Of course. But the nonsensical liquids policies he implemented remain in place.

Most of the baggage areas have different screening methods and better tech. The equipment in baggage is usually quite expensive, so it can't be placed at all checkpoint areas (although it would be nice wouldn't it?) The bag is also unavailable to the passenger (which limits some interactivity). I really want to know what an endothermic liquid would be.... sweet, maybe it could take the place of my air conditioner eh? Anyway, the puffers had many problems with dust and enviornmental contaminants, maintenance, etc, and became to costly to maintain at effective levels. I actually think the agency has admitted the limitations of the xray by taking steps like this and using the trace detection equipment. Nothing is foolproof, all aspects of the screening have faults and shortcomings, that is why we use several different (to quote agency speak) "layers" of security.

And Gail Rossides is an idiot for continuing his idiocy.

So you don't think it likely that a evildoer would check his liquid bomb and have a remote detonator in his pocket that looked like a pen.

I really feel safe now!

Because the ONLY threat the TSA seems to recognize or care about is the one at the passenger checkpoint. Checked bags are given a cursory glance (unless there is something worse stealing) and cargo gets on board almost totally check-free. Through-the-fence contractors have almost free, unfettered access to aircraft where they can hide God knows what.

There is ample proof that all the TSA is after is a public display of 'security' (hence security theater) which will keep the public satisfied and their funding stream alive. They likely would care less if a cargo bomb went off and took out an airliner.

The sad part is the number of screeners who actually believe the X-Ray machine can detect the presence and content of liquid explosives. The organization is rotten from the top down and everything in between. It is beyond saving at this point.

Well, I didn't phrase it explicitly enough. Not to get overly technical, but IIRC, it's the reaction the substance(s) undergoes(go) that is either exothermic or endothermic. Obviously the postulated reaction from a given detonated explosive has effectively the same exothermic result whether it's in the cargo hold or the passenger compartment, even allowing for slight differences in the heated, pressurized atmosphere in the cabin vice the cargo hold.
A good, everyday example of an endothermic liquid reaction would be the passenger held (not OK for air travel in the passenger compartment) water, that will undergo an endothermic reaction when boiled. Any liquid requires heat of vaporization to change state to vapor/gas. H2O makes a lousy refrigerant, though a theoretically possible one.

And you believe the equipment used in baggage at any airport can differentiate between explosive and benign liquids?

It's also really telling that any mention of costs from TSA or individual TSO's comes to what the testing equipment would cost the agency. Apparently the cost to pax of throwing away completely harmless liquids, of buying the airport $4 per bottle "screened" water vice the Albertson's $1.49 a skid brand, of the time spent (and expense to the airlines) of dealing with checked bags that would have been perfectly safe in the cabin is apparently not worthy of mention.
A more rational policy is apparently being implemented with powders. Perhaps someone could consider adapting this to liquids.

Links, please? Other "versions" I'm finding are much older than yesterday.

Ohhhh noooo, I questioned one of the most respected news organizations in the world. As a citizen, voter, and general participant in life, that's my job. I would be derelict to uncritically trust "authorities" whatever their nature.

The New York Times has been scammed, the Pulitzer committee has been scammed, but BBC is immune? Even skilled and dedicated journalists will have a few deficits in knowledge, experience, and time.

Generally I have a good opinion of the BBC; having family and friends in the UK I surf it regularly, as well as other UK news media. My point was that lack of continuity fails to prove the orange-filled Oasis bottle was placed, alone, in the fuselage and produced that explosion unassisted. Perhaps it did; but what is shown leaves plenty of room for other possibilities. If I were seeing this as a juror, my reasonable doubt would not be overcome.

As I said in my first post, BBC may well have edited the visuals for "responsible" reasons. Regardless of justification, these cuts greatly weaken their strength as "evidence."

That an open-ended fuselage section at ground level does not replicate conditions of a pressurized cabin at cruising altitude is beside the point. Even the explosion shown could bring down an aircraft. That's not in dispute.

The question is, did that orange liquid in the Oasis bottle, absent any other apparatus or assistive detonation, cause the damage we see?

Exactly! Here in the 21st century, any video "evidence" must be taken with a large grain of salt. Especially when the "scientific expert" is a government consultant whose livelihood depends on convincing the authorities (and by extension, the taxpayers) that there's a threat to be countered.

OTOH, the BBC does keep us up-to-date with the true life adventures of Dr Who. I don't understand why the TSA is more worried about powders than about Cybermen.

Sidney Alford who ran this experiment is an adviser to both the British and U. S. governments...

I always believe every video that I see on TV. Including the the Dateline piece on the exploding gas tanks on GM pickups. Of course, it was later determined that Dateline rigged the truck with explosives to make sure it would blow up.

http://www.mediaresearch.org/mediawa...ch19930301.asp

GAK! I was trying to make a joke!

Never said that, as a matter of fact that is one of the most espoused theories. It is also one of the most difficult to counter, hence the more expensive equipment in many o fthe bag areas.


Some of the xray machines out there can detect a difference. Several of these are in use by MANY groups worldwide, including TSA. If you actually think anyone for the agency wants some sort of an incident with cargo, then you are probably cynical beyond help. At this point the agency is still on track to screen 100% of cargo by the congressional mandate. That may change, but as of now TSA is still on track to achieve that goal.

(emphasis mine)
Which does absolutely no good if the evil-doer ships the bomb package as cargo through an airline cargo desk, most of which allow the shipper to see which aircraft their package will actually be assigned to ride and are not, to date, fully secured and inspected prior to placing items in the hold.

I BTD, it's easy to counter. If TSA actually believed the cr*p it spews, it would, in the interest of flight safety, ban liquids (>100ml) from aircraft cargo holds, as well. It doesn't because airlines would scream too loud as cargo income transferred over to FedEx, and because TSA knows this isn't about logic, it's about theatre.
Instead, the more expensive equipment that apparently detects explosive liquids in bag areas would be installed at pax check-points in lieu of uniform upgrades or shiny new badges. TSA doesn't because it would rather spend money in a futile attempt at image polishing, or because the moment of separating pax from liquids is deemed to be one that convinces some traveller somewhere that we have an effective airport security policy. Like I said, theatre and poor theatre at that.

There are no X-Ray machines in existence that can detect the chemical composition of a liquid. None. Nada. That's not what X-rays do.

There ARE machines out there that can - these are separate add-ons and I blogged about them here (even providing a link to the vendor) almost two years ago. They are not overly expensive, can test without a sample prep, are highly accurate and require little in the way of passenger inconvenience.

I believe the TSA has bought a few of these, or similar machines for testing - but in no way does the X-ray portion of the bag screening device or any of the standard X-ray devices there which lack this add-on detect the presence of a binary explosive compound.

I didn't say the TSA wants a cargo-sourced incident - but their ridiculously unbalanced approach to threat management clearly indicates to me that an incident caused by a cargo explosive is not on their list of priorities, and it should be their number one priority as it's the easiest attack to carry out.

The entire TSA security apparatus is focused on three things:

1. prevent another 9/11
2. prevent another shoe bomber
3. prevent a liquid bomb attack

1. has already been taken care of by procedural and structural changes. 2. is not a credible threat, and it's a threat that could manifest itself in any number of places other than shoes, and 3. was never a credible threat to begin with - the science has proven that it's functionally impossible to prepare a liquid bomb on board or to prepare it ahead of time and transport it to the aircraft without it either detonating ahead of time or going benign en route.

These 'controlled lab' demos to "prove" the viability of a liquid explosive are nonsensical when applied to a non-controlled test.