They don't have to be Chuck Yeager to know and implement a 50 year old procedure. The article implies one of the problems is that the procedure is SO basic, the indicators SO blatant that no one thought there'd be an issue. It reminds me of the scene on "From the Earth to the Moon" where Frank Borman was asked what caused the Apollo 1 fire and he replied, "failure of imagination." I've seen similar cases where people aren't trained or practiced in things that have been considered basic knowledge for years (albeit none with anywhere near such catastrophic impacts). I've been frustrated by people wanting checklists to exacting detail and covering every possibility such that they would require dozens of volumes where the standard once-upon-a-time required their predecessors to know and understand their tools and situation then apply the tools appropriately with the checklists acting as memory joggers. At some point, the designer/engineer has to assume a certain level of competency on the part of the operator.

BTW, the author clearly feels Boeing is going to have to change:

Sure, that’s a very reasonable response. It can also be said that the behavior of a malfunctioning MCAS was something totally outside the pilots’ realm of prior experience. That no one (especially in the case of Lion Air) extensively instructed and drilled the pilots about it is a true system failure originating with Boeing.

At their contracted regionals there certainly were. 350, 450 hours was not uncommon at all.

I would also advise there have been plenty of accidents where experience, age, and complacency have been primary or massive contributing factors.

No one is well enough prepared to fly an aircraft which itself won’t fly.

IANAP, was just about to solo when 9/11 occurred and caused my base Aero Club to go into hiatus. I was a bit too busy to continue when they opened back up. However, it sounds from 737 pilots in the US like pilots ARE drilled in runaway stab procedures. The NYT article goes into length about the differences between the Indonesian training "schools" and American training standards (e.g., number of pilots in the simulator at one time, type of training, graduation rates, etc.). The system failures you are talking about required multiple factors that Boeing and the FAA and many pilots didn't/don't consider reasonable.

No aircraft or vehicle operates well when driven past its limits (and the airspeed limits were well known, apparently the overspeed alarm was working, etc.). None of the articles I've read so far have any information on why the ET pilots didn't request more altitude, kept the throttles pushed to take-off power despite the warnings, etc. Did they have a condition like Toyota vehicles circa 2000 that pushed into irrecoverable acceleration due to bit flips? It took Toyota years and the recorded phone conversation of a noted vehicle safety expert who got caught in one of those acceleration events to verify that particular problem and then fix it.

As I said above, IANAP and I'm open to the idea that there is an inherent problem like with the Toyota software but there is abundant evidence of fundamental failures in basic airmanship in the 2 Lion Air and the 1 Ethiopian incidents -- the NYT article summarizes them quite well. We've had numerous testimonials from pilots about the plane flying well if you don't let situations build (there have also been demonstrations that no experienced pilot could recover once the situations were allowed to build past the critical point).

The aircraft were pushed past their airspeed limits because they pitched themselves into the ground...

Are you saying MCAS moved the throttles forward? I didn’t think so.

While the pitch caused additional acceleration, the failure to reduce speed makes it difficult, then impossible, to control pitch. If speed was reduced, the situations may have turned out differently.

There was a design flaw that put the pilots in a difficult situation that should have been avoided.
The pilots acted in a way that turned the difficult situation into a tragic one.
There are many parties and decisions that led Boeing and the crews to those points.
Blaming one party is ignorant and cheap.

This is just preposterous. When MCAS fails and takes control of the aircraft pitching it into the ground, it’s going to take a moment for the crew to figure out what is going on. While reducing speed may be useful, in a scenario where the aircraft is pitching itself directly into terrain with only a few seconds to respond, it’s not unreasonable to believe the crew would focus on trying to fly the aircraft as opposed to manipulating the throttles.

The blame for this and all issues associated with this aircraft lies squarely on Boeing and the corners it cut to reduce production costs, training costs as dictated by AA, and rush an aircraft into service. Negative impacts as a result of this impulsiveness and inattention to detail are secondary results caused by the primary issue here, a poorly produced product.

https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/3...se-pilot-error

https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...ts-11559341016

There is a debate about whether a pilot needs to know about the cause of a problem in order to respond. Clearly, you are off the mindset that pilots must be able to diagnose the origins on uncommanded or runaway trim before they can stop it.

While it is undeniable that Boeing needs to change MCAS (something that was recognized almost immediately after the Lion Air accident), I have to dismiss any and all attempts to dumb down the situation to place the blame in a single place. We are not that stupid.

It may be helpful to acknowledge this is an opinion piece from 5 months ago when less information about each incident was known.

Likely already posted, but:

https://gizmodo.com/united-and-south...t-o-1837912072


"The policy is not new but reiterated this week by a United Airlines executive during an investor conference. <snip>...if a United passenger arrives at a boarding gate “and it’s not an airplane you want to fly on for whatever reason, if it’s a Max, we’ll put you on another flight.”
United Airlines currently has 14 Max aircraft in its fleet. A spokesperson for the airline told Gizmodo by email that United Airlines will work with customers on rebooking their flight if customers don’t want to fly on a Max, but..."

For me, I'd word it differently.

There was a design flaw that developed out of an obsessive need to keep a 40-year-old type certification and avoid simulator training.

The design flaw put the pilots in an extremely difficult situation with little time to recover, as the incidents occurred at full throttle during takeoff when the plane was at low altitude.

The pilots reacted in a way that reflected their lack of knowledge of a system that Boeing had not revealed to them or trained them on.

There is always a chain of events that leads to such disasters. The focus should be on the absolute root cause, and then the proximate causes. The absolute root cause appears to be the design and/or MCAS.

The pilots are no longer with us to explain their actions. But systems and processes can be examined in depth.

As a passenger, I want my passenger aircraft to be as mistake-proof as possible. With the pilots as the absolute last line of defense against errors, I want their burden to be lessened over time and new aircraft models, not extended or made more complicated.

Fair enough. As a passenger, I want to arrive at my destination alive and preferably uninjured.




I'd word that differently. I don't need Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten to explain his action in order to determine with high accuracy what happened on his fateful day!

There seems to be little point in going over all of this again. I sincerely doubt anyone is going to change their mind at this point. This argument is as unconvincing now as it was when it was first put forward, and my rebuttal is unlikely to convince you either. We're talking past one another.

Although I am not a pilot and engineer, I’ll share my understanding of the situation and why you’re wrong on key points.

The functionality of MCAS is a certification requirement, not just to maintain the type certification, but to get certified at all. When a pilot pulls back on the control column, pressure should increase as the nose rises and the aircraft pitches up. Under certain conditions, this did not occur on the MAX. Other commercial airplanes have software to address similar conditions because no jet has perfect aerodynamics.

There are two problems with MCAS: first, it gave an unlimited number of nose down commands. It appears this was permitted as both Boeing and the FAA believed pilots would recognize erroneous deployment as runaway trim and respond accordingly. In hindsight, this assumption was wrong. It’s difficult (with info currently available) to attribute any negligence to this decision as a different deployment wouldn’t increase cost.

The other problem is the decision to depend on one AOA. There has not been a good explanation publicly, probably because this will be harder for Boeing to explain. The change is with software, so it may be difficult to attribute to cost.

It it important to remember that Boeing was building the plane it’s customers wanted to buy. While airlines and passengers would love new technology that has step function improvements in fuel consumption, speed and comfort, no one is willing to pay for it. While Boeing needs to own its decisions, the situation and consequences, it is probably appropriate for customers to ask how our demands for cheaper fares (or more benefits at lower cost) is driving the entire aviation industry to the lowest common denominator.