There is absolutely no evidence that there is NOT a threat from shoes. The same could be said for the most common argument I get here:
Since Richard Reid, no one has brought down an airplane (post hoc), therefore there is no threat to aviation from shoes (ergo propter hoc). The argument works in all directions. The people on Reids flight got lucky, and took great steps to prevent him from carrying out the plan once they figured out what he was doing. You guys can keep posting, but I will keep telling you the same thing - Shoes are a viable threat, and the rules are what they are until we can come up with a better way to clear them.

Every time you tout TSA as a preventative element (as you did in the post to which I responded), you undermine yourself.

The post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy certainly also applies to the way in which you've reworded the argument. Please don't reword the argument. I did not posit there is zero threat from shoes. In fact, I didn't address the level of shoe-threat at all; I merely pointed out a logical fallacy in your argument.

However, since you raise the point, the challenge is not whether the threat is "viable" (whatever "viable" may mean). What has been posited is: there is an extraordinarily low probability that such a threat would be actualized.

TSA is obsessed with providing a zero-risk environment at any cost, and the shoe carnival is just one example of this mindset. First, a zero-risk environment is a virtual impossibility. Second, I object to TSA's demonstrated willingness to disregard law and regulation in its attempt to realize this impossible-to-obtain obsession. Third, this impossible-to-obtain obsession, combined with rash and ill-conceived methodology, has resulted in a magnitude of fiscal waste by one single agency, within an extraordinarily short time frame, unseen in this country's history -- and, wow, do I ever object to that. (And I'm not even going to the absolutely appalling lack of training and competence demonstrated by most of its employees.)

TSA IS a preventative measure, you are safer getting on a plane with TSA there than you would be without them there. That is not undermining myself, it is simply a fact. With no screening, there would be a chance for anyone with anything to get on the plane.

Websters defines viable as :http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/viable

It means it has a reasonable chance of working. I agree that the aim of the organization is a risk free enviornment, I also agree with you that it is impossible. I believe that means we should try to prevent what we can with all means at our disposal, that is just trying to do the best you can with what you have. Probability is a bad reason to change a screening process. the probability of someone taking over a plane with a gun is an extremely low, but there is the chance that several people on the flight will be injured or killed if someone tries it - does that mean we should not screen for guns? The probability of someone taking over a plane with a box cutter or knife is nil, does that mean we should stop screening for them? All it takes is one person to try the shoe bomb apporach again and then the same people on here that have been raising hades about the shoe screening would be whining about how TSA stopped the "shoe carnival" (as you so affectionately call it) and it was all our fault. I reworded the argument to make the point that most of the arguments made here against the shoe screening process can be defended with the same thought process. I think that the agency has taken legal issue to heart and consult before making changes. Do they get it wrong sometimes? Yup, they would be computers if they didnt, but they are human, so mistakes will be made from time to time. If there are legal questions for the procedures, they will be worked out in the courts system, that is what it is there for. As for the lack of training or competence, I challenge your assumption, this is the best trained workforce in the federal government, we recertify, train constantly and learn new stuff almost every week. The fact that 99% of the publicity you see is negative must have influenced your assumption, because for every bad thing I see on the news, I see a thousand good things done by my coworkers (both here and nationally). I will agree that we have room for improvement, that will always be the case and to say or think otherwise is unrealistic.

If shoes are a viable threat, why have no planes been brought down by shoe bombs in countries that don't have a mandatory shoe carnival?

If shoes are a viable threat, why were no planes brought down before August 2006, when the shoe carnival was not mandatory?

What is the name of your first grade teacher, and does she know that your reading comprehension is at about the same level as a cocker spaniel's?

My first grade teacher was Mrs. Pegram, and she was a wonderful lady. Personal attacks serve only to further the image that the person dealing them has nothing salient to add to the conversation. Shoes are a viable threat, the fact that they have not been used elsewhere (or here for that matter) is not an indicator as to the viability of the method.

There's no personal attack at all: You clearly have poor reading comprehension skills, since you take evidence that proves TSA's shoe carnival is pointless as supporting the shoe carnival.

Please answer these questions, then:

If shoes are a viable threat, why have no planes been brought down by shoe bombs in countries that don't have a mandatory shoe carnival?

If shoes are a viable threat, why were no planes brought down before August 2006, when the shoe carnival was not mandatory?

If a risk free environment is a TSA goal then why does TSA only screen a fraction of the people who enter the secure area?

Do the people who are not screened present NO risk?

As noted in earlier threads, this is a false choice. The alternative to "TSA doing everything they do now the way they do it now" is not necessarily "no screening." We recently established that no one here is suggesting that there be no screening, only that the screening be reasonable and in proportion to the threat. Which brings me to:
But what you have "at your disposal" is $7 BILLION a year with requests for more (yet still not enough, obviously for the magic liquid-explosive-finding x-ray). How much is enough? When do you say "we could do something else but the cost is too high?"

There are three things to be considered in any restriction on items and the associated screening: (a) what is the actual risk, (b) how intrusive/slow/expensive is screening for it, and (c) to what extent will people be inconvenienced by not being allowed these items.

Take two extremes: a Wily Coyote ACME-brand bomb is (a) dangerous and (b) easy to find with x-ray or WTMD. As for (c), it's hard to envision anyone who legitimately needs to carry on an ACME bomb and will be inconvenienced if they're banned. This is an obvious case of "should not be allowed."

On the other hand, consider liquids. Every bomb is a threat, every gun is a threat, but most liquids are harmless. Just for now, I'm going to pretend that liquid explosives are a viable threat. But compared to guns or Wily Coyote bombs, liquids have not proven, historically, to be a huge risk. So on part (a), liquids score low (maybe not zero, but low). For part (b) finding liquids is more difficult so the screening now has to include a patdown or nude-o-scope. People have to answer medical questions about their legitimate liquids, risk contamination through testing, risk having medicines or baby food confiscated by your colleagues who get it wrong, decide to leave important medicines at home because they're worried about getting in trouble, etc. In short, screening for liquids is far more intrusive, expensive and slow than screening for guns or bombs. As to (c), many, many people have legitimate needs to travel with liquids, which means that you need to allow exceptions (which negate the restrictions) and also that many people with legitimate intentions (bringing a bottle of wine back from overseas, for example) are inconvenienced.

Instead of TSA increasingly restricting every single thing that could possibly be a "viable" threat, they need to weigh up factors in this way. This is what I meant by saying screening should be proportional to the threat. Is the increase in cost (not only to TSA but to the passengers, in real money and in time), intrusiveness and inconvenience for law-abiding citizens justified by the extent of the threat? It is clear that TSA NEVER does such an analysis, they just respond to every "viable" threat in the same way.

When I leave my house, I turn off the oven, stove and steam iron. But I don't unplug all the electronic devices which are on standby and I may leave a light or two on, even though there is a risk those things may cause a fire. Why? Because the risk of fire from the TV or DVD player or 100W bulb is very very very low compared to a fire from the gas cooktop. And unplugging everything in the house is inconvenient. I make an assessment of risk versus the difficulty of eliminating that risk. Similarly, I lock the front and back door. If I took the TSA approach you suggest: "we should try to prevent what we can with all means at our disposal" I would have to hire armed guards to patrol my house day and night. Some cities in the world, that's actually a good strategy, as the risk outweighs the cost. But not where I live.
Probability is one of the things that needs to be taken into account, and the one that TSA ignores. There are literally billions of things/events that could be dangerous 1 time out of 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, but the risk is not sufficient to justify screening for them. (For example, there's a very tiny but non-zero risk that all the polyester seat covers on the plane could spontaneously burst into flame.) At the same time, TSA ignores obvious risks (cargo, employees) because it's "too hard."
Apply the rationale above. (a) Guns are very effective if you want to hurt or threaten people. (Compare that to liquids, which, per se, are not weapons.) (b) Guns are easy to screen for with x-ray and WTMD. And air travellers have decades of experience of restrictions on guns. (c) People who need to transport guns should have safe methods to do so without carrying them on board. (Note - TSA needs to improve luggage security so this is true.) Sum: yeah, screen for guns.
Actually, I think you should, at least for box cutters and pocket knives. (Machetes and swords should probably still be forbidden.) (a) risk from small knives is fairly low, but (b) screening is fairly easy but (c) lots of us would like to have our Swiss Army knives back.
The CYA approach is a bad way to do security. All it would take is one TSA employee getting an explosive through security and blowing up a plane, and we'll all be raising hades about how you aren't screening your own people. TSA is willing to accept that risk because it would be inconvenient for you. When it comes to inconveniencing us, however, TSA is not willing to accept ANY risk, no matter how small.
As noted by others, the "oops, oh well, we're only human" only applies to the TSA. Passengers don't get the same consideration.
Only if (a) someone can show that they've been harmed by your processes and (b) has the money and time (and more money) to take it to court. It'll happen, but not right away. And "we'll do this until someone says it's illegal" is not a responsible way to run a gov't.
Quantity of training is not the same as quality of training.
If you get to judge all passengers (more than 99% of whom are law-abiding innocent people) in the light of Richard Reid and the 9/11 perpetrators, we get to judge all TSA screeners on the basis of the far more than 1% who steal, yell, lie, make up rules, mock, threaten and ask D-Y-W-T-F-T. The TSA can't simultaneously present itself as infallible and above scrutiny, then hide behind "nobody's perfect/room for improvement" when found out.

The world has been lucky.

The world WAS lucky.

I keep pointing out that it is viable, you keep indicating it is not. Give me reasons it is not. You could cite the ability to obtain the types of explosives used in this type of endeavor would be difficult (which I would counter with the black market angle, not to mention the ability to download directions for most types of explosives from the internet and the fact that some of the terrorist organizations have connections that can make it much easier for an organized group). That would be a reason it is not viable (a wrong reason, but a reason), the fact that it hasn't been used (previous to Reid or since) is not a good reason to say it is not a viable method. The method is there and actually fairly easy, hence the protocols used now. Obviously we are not communicating very well, because it is a viable method. I did not take information supporting the fallacy (thanks for the word I haven't used since college Irish!) that it is not viable as information for my point. I merely used an older phrase to point out that the argument being used most here can be placed into the same phrase and it is true. "Because we have not had an attack of this nature, it is not a viable threat" it is a perfect fit. It is also erroneous. Assaulting my ability to read and comprehend means you have reached an impasse in what you have to add to the argument, further reinforced by the fact you keep repeating "why have planes not been falling out of the sky if this is viable". This is probably due to a series of things -
1. The people that would use this method may have not done so simply out of expedience (the shoe protocols make it difficult to do this in the US or coming to the US).
2. The people that would use this method may be waiting until an important time frame to make a bigger statement (waiting until several of their people are in place to do so all at one time for more impact)
3. There could be problems with the command structure of the organization that would use this method (several figureheads have been killed over the last few years).
4. We all got lucky.
5. They may not have the money to pull it off.
6. They may not have the technical savvy to get it to work the way they want it to (the front enders are not usually the bomb makers, just the ones with a desire to further the cause with a bang and glory).
7. Did I mention we may have just gotten lucky?

Shoes are a viable method for bringing a plane down. You can disagree with the screening protocols all you want to, but the method is there and fairly easy (all it takes is boom, and a hot glue gun and you are in). The screening procedures are there until TSA can come up with a better method of screening them sufficiently.

Bolding mine.
The rest of the world doesn't think what you just posted is true/valid.

Straw man, false dichotomy, argumentum ad consequentiam.
Question: Is it safer getting on a plane with TSA than it was getting on a plane with the pre-TSA security? Answer: No.


In terms of the mechanics of the device, not in dispute.


Argumentum ad consequentiam.
ALL means? How very Machiavellian. I submit to you, sir, that the ends do not always justify the means.



False dichotomy, argumentum ad consequentiam.
Probability is the only reason to change the screening process, and you�re addressing probability in the wrong context. Question: given the range of devices accessible to be used to take over a plane, what is the probability that a given device will be effectively used?


Tu quoque.
Do not presume my motivation or determination. Your assertion presumes that I (and others) lack the principles to stand by our beliefs. You are wrong, sir. Period.


I�ve seen no evidence of any such thing. To the contrary, I�ve seen at least two posts within the last seven days detailing continued recent, egregious, inappropriate and illegal extensions of power by TSA operatives.


It is unfortunate and dismaying that an agency of the United States government in unable to remain within the bound of law and regulation absent intervention by the courts.



Quantity of training does not imply quality of training. Neither quantity of training nor quality of training implies competence. It�s bad enough to have an entire federal agency apparently run by the Peter Principle. It�s worse that the Peter Principle apparently extends to the hiring level in so very many cases.


STOP making baseless assumptions. Publicity, good or bad, does not influence my thinking. Neither do your anecdotal experiences. I acknowledge the fact that some TSA operatives are above the baseline. I draw conclusions based upon what I personally experience. I can believe TSA�s propaganda, or I can believe my own lying eyes. Guess which way I tend to lean.

Because no planes have been brought down by shoe bombs in countries that don't have a mandatory shoe carnival.

Because no planes were brought down by shoe bombs in the US before August 2006, when the shoe carnival was not mandatory.

These are facts that cannot be disputed. They are incontrovertible. They demonstrate that, regardless of what shoe screening protocols are or are not in place, that Reid was an aberration, not the first in a long line of would-be shoe bombers. That you continue to type increasingly shrill and incoherent screeds in response to these facts does nothing to change them.

And they have suffered absolutely no ill consequences as a result.

I agree that there should be some weight given to the impact on the passengers before instigating procedures (and in more cases than you think that is done). Liquids are viable, according to the agency, it is a serious possibility. I have always argued the all or none approach to the LAG prohibitions, it doesn't make sense any other way. Either let the passengers take them, and test them all (or get the xray/cts that can detect the difference), or let nothing but medical exceptions go (through the checkpoint, baggage areas with the CT capabilities should allow LAG with no problems) and test all of them (either with CT or test strips. The way we do it now leaves way to much open to individual interpretations (TSO A allows bottle a, TSO B does not), confusion, and PR nightmare.

Shoes are way easier to do, therefore I think the protocols outweigh the inconvenience factor for that reason alone (I mean seriously, it takes 15 minutes once you get the boom stuff).

I actually agree with the knives under 3 inches, I mean - you can take a 12 inch knitting needle made of carbon steel but not a pocket knife? Larger knives need to be checked (did I mention when am away from work, that I carry a pocket knife and have since I was about 5?).

I have always stated that I would not have a problem screening upon entry to work. I will say that revamping the protocols for airside workers would take tons of money and time because of the amount of locations that would need to be changed around and rebuilt and switched around, there would have to be new equipment... it would be nothing short of a goat roping of the first order. NOT arguing for or against, just pointing out the obvious.

I have never been rude to a passenger, even when they were being referred to LEO (sometimes for getting nigh on physical with me - and I was really NICE to the guy, he was drunk and unruly to start with...), I make no excuses for those TSOs that are. I hold people accountable for their actions, not for some super secret rule somewhere. If you bring something with you on the prohib list (depending on what type of item it is) I give the same options to anyone coming through. I have never uttered DY...T or any variation thereof, and have no mercy for coworkers that do (even STSOs), I have found that 99% of the time that just escalates an already somewhat tense situation. I have NEVER claimed that TSA is infallible, nothing even close to it, as a matter of fact when I see areas for improvement I point them out to the appropriate persons. I have never stolen anything from work (I hope an ink pen here and there does not count) or a passenger and never will. I have no mercy for those that do from this position, I find them despicable and hope they are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. I have never made up a rule, lied to a passenger, mocked a passenger or yelled at a passenger, and think those that do should be counseled, written, or fired based on the severity of the issue.

If you think that the agency is immune to the failings of human nature, then you are sadly mistaken. All agencies are subject to that element of nature and some will always slip through into the ranks. It happens to all federal agencies, FBI, CIA, DHS, USS, and any other alphabet soup group you can throw at the wall, it is unrealistic to expect different - just like it is unrealistic to expect passengers to know all of the rules on flying and to be 100% perfect every flight. I keep saying on here that I am lucky, I work at a smaller airport and don't see much of what you guys post about on here. The worst we usually have is an argument over who is supposed to rotate to the next position when. I think you should take each passenger that comes in as they come, help them where they need it, and communicate with them as they come through (this applies mainly to the ones that need the help, not the Road Warriors that fly twice and 5 times a week, those folks just want to be left alone!).