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-   -   B737MAX Recertification - Archive (https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/2031779-b737max-recertification-archive.html)

DenverBrian May 15, 2019 10:19 am


Originally Posted by worldclubber (Post 31104140)
Corrected.

"near-impossible" is bad enough, you are right.

And "near-impossible" in a simulation environment could very well be "impossible" in real situations.@:-)

mduell May 15, 2019 10:43 am


Originally Posted by spin88 (Post 31102764)
People keep making this argument, and its just wrong. In both the lion air and Ethiopian crashes the pilots fixed the trim, only to have it go back out rapidly on its own. This was not a one time problem, it was a problem that kept re-occurring when the run-away trim process was used. And the usual thought, turn off the auto pilot did not fix the problem.

In both crashes they failed to follow the five decade old runaway stab trim procedure which includes flipping the stab cutout switches and leaving them there. In the Ethiopian case, they were also likely too slow to react to the problem, which compounded their difficulties with manual trim.

LarryJ May 15, 2019 10:57 am


Originally Posted by worldclubber (Post 31104140)
"near-impossible" is bad enough, you are right.

It might be helpful to consider how they got into the situation that made it so difficult to operate the trim with the manual trim-wheels.

clubord May 15, 2019 11:39 am


Originally Posted by LarryJ (Post 31104341)
It might be helpful to consider how they got into the situation that made it so difficult to operate the trim with the manual trim-wheels.

I know exactly where you’re going with that and totally agree with you Larry, but pick your battles.

Very few here have the willingness to put aside their media driven interpretation of the events and be receptive to accept feedback from experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft.

USA_flyer May 15, 2019 12:30 pm


Originally Posted by LarryJ (Post 31104341)
It might be helpful to consider how they got into the situation that made it so difficult to operate the trim with the manual trim-wheels.

How about next time you're in a 737 sim that also has mcas and see if you're able to recover the plane as per the Ethiopian airlines situation and report back.

worldclubber May 15, 2019 12:34 pm


Originally Posted by LarryJ (Post 31104341)
It might be helpful to consider how they got into the situation that made it so difficult to operate the trim with the manual trim-wheels.

Sure.

But the question remains; Why do the allegedly badly trained "third-world" pilots have a problem with these runaways on the max but not on the ng? mcas could be the difference, or something else.

EmailKid May 15, 2019 12:49 pm


Originally Posted by clubord (Post 31104467)

I know exactly where you’re going with that and totally agree with you Larry, but pick your battles.
Very few here have the willingness to put aside their media driven interpretation of the events and be receptive to accept feedback from experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft.


Originally Posted by USA_flyer (Post 31104667)
How about next time you're in a 737 sim that also has mcas and see if you're able to recover the plane as per the Ethiopian airlines situation and report back.

OK then :rolleyes:

clubord May 15, 2019 12:59 pm


Originally Posted by USA_flyer (Post 31104667)
How about next time you're in a 737 sim that also has mcas and see if you're able to recover the plane as per the Ethiopian airlines situation and report back.

You bet this will be covered in future B737 recurrent training curriculums along with a demonstration on non-recovery compliance with MCAS, probably in both high and low speed regimes.

Unfortunately it seems like the ET pilots got themselves in a tough position with the multiple MCAS trim inputs without disconnecting electric trim and/or providing proper runaway trim recovery techniques.

The situation compounded due to an extreme high speed/thrust setting. Either A) Auto-throttles were never disconnected (per procedure) or B) Airplane captured altitude hold setting keeping the current airspeed/thrust position and pilots never reduced to a manageable speed.

At a slower airspeed, manual trim movements are easier to conduct and the negative aerodynamic effects of the out of trim situation are significantly reduced. Flying fast with takeoff or climb thrust still active and trying to handle a flight control issue, that’s a really difficult position to recover from.

LarryJ May 15, 2019 1:12 pm


Originally Posted by clubord (Post 31104788)
The situation compounded due to an extreme high speed/thrust setting. Either A) Auto-throttles were never disconnected (per procedure) or B) Airplane captured altitude hold setting keeping the current airspeed/thrust position and pilots never reduced to a manageable speed.

The data that I've seen indicates that they (ET302) were in LVL CHG with a higher altitude selected on the MCP. That puts the autothrottles into N1 mode with an N1 setting of CLB (climb power). A/T was never disconnected. Thrust stayed at 91% N1 until a few seconds before the end of the flight. Indicated airspeed was as high as 390 KIAS. Electric trim wasn't disconnected until multiple uncorrected unscheduled MCAS activations had pushed the stab to nearly full nose-down trim.

That situation would be quite difficult to recover from at such a low altitude.

clubord May 15, 2019 1:20 pm


Originally Posted by LarryJ (Post 31104830)
The data that I've seen indicates that they (ET302) were in LVL CHG with a higher altitude selected on the MCP. That puts the autothrottles into N1 mode with an N1 setting of CLB (climb power). A/T was never disconnected. Thrust stayed at 91% N1 until a few seconds before the end of the flight. Indicated airspeed was as high as 390 KIAS. Electric trim wasn't disconnected until multiple uncorrected unscheduled MCAS activations had pushed the stab to nearly full nose-down trim.

That situation would be quite difficult to recover from at such a low altitude.

Ouch, that’s not good. I never saw the FMA data for Flight Director/Autopilot command modes but that really helps paint the picture.

Escalating downward trim with high climb thrust is a tough place to be. Bad things happen very quickly.

BF263533 May 15, 2019 1:53 pm

Addis Ababa Bole International Airport is at 7,625 ft elevation? The ET plane was like at 3,000 ft above the ground?

ajGoes May 15, 2019 2:18 pm


Originally Posted by BF263533 (Post 31104962)
Addis Ababa Bole International Airport is at 7,625 ft elevation? The ET plane was like at 3,000 ft above the ground?

3,000 feet above ground level is a very low altitude in a 737.

DenverBrian May 15, 2019 2:31 pm


Originally Posted by clubord (Post 31104467)

Very few here have the willingness to put aside their media driven interpretation of the events and be receptive to accept feedback from experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft.

Yes. Exactly. I would say the exact same thing.

The two or three "experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft" who post on this thread are counterbalanced by the "experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft" who have had to comment, anonymously for fear of retaliation, about the problems with the MAX.

Perhaps I would say that very few here have the willingness to put aside the Boeing talking points and be receptive to accept feedback from experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft.

ExplorerWannabe May 15, 2019 3:09 pm


Originally Posted by DenverBrian (Post 31101986)
I'm well aware. And you get to fly it for a while when it comes back before I set foot on it. <shrugs>

The question is: Did 350 people have to die for us to realize that there were flaws in how the 737MAX was brought to market? Could we have seen the potential dangers, identified and remedied them earlier in the process, and not have had to destroy 350 families and thousands of family members? @:-)

Question: Did 350 people have to die for us to realize all pilots -- not just US mainline ones -- should be trained and familiar with basic procedures and that the FO is and should be a co-pilot, with all that entails? Could we have seen the potential dangers, identified and remedied them earlier in the process? If you're going to avoid the 737MAX (as is your right to do) over misunderstanding what MCAS is or isn't, I presume you are also going to avoid airlines that use co-pilots with flight experience measured in the low hundreds rather than thousands of hours?

Newman55 May 15, 2019 3:11 pm


Originally Posted by DenverBrian (Post 31105082)
Yes. Exactly. I would say the exact same thing.

The two or three "experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft" who post on this thread are counterbalanced by the "experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft" who have had to comment, anonymously for fear of retaliation, about the problems with the MAX.

Perhaps I would say that very few here have the willingness to put aside the Boeing talking points and be receptive to accept feedback from experienced pilots with knowledge of this aircraft.

So, these "anonymous" pilots are afraid that Boeing going to retaliate against them. How is Boeing going to retaliate against them and how will they find out who these "anonymous pilots" are? Does Boeing control the internet as well? These conspiracy theories are really piling up here.


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