J.Edward

On the surface, I would agree here. A design being old - by whatever/whoever's definition - does not automatically invalidate it or evidence that it is flawed.

Focusing in on the 737 & MAX - based on your posts these are the arguments I see (please correct me if I missed any or misinterpreted any of them)

1. Technology has progressed a lot in the 50 years since the original 737 was certified;
2. the basic laws of aerodynamics are unchanged;
3. a design that flew perfectly well 50 years ago will still fly perfectly well;
4. the horizontal stabilizer is one such system [critical for flight control] but the electronic system controlling it [MCAS] is not as [the horizontal stabilizer] can be adjusted manually

Point 1 and 2 strike me as self-evident and I do not think (?) posters in the thread disagree with them. Therefore point 3 and 4 are where the issues lie.

Drilling down into point 3: a properly maintained 737-100 (entering into commercial service in 1968 ~ 51 years ago) or 737-200 (entering into commercial service in 1968 ~51 years ago) will fly just as good today as it did fifty-one years ago. However, this is largely irrelevant to this thread as no one is expressing concerns on the safety or airworthiness of a properly maintained 737-100/200. The concern expressed here is with regards to the MAX and I'd argue the MAX represents a material differentiation from the original 737's of the late 1960s.

This is NOT to say any evolution/differentiation is bad. The 737 classic (733/734/735) as well as the next-gen 737s (73G/738/739) strike me as a logical extension of the 737 family and affirm your first two arguments (technology progressed, basic laws of aerodynamics remain unchanged).

But when it came to the MAX, the impression I get (as a concerned spectator who has no training, experience, etc. in aeronautical engineering) is Boeing pushed the MAX too far. At the risk of making an analogy to software (where I also have no training, experience, etc.) this strikes me as being akin to an enterprise customer who refuses to let go of their legacy software they've since outgrown...they're using excel to manage their inventory when they really need a purpose-built database. Or maybe they refuse to let go of QuickBooks when the accounting complexities of the business have grown to demand a more complex solution. This is NOT to say there's anything wrong with Excel or Quickbooks BUT it is to say there's a natural limit to what these two programs can offer and a customer demanding more than what they can offer is just setting themselves up for failure.

...and I think this is where the main point of contention is. A growing company migrating from excel to custom built relational database is not throwing away excel as it more so realizing their business demands have outgrown the capabilities of excel.

Thus the 737 as it was 51 years ago, and its subsequent evolutions, can only go so far. The classics and NG 737s strike me as being winners for all involved. But in designing the MAX, I fear Boeing demanded too much of the 737 leaving us the traveling public to pay the price.

VegasGambler

Of course they did. MCAS would be unnecessary without the engine size and placement changes. A feature can't fail if it's not there...

DenverBrian

Not certain at all. While perhaps not the proximate cause, one thing is for certain: It'll be noted in the long chain of events that lead to the two crashes.

spin88

I think that you (DB and VG) point out the problem with Newman55's reasoning. We do not look at things as just direct cause, but as a chain of events more generally.

Had Boeing done an updated design (back in the late 2000s when the Board decided not to) neither of these crashes would have occurred. Instead, Boeing moved late, compromised the plane's aerodynamics out of need due to the limits of the low stance of the 737 and then (either to make it certifiable, or just needing them fixed) MCAS was the "fix". Lots of design issues with the "fix" (single sensor, taking the disagree system off-line absent a special add on instrument package). At a whole host of decision points, had Boeing gone a different way, these accidents would not have happened.

So a chain of errors, which lead to earlier decisions, but (a) not doing a new clean sheet design, and (b) then having to move the engine's forward and up so they could fit under the wing, are good places to look as the initiation of a series of events leading to these crashes.

Weatherboy

When will UA update their schedules again to remove more weeks/months of MAX service? The WSJ quotes the FAA this week saying it won't return to service earlier than October, but UA still has the equipment in their summer (and beyond) schedules.

spin88

Wow! If so, it suggests the FAA has given up on trying to ram Boeing's "plan" - a few extra hours on an iPad - as additional training through.. Unless some other issues we don't know of was uncovered, hard for me to see what the additional delay would be for, other than requiring more intense, and possibly simulator, training.

chrisl137

Because changing anything vaguely safety related on an aircraft or spacecraft takes a long time, and it takes even longer when there's a lot of visibility. I would expect it to be more real world testing and comparison of pilots flying real aircraft in edge cases against models than simulator training.

spin88

Well that was not the original Boeing/FAA pitch. They were just going to flash on some new software and roll-out a few hours of iPad training. Guess that is not gonna work....

If they have to pay delays through October, and assuming given that length of time that Boeing ends up having to pay $5M in compensation for each plane, then we are talking about $1.5+ Billion. That is more than the MAX program cost Boeing (not counting the engines) according to reports I have seen.

BF263533

“Boeing is in talks to settle with families suing them over 737 Max crash deaths and avoid a potentially excruciating trial”

“A lawyer representing multiple families told Business Insider it is in Boeing's "best interest" to settle, as it would stop lawyers going through evidence to see if there were any issues with how the company designed and made the plane.”

https://www.businessinsider.com/boei...d-trial-2019-6

This is why I may now wait up to 3 years to step on a MAX. . I was hoping that the discovery in the lawsuits would flush out the hidden issues.

jsloan

So, the FAA is inept, until they're suddenly all-powerful again, exactly at the right time to quash Boeing's wanton recklessness, despite the likelihood that it would bankrupt the company?

Maybe it will take longer because both Boeing and the FAA have been trying to get it right the whole time. That interpretation really seems to involve a lot fewer mental gymnastics.

And if they have to pay $30 in compensation for each plane, we're talking about $100K. I don't have any basis for my number, either. And, honestly, what earthly difference does it make?

A plaintiff's attorney is hardly an unbiased source.

It is, and has always been, in Boeing's best interest to settle, not because they want to avoid discovery (although they might -- I have no idea), but because a trial makes for great headlines and terrible PR. Even if they were to win at trial, they'd lose.

DenverBrian

If Boeing and the FAA had been trying to get it right the whole time, 350 people would be alive today who are now dead. @:-)

I'm certain Boeing shareholders understand the earthly difference between a $100K loss and a $1.5B loss. @:-)

VegasGambler

I'm not so sure about that. To the general public, a settlement looks like an admission of guilt.

chrisl137

They started working on the software mod after the first crash, and it was about 6 months before they were talking about thinking they're done - it never looked like "just flash some software and toss out some ipad training"

As much as it sounds like, $1.5B is tiny compared to what they're going to make (or lose) on the orders they have (or lose) if the program succeeds (or tanks). While they wait to get cleared to fly again, they should also be spending a few hundred $M reviewing all the docs behind every change they made from the NG to the MAX to make sure there aren't other high risk changes that got through.

jsloan

You're assuming willful neglect. I'm not. In the real world, accidents happen. It doesn't take negligence in order for mistakes to be made.

So? I doubt any of us hold enough Boeing shares for it to make any real difference to any of us. (Personally, my only position in Boeing is through a couple of index funds).

It doesn't matter. If they settle, the story ends, which puts it in Boeing's best interest. The general public (a) has already convicted Boeing anyway and (b) won't remember this six months after the planes are back in service.

HNLbasedFlyer

Or, more importantly, more qualified pilots at those airlines.....