out. Sorry you have a misunderstanding of that.

No, 350 died because of a crappy cheaply made aircraft. This is specifically a 737MAX problem, not a pilot problem. Otherwise this issue would occur on other aircraft.

This is a pretty good documentary including interviews with well experienced flight crews who also have no confidence in this aircraft:

Like Ethiopian 410? Vaguely similar crash, not in a MAX, just ET pilots driving it into the sea.

This thread has once again turned "personal", especially some recent posts (now deleted).

If you are thinking about commenting about other posters, don't -- stay to the issues and stay away from commenting on posters (even in a third party way - that is not fooling anyone.). We can disagree but the rules are clear
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator

Dennis Tajer is a pilot I can trust.

We should disagree with a post with logical argument, not a personal attack. We can debate and not attack. Infighting somehow seems to pop up in 737 MAX threads. A similar thread at pprune was shut down for a cooling off period after 5129 posts:

“8th May 2019, 09:23 Post #5130 Thread closed until there is actual news

Abrasive posturing and in fighting has become the dominant feature of the thread. We'll wait until there is substantive news.

Rob”

deleted.

Not similar at all. This was a case of pilot error (ET409). Vastly different from the 737 MAX which flies itself into the ground.

See, this is why the discussions keep getting personal. That statement is utter nonsense.

The 737 is not a fly-by-wire aircraft. It cannot fly itself into the ground. It's simply not possible. So, when people keep repeating this kind of thing, it gets extremely frustrating to anyone who's trying to have a reasoned, nuanced discussion of the aircraft.

When the final reports come out -- which won't be for at least a year on the ET crash -- some of the blame will almost certainly be ascribed to the pilots for failing to recognize and correct the emergency situation. I have no wish to speak ill of the dead, and I don't mean to exonerate the aircraft entirely, but framing it as though the pilots had no control at all is inaccurate. In a 737, the pilots are in control.

I don't understand why this seems so controversial: blame is going to end up being shared. Boeing needs to correct the tendency of the MAX to create emergency situations at a rate greater than the NG, and the airlines need to make sure that the pilots are trained to deal with the emergencies that do arise. Air travel, on all commercial aircraft, is extremely safe, but the only plane that is immune to emergencies is one that's parked out at Vacaville.

Things get personal because posters (and I'm guilty as well) say things like "this statement is utter nonsense" instead of "I disagree." @:-)

Watch the 60 Minutes Australia video. From a layman's point of view, those planes flew themselves into the ground, because a computer system continually nosed down the aircraft, and the pilots were never provided the proper training because they were never even informed that such a computer system had been added to the MAX.

It'll be interesting to see how much. Virtually all accident reports in their final versions ascribe blame all over the place. I personally would bet $1 that it'll be 10% or less on the pilots.
Listen to Dennis Tajer in the 60 Minutes Australia video. In my opinion, his message is pretty clear that the pilots cannot be in control when a computer system, undisclosed to the pilots, noses the plane down with seconds to recover, and the pilots have to consult a checklist that is essentially unchanged from 1967.

There is clearly no point disagreeing with fantasy.

The title card alone was enough to convince me that it was sensationalism and not a serious attempt at journalism.

Which is why it's important to stick to facts, because without the facts, it's easy for people to misunderstand the situation.

I'm not going to be baited into this argument again. You train based upon the things that can go wrong, not the reasons why they can go wrong.

It "the plane flew itself into the ground," it would be 100% on the plane. You've already acknowledged my point. I don't know what percentage of the blame will be ascribed to the pilots; I just don't think it's zero.

Do checklists get stale?

The reason that this procedure was documented in 1967 is that it was possible to have a runaway stabilizer in 1967. The MCAS appears to make that more likely, and that's something that should be fixed. But if the steps to resolve the situation are exactly the same, why would you change the procedure? The fewer things pilots have to remember, the better.

:confused:

Consider driving a car. If the car stalls, do you immediately wonder if there's a problem with the air intake, fuel injection system, or maybe you got some low-quality gas? Or do you attempt to clear the car from the road and get to safety before you start trying to diagnose the problem?

The same thing is true for a pilot. With 20/20 hindsight, it's easy to say that Boeing should have included specific training on this system. But what would the training have consisted of? "If the aircraft keeps nosing down, disengage the automatic stabilizer." But that's exactly what you're supposed to do if you can't control the pitch of the aircraft in the first place.

There is no time, in an emergency situation, to diagnose the cause of a failure. There's plenty of time to do that after the plane has landed. The entire focus should be upon resolving the situation.

Now, to be clear -- if there were some special MCAS failure mode that needed to be differentiated from other runaway stabilizer situations, then, of course it should have bene included. "If you notice the plane nose down, and, after 15 seconds, it noses down again, do X, Y, Z, but if it only happens once, do A, B, C." As far as we know, there is no such thing.