The core problem here is that the airlines demanded an airplane where 737 pilots required minimal training to be 737-MAX qualified. To make that happen, they created MCAS to compensate for the design differences between the 737-700/800/900 and the 737-MAX. But MCAS was poorly designed. Didn't take input from both stall indicators. Didn't have logic to say ... hmmmm ... stall indicator says we are stalling, so I will nose down. Hmmm.... we are descending and gaining speed, but the stall indicator says we are still stalling. Something ain't right here!

Further, the software should have said ... hmmm ... we have been stalling for quite a while now and I have been going nose down. We are going faster and faster. The ground is getting pretty close now. Perhaps pulling up with max power would be a good idea.

Instead, it said "I don't care how close to the ground we are. If that stall indicator says we are stalling (or close to it), I will keep going nose down. I feel the need for speed, regardless of how close to the ground we are. I didn't watch Top Gun. I don't understand the concept of a HARD DECK (especially the real hard deck -- the ground). We will only be below the hard deck for a few seconds, what's the danger here? Oh my, we have been below the hard deck for quite a while now, maybe I should try something else?"

Also, the basic concept of -- an instrument is telling me something, but its possible that the instrument is telling me the wrong information. Especially when I take action based on that instrument and the problem is either staying the same or getting worse. Look at all the other facts and figure this out.

Please don't put words in my mouth. All I said was that if you look only at the outcomes, you can get a skewed view of reality. If the two MAX flights hadn't crashed, the MAX would still be flying, MCAS and all, despite the fact that its safety characteristics are no different than the model that's currently grounded.

I thought MCAS was supposed to make a Max fly like an NG. Unless Airbus has a similar software running on the A320, they're not analogous. Either way, Boeing truly messed up with MCAS.

Until it isn't.

Airbus does, to an even greater degree than Boeing. The Airbus fly-by-wire system uses software to interpret inputs from the pilot's movement of the flight controls, adjust based on other data sources, and then apply movements to the aerodynamic control surfaces. One of the purposes of the system is to ensure that different models within a single type rating behave similarly. There is far more software running the flight control surfaces on an Airbus plane than there is on a Boeing one. Boeing has been moving to more fly-by-wire systems, but they generally more closely mimic mechanical controls.

Yes, the software problem here created tragic results, but using software to augment controls is nothing new or unique.

Maybe I'm missing some context in your post, but plenty of things are certified and deemed safe, until things happen that were never thought of. That includes not only commercial aircraft, but private aircraft, the space program, and even more personal items such as cars and furniture.

If we hadn't grounded the airplane, but had more crashes under similar circumstances, is there a quantity that would concern you? Is it one a month, is it only North American or Western Europe carriers that count? That's somewhat rhetorical as I assume you care, but this assumption that this was an easily recoverable event isn't fact, since we don't have the reports yet. If I fly 100 different 172's, and Cessna tells me the brand new 172 flys the same as a 1978 or a 1985, that is what I expect after hundreds of hours in type. If it does something unexpected outside of what I've dealt with in the same type for decades, that is easily something that could create confusion. Training or not, at some point you know the type airplane inside and out, and what has never happened starts to fade into that back of your mind. So when a very non-standard event occurs in new airplane sold as though it's identical to the one you know, your first reaction may not be the correct one.

Maybe not the best analogy, but if a car company added traction control or anti lock braking to a vehicle back in the 90's without disclosure to anyone, that could have created problems. The early 90's is when these features became more widestream, but not hidden by manufacturers. I could see someone not expecting either feature to be caught off guard if not told about it. Thankfully both were considered safety features and not hidden in the case of car manufacturers, in fact it was always advertised as an improvement.

So while I think a clean sheet replacement would have been best for Boeing, I'm not against the aircraft. I don't agree that airlines demanded another 737, what they likely demanded was an aircraft that didn't increase cost for them. Every client wants better efficiency at the same cost, who doesn't? Big engines and the 737 didn't work as planned, hence MCAS, and I'll bet in hindsight Boeing is questioning themselves. They are a smart company, again I don't have the hatred some do for them, and really hope they survive this.

For the benefit of our economy and frankly Boeing I hope its back in the air again sooner rather than later, even though I don't agree with how things have been handled.

I was speaking the nearly identical handling characteristics of the airplanes necessitating augmentation. There are various ways to approach the same issue.

My point is that we will know the airplane is safe when the regulators allow it to return to operation. There are always unknown unknowns that could impact safety of the 737 - or any other product - in the future, necessitating regulatory action.

I wonder how many people are involved in improvement or approval that wouldn't have a clue how to fly an airplane? My wife is smart enough to know that I know much more than she does about airplanes, even though she is overall much smarter than me.:)

If the two MAX flights hadn't crashed, but had gone through 20 minutes of porpoising before recovery and landing, I can almost guarantee you they wouldn't still be flying. @:-)

There are millions of if/then statements that can be created and floated about.

This thread is returning to its old habits of personal attacks (even if in the third person). Discuss the issues, not the posters. If you are thinking of making comments about other posters, DON'T

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This includes sweeping statements about the ability of others to comment on this situation.

Multiple Moderators have had to address multiple issues today on this thread. The Moderator Team has worked to keep this thread open as has been a source of interesting information but if a civil discussion can not be had, this thread will be closed.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator

If the correct procedures had been applied there wouldn't have been any porpoising.

I've got a flight in October that was originally scheduled on a Max 9.

Following the announcement that they were extending the grounding, the aircraft changed to a 737-900.

This week its back to a Max 9.

Hoping that's just a placeholder and not a sign that this flight in particular is likely to be canceled.

Thanks. Its a trip to Vegas for a concert that night and I'm meeting people driving in from California- I'd rather fly in the night before if this one isn't going as the later flights won't work for me.

On the off chance that your flight is cancelled, UA will move you to the previous night's flight at no charge.

That said, I agree with clubord. Once UA gets through the next couple of weeks, the schedule starts to lighten up, and I suspect that cancellations will be rare.