Uh, no, there is no reality behind this assertion.

I'm having a hard time imagining the 737 Max flying ever again. This, along with the quality problems at the 787 SC plant and Airbus has to be doing cartwheels.

i am sure they do. They have enough lawyers to have an opinion on lots of things, but not all of them are necessarily correct, as federal courts tell them on a regular basis.

But more importantly, Boeing’s “excuse” isn’t that the DOJ told them not to share it. They thought it would have been improper. See my quote.

Thanks, that’s helpful. The ST quote made it sound (to me) that Forkner did a copy/paste job, and presumably because he felt a need to preserve them.

Umm, Airbus is having its own issues. They’ve just managed to keep them a bit quieter. Of course, they only had one A330 crash, rather than two in close sequence. That said, Airbus has actively been trying to use the two MAX crashes to sell their airplanes in a quite distasteful way.

I'm not sure if there's currently a lot of interest in their products stateside, given how affected they are by the new ex-EU import tariffs that just came into effect post the WTO ruling with regards to the EU subsidies they received.

Not that that makes it any easier for US airlines looking to expand their fleet.

That's what I mean by a rebuild - new software, not just a patch, proper software written stateside, not by foreign contractors, and with the FAA certification people monitoring every iteration and test onsite, over everyone's shoulder. If additional sensors are needed, they go in, if not, it's just new software - and no pushing through certification, but a lengthly process with frequent checks and balances by outside officials not connected with Boeing given all the eyes not just on Boeing, but on the FAA for mishandling this process from the beginning.

It's either this, or goodbye MAX permanently.

LOL if you say so - but so far everything I've forecasted for dates, delays and more surprises has become reality, so I am sticking with my track record.

Keep in mind I am a Boeing supporter - I dislike Airbus and their shady business dealings, and their overly aggressive reliance on automation. Now the A220, is having its own engine based debacle.

The more fancy technology that goes into airplanes, the worse they end up.

I don't see the MAX entering commercial service before summer-fall 2020, assuming we don't have any more unwelcome surprises come up.

This is a thread about UA 737MAX, but that statement above is quite inaccurate. They had quite a few more than that. At least two where the side stick input (vs. yoke) was a major contributor.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List...he_Airbus_A330

Correct. I was referring to incidents related to design flaws.

I contend the side stick *IS* a design flaw that led to two crashes 11 months apart.

As far as any report I've seen, the software writers delivered software that did exactly what the spec required. The problem was with the control law that was undoubtedly provided by Boeing - the software engineers don't decide how the plane trims itself, they just implement the code to do it. And they had configuration management problems (again at Boeing) in that they allowed a parameter change (the amount of trim applied by MCAS) without triggering a safety review.

I am sure that the flying public will be comforted by the fact that Boeing engineers figured out the problems with the MCAS system in 2016, but Boeing hid that from the public and the FAA, and launched anyway. And then kept it hidden after two deadly crashes. Boeing's humanitarian desire to prevent people being afraid is truly admirable. Given Boeing's noble actions, I am sure that Airbus will treat it with the same magnanimous spirit that Boeing demonstrated.

Airbus has switched some A321 and A220 assembly to Alabama to avoid in part these issues.

The bigger issue is that Boeing was the first to file it's claims against Airbus in 2004. The WTO rejected claims re launch aid for the A320, A330, and A350, but allowed $7.2B in counter measures against Europe (mostly re older programs and the A380) In the Airbus Case against Boeing filed in 2005, the WTO found violations in DOD support for Boeing and in local tax breaks, specifically finding $5.2B in aid to Boeing on the 787. BUT, and its a big but, the appeal panel has not finalized the "penalty number" (which Europe claims is between $15-20B), which will come out in early 2020.

So Boeing has a 6 month jump on imposing penalties, and then the Europeans will get to impose their penalties. Meanwhile the Europeans are really, really POed that the US (by dint of having started its case a little earlier) has refused to resolve the dispute and has devolved to imposing penalties, despite Europe being able to shortly impose penalties. You can bet that Boeing is going to get clobbered in 6 months, and that any good will towards Boeing by regulators is going to be in very very short supply.

Basically Boeing has lied to the US regulators and tried to overpower and bully the Europeans on subsidies. The MAX is VERY, VERY vulnerable.

This is the narrative that’s been created but we don’t know the specifics of the problem referenced in the text message (Forkner’s lawyer says it was specific to the SIM), what was or wasn’t shared with the FAA and if there was negligence or malfeasance. The intent of various investigations is to answer these questions.

Regardless of the truth, and the fact that the future safety of the airplane has little to do with how mistakes were made in the past, much of the public is disinterested in the truth and will focus on misleading headlines.

That said, the aviation industry has long had an un spoken agreement that safety is a shared commitment and off limits for marketing. I’ve seen Airbus cross this line in private and public conversations. Like all effective attacks, there are kernels of truth. That doesn’t mean it is not disgusting and, as they say, those in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.

While it is difficult to separate politics, I think it is ignorant to try and connect WTO issues to the certification of new airplanes. Escalation of either issue serves no one. Are you trying to suggest that EASA will fail to recertifications the MAX because of import duties imposed on EU products by the US?

As UA and none of the Northern American carriers are using MAX aircraft to Europe and of UA partners none of the *A European partners have MAXs (although TK and ET do), the European certification, while an interesting issue with political side issues, seems to be an area of little relevance to the UA forum and highly likely to take this discussion OMNI. So, let's stay away from the political issues and European certification.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator

Naive question:

My understanding is that the original motivation for MCAS was to keep the handling characteristic of the MAX similar to all previous 737. However, without MCAS, it would be a perfectly functional aircraft, just one that is sufficiently different to previous 737 models, and therefore one that would require new pilot certification.

At this point, why not just remove MCAS and implement a new training / certification programme? Is that still more expensive than the current debacle?

I by no means am an expert or have any insight beyond the little I read, but my arm-chair take on the situation is Boeing opted for what they perceived at the time to be an optimal strategy to edge out the next-gen A320 series.

A large part of this rested on not requiring expensive pilot re-certifition allowing the MAX to be certified as if it were a 737NG* and extracting more efficiency from the 737 platform by using a higher bypass engine. However, achieving the required gains from a new engine required a larger engine. Due to the ground-to-wing clearance of the 737s, or lack thereof, Boeing mounted the engine further forward on/in-front of the wing to accommodate the increased diameter of the new engine. This in turn changed the handling characteristics of the MAX which jeopardized Boeing's promise pilots would NOT need to be re-certified a 737NG pilot could fly a MAX under their existing 737NG certification*.

*(see comments added below)

This lead Boeing to develop the MCAS system to "simulate" the handling of a 737NG and avoided, or so they believed, needing to re-certifiy pilots.

I always know the winning lottery numbers...problem is I only know them about a day too late.

In hindsight, my guess is "yes", it would have been cheaper for all involved.

What's troubling to me is it appears Boeing failed to place the safety of their ultimate customers - you and me - first through willful ignorance, if not outright deception, and in doing so violated the public's trust (or at least IMHO - still following the story to see what further develops).

Edited to add updates to the MAX's certification vis-a-vis the 737NG: