Man, you got THAT right.
Old saying: “ You know how to make a small fortune? Take a large fortune invest it in airlines. You’ll have a small fortune in no time”.

Will be interesting to see to see if there is a bump for Boeing or large MAX airline customers when a(n actual) resumption date is announced.

Is Boeing's stock in trouble? Absolutely. Do they have a public confidence problem? Also absolutely. Do those factors prove the primary causative factor was a design issue or disprove pilot error(s) as primary causative factors? Absolutely not. The reality is that 2 crashes of this magnitude in a short time period was always going to provoke inquiry and shake confidence in the product and there's nothing wrong with that. It ALSO should have provoked inquiry and shaken confidence in 2 Third World airlines that have now been shown to have questionable training practices and standards (and one of which has been known to have more than questionable maintenance practices). National politics and interests in the two countries that home those airlines may be playing as much a factor here as US politics/economics play in Boeing's fate.

What does this have to do with United?

1. United has little exposure to the MAX but the rolling impacts of aircraft unavailability are eventually going to bite them.
2. United's hiring and training standards for flight crew as well as maintenance practices compared to the two airlines suffering MAX crashes are one reason to keep flying UA (versus going with *A partners that have "better" soft product for the costs).
3. While I'm not happy with United's devaluation of award miles or cheapening of the soft product on-board, I'd rather the airline cut costs there than put 7 pilots in a simulator at the same time and count them all as "trained" or put FOs in the right seat with less flight time than the drive time my parents required before letting me take a car out solo.

No opinion on that and a subject not for this thread. Let's stay focused on the MAX issue, and if and when it will return to service and what may be barriers to that.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator

I would argue this is even more of a leap than assuming MCAS was the primary contributing factor to the cause of these accidents. At the end of the day, here is the reality: if MCAS had not been installed and had not been functioning on these aircraft, they undoubtedly would not have crashed.

We can dive into the semantics of pilot training at Lion Air and ET for years and sure, admittedly at least in the case of Lion Air it's not great. They have had numerous runway overrun incidents in 737 type aircraft over the years which points to a shortcoming in the training of their flight crews. It is also worth noting that Indonesia suffers from very heavy rain frequently, has questionable runway design and drainage at many smaller airports, and that the 737NG has a relatively high approach and takeoff speed. The 737MAX case is very different from these other accidents and incidents. This is a situation where nothing would have happened to either of these flights had Boeing's need to appease AA and make the MAX fly just like the NG not existed. This whole fiasco screams of incompetence, impulsivity, and inattention to detail on the part of Boeing, AA, and the FAA.

This is a massive and IMO uninformed leap to make. Airlines such as LH, SQ, NH, and LX have better reputations for safety than UA and many other US airlines. And if you recall UA and other US airlines are the ones who called for no simulator training on the MAX and wanted pilots to take only a brief transition course.

My thoughts as well.

I do not understand what Boeing is changing to make me feel any safer getting on a MAX. I understand my fear may be irrational but the MCAS is still going to be required on the MAX as Boeing has not changed the fundamental design of the plane so the MCAS is needed, albeit there will now be (mandatory/better) pilot training.

If a flight is going to use a MAX I will not be going. I did the same with DC-10s. There are also certain makes of cars I will not rent for similar safety concerns. Limits my choices but these are choices I choose to make.

I really hope United and other airlines decide to boycott the MAX planes and hope Boeing considers offering alternative aircraft to United.

That simply isn't true. Any failure of the automatic trim stabilization feature would likely have caused these planes to crash, given that the crews apparently failed to follow the procedure to disengage the automatic stabilizer and trim the aircraft manually.

For the nth time, the MAX is not a fly-by-wire aircraft; it is not possible for it to fly itself into the ground, unlike the planes (e.g., the A321) which are often floated as replacements (or, for that matter, the 777/787, as this isn't an Airbus/Boeing thing). A crew that knew how to handle the situation would not have crashed the plane (see: the penultimate LionAir flight).

Also fo the nth time, this isn't to sy that Boeing can't make some improvements, but ultimately the 737 can be flown manually, and both Boeing and the FAA have relied upon pilots understanding when that needed to be done.

There is approximately zero chance that UA, or anyone else, is going to boycott the MAX.

I take it that your definition of "anyone else" does not extend to individual people.

Your fear is irrational, but not unexpected.

This is a complicated technical topic that is difficult to explain and understand. Combined with the fact we are talking about a life and death situation, most people will revert to making emotional rather than logical conclusions. This is a problem for Boeing and the FAA.

What is critical to recognize is that neither Boeing nor the FAA or other regulators are motivated to compromise safety, despite mistakes made in the past. The amount of attention placed on this aircraft will insure the same issues will not reoccur. Airlines and their pilots are also approaching the MAX with great skepticism and the willingness of United to take delivery of a MAX, and its pilots to fly it, should provide comfort.

As pointed out repeatedly in this thread, there is absolutely nothing wrong with the fundamental design of the plane. The plane's issues are redundancy, software and reinforcing training, which are fixable.

I'm glad you recognize that your fear is irrational (as are most fears). Everyone is free to make a choice what aircraft they fly on, irrational or not. The plane will start flying again and will have a long service life. I think most people will forget all about this within a year. I book away from certain aircraft as well.

Sorry, yes, "anyone else" in that context meant "any operator."

It is absolutely a true statement. There is nothing to indicate that there would have been any kind of runaway trim event on either of these flights if the MCAS system had been disabled or simply not installed to begin with.

I thought there was a faulty AOA sensor from some dubious Florida outfit installed in the LionAir plane?

Runaway trim is a real possibility, at any time, on any 737. That's why there's a specific procedure for dealing with it. Yes, these particular runaway trim events were likely due to the design of the MCAS, which is why it's being modified. I've said from nearly the beginning that the MAX appears more likely to enter an emergency state than the NG, which is why it's been grounded, and which is what they're addressing.

That said, it is absolutely the responsibility of the pilots to be able to deal with this type of emergency. That philosophy -- not some strange conspiracy -- is why the plane was certified as-is in the first place. Boeing's belief, signed off on by the FAA, was that if the system failed, the pilots were the backup, which is (a) pretty much a core Boeing philosophy, and (b) true for all of the other automation on a 737 (NG or MAX).

Both Boeing and the operators are at fault here.

Irrelevant however in this instance, because these two events were triggered solely by the existence of MCAS.

While it would have been great if the flight crews were able to identify and solve the problem before it became a catastrophe, the point still stands: Neither of these accidents would have occurred if Boeing had not installed MCAS on the 737MAX.

computer software that manages flight systems is a design feature and there is now ample evidence of an inherent defect that was known to Boeing and neither disclosed to regulators or operators, thus operator training was already deficient by default.

It is in poor taste and really inappropriate to suggest that United, American or Southwest pilots would have some inherent superior skill to manage this defect if encountered without being told about it in the first place.

and I quote: “MCAS is "running rampant in the sim" – referring to the flight simulator – and that the system's performance was "egregious".”

therefore there is a fundamental design problem with the aircraft at the software level.