"Liquid explosive" damage on the BBC
Sep 11, 2009 | 9:03 am
#31
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: Greensboro
Programs: TSA
Posts: 2,496
Links, please? Other "versions" I'm finding are much older than yesterday.
Ohhhh noooo, I questioned one of the most respected news organizations in the world.
As a citizen, voter, and general participant in life, that's my job. I would be derelict to uncritically trust "authorities" whatever their nature.
The New York Times has been scammed, the Pulitzer committee has been scammed, but BBC is immune? Even skilled and dedicated journalists will have a few deficits in knowledge, experience, and time.
Generally I have a good opinion of the BBC; having family and friends in the UK I surf it regularly, as well as other UK news media. My point was that lack of continuity fails to prove the orange-filled Oasis bottle was placed, alone, in the fuselage and produced that explosion unassisted. Perhaps it did; but what is shown leaves plenty of room for other possibilities. If I were seeing this as a juror, my reasonable doubt would not be overcome.
As I said in my first post, BBC may well have edited the visuals for "responsible" reasons. Regardless of justification, these cuts greatly weaken their strength as "evidence."
That an open-ended fuselage section at ground level does not replicate conditions of a pressurized cabin at cruising altitude is beside the point. Even the explosion shown could bring down an aircraft. That's not in dispute.
The question is, did that orange liquid in the Oasis bottle, absent any other apparatus or assistive detonation, cause the damage we see?
Ohhhh noooo, I questioned one of the most respected news organizations in the world.
As a citizen, voter, and general participant in life, that's my job. I would be derelict to uncritically trust "authorities" whatever their nature.The New York Times has been scammed, the Pulitzer committee has been scammed, but BBC is immune? Even skilled and dedicated journalists will have a few deficits in knowledge, experience, and time.
Generally I have a good opinion of the BBC; having family and friends in the UK I surf it regularly, as well as other UK news media. My point was that lack of continuity fails to prove the orange-filled Oasis bottle was placed, alone, in the fuselage and produced that explosion unassisted. Perhaps it did; but what is shown leaves plenty of room for other possibilities. If I were seeing this as a juror, my reasonable doubt would not be overcome.
As I said in my first post, BBC may well have edited the visuals for "responsible" reasons. Regardless of justification, these cuts greatly weaken their strength as "evidence."
That an open-ended fuselage section at ground level does not replicate conditions of a pressurized cabin at cruising altitude is beside the point. Even the explosion shown could bring down an aircraft. That's not in dispute.
The question is, did that orange liquid in the Oasis bottle, absent any other apparatus or assistive detonation, cause the damage we see?
The first link is the video shown in the court in London during the trial. It is simply a demonstration of the capability of this type of bomb.
http://a.abcnews.com/Blotter/story?id=4846354&page=1
This one is actually a demonstration of how you could take enough through in a baggie to blow a hole in a plane. It isd actually fairly compelling for a complete ban or deployment of more tech to counter this capability.
http://video.google.com/videoplay?do...fKuqSVAw&hl=en
The last one I have is the only version of this event that I can find now. There is a longer version that is like 4 minutes long that I can't find right now. It has a camera angle across from the bottle and another one at the back of the plane looking forward. This demonstration took place in 2008, by Dr. Sidney Alford. If you pay attention, even he is surprised at just how effective the bomb was (you get varying yield based on mixtures). I wish I could provide you the other link, but I can't right now (maybe I will find it later). This is the same video posted this month on BBC.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7536167.stm
Dr Alford and BBC, and ABC have nothing to gain by posting fakery or things like that, quite the opposite, they have a ton to lose if they post junk. I was not harping on you for questioning, merely pointing out that they have no reason to decieve.
Sep 11, 2009 | 9:04 am
#32
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: Greensboro
Programs: TSA
Posts: 2,496
(emphasis mine)
Which does absolutely no good if the evil-doer ships the bomb package as cargo through an airline cargo desk, most of which allow the shipper to see which aircraft their package will actually be assigned to ride and are not, to date, fully secured and inspected prior to placing items in the hold.
Which does absolutely no good if the evil-doer ships the bomb package as cargo through an airline cargo desk, most of which allow the shipper to see which aircraft their package will actually be assigned to ride and are not, to date, fully secured and inspected prior to placing items in the hold.
Sep 11, 2009 | 9:12 am
#33
A FlyerTalk Posting Legend
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: LAX/TPE
Programs: United 1K, JAL Sapphire, SPG Lifetime Platinum, National Executive Elite, Hertz PC, Avis PC
Posts: 47,163
They will do the bare minimum to meet the mandate regardless of whether or not the process is effective or efficient so they can continue their dog and pony shoe at the checkpoint.
Sep 11, 2009 | 9:14 am
#34
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: Greensboro
Programs: TSA
Posts: 2,496
There are no X-Ray machines in existence that can detect the chemical composition of a liquid. None. Nada. That's not what X-rays do.
There ARE machines out there that can - these are separate add-ons and I blogged about them here (even providing a link to the vendor) almost two years ago. They are not overly expensive, can test without a sample prep, are highly accurate and require little in the way of passenger inconvenience.
I believe the TSA has bought a few of these, or similar machines for testing - but in no way does the X-ray portion of the bag screening device or any of the standard X-ray devices there which lack this add-on detect the presence of a binary explosive compound.
I didn't say the TSA wants a cargo-sourced incident - but their ridiculously unbalanced approach to threat management clearly indicates to me that an incident caused by a cargo explosive is not on their list of priorities, and it should be their number one priority as it's the easiest attack to carry out.
The entire TSA security apparatus is focused on three things:
1. prevent another 9/11
2. prevent another shoe bomber
3. prevent a liquid bomb attack
1. has already been taken care of by procedural and structural changes. 2. is not a credible threat, and it's a threat that could manifest itself in any number of places other than shoes, and 3. was never a credible threat to begin with - the science has proven that it's functionally impossible to prepare a liquid bomb on board or to prepare it ahead of time and transport it to the aircraft without it either detonating ahead of time or going benign en route.
These 'controlled lab' demos to "prove" the viability of a liquid explosive are nonsensical when applied to a non-controlled test.
There ARE machines out there that can - these are separate add-ons and I blogged about them here (even providing a link to the vendor) almost two years ago. They are not overly expensive, can test without a sample prep, are highly accurate and require little in the way of passenger inconvenience.
I believe the TSA has bought a few of these, or similar machines for testing - but in no way does the X-ray portion of the bag screening device or any of the standard X-ray devices there which lack this add-on detect the presence of a binary explosive compound.
I didn't say the TSA wants a cargo-sourced incident - but their ridiculously unbalanced approach to threat management clearly indicates to me that an incident caused by a cargo explosive is not on their list of priorities, and it should be their number one priority as it's the easiest attack to carry out.
The entire TSA security apparatus is focused on three things:
1. prevent another 9/11
2. prevent another shoe bomber
3. prevent a liquid bomb attack
1. has already been taken care of by procedural and structural changes. 2. is not a credible threat, and it's a threat that could manifest itself in any number of places other than shoes, and 3. was never a credible threat to begin with - the science has proven that it's functionally impossible to prepare a liquid bomb on board or to prepare it ahead of time and transport it to the aircraft without it either detonating ahead of time or going benign en route.
These 'controlled lab' demos to "prove" the viability of a liquid explosive are nonsensical when applied to a non-controlled test.
Ok, what I am referring to as an Xray (CTX) has a CT component to it, that works in conjunction with the xray. That has the ability to tell the difference. I was not specifying that, but ok, there you go.
The organization is moving towards the 100%, I have nothing else to give you on that, because it is not in my sphere of influence.
1. Remains an impossibility because of the new policies (if all involved respond the way they are supposed to). The most likely scenario will involve an IED blowing the plane up or killing a handful of people near the bomber.
2. Remains a viable threat. The best way to screen the shoes is xray.
3. Is a viable threat. Watch the videos I posted earlier in the thread, there is even one that details how simple it would be to circumvent the screening in place now. This makes a fairly compelling case to ramp up the tech or ban all LAG. I want the tech rolled out to help the checkpoint, but that is not in the budget right now. When it is, I think we could see some constructive direction on the ban.
Sep 11, 2009 | 9:27 am
#35
Suspended
Join Date: Apr 2009
Posts: 418
Nonsense. Planes did not fall from the sky thanks to shoe bombs when the shoe carnival was not mandatory before August 2006, when TSA completely lost its mind; nor are they falling from the sky thanks to shoe bombs in any of the other countries that do not have a mandatory shoe carnival. There is no threat from shoes, and when TSA says that there is such a threat, it is lying.
Sep 11, 2009 | 9:37 am
#36
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Sydney (for now), GVA (only in my memories)
Programs: QF Lifetime Silver (big whoop)
Posts: 9,293
3. Is a viable threat. Watch the videos I posted earlier in the thread, there is even one that details how simple it would be to circumvent the screening in place now. This makes a fairly compelling case to ramp up the tech or ban all LAG. I want the tech rolled out to help the checkpoint, but that is not in the budget right now. When it is, I think we could see some constructive direction on the ban.
So first of all, why has TSA been making these promises for over two years if, as you say, there's no budget for the technology? And secondly, if for the third year it's still at least another year away, why should we believe that this will ever be deployed? It's just as likely that in 2015 your management will still be saying "next year we plan to deploy technology for liquids."
Last edited by RadioGirl; Sep 11, 2009 at 10:03 am Reason: extra words deleted
Sep 11, 2009 | 9:38 am
#37
A FlyerTalk Posting Legend
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: LAX/TPE
Programs: United 1K, JAL Sapphire, SPG Lifetime Platinum, National Executive Elite, Hertz PC, Avis PC
Posts: 47,163
Ok, what I am referring to as an Xray (CTX) has a CT component to it, that works in conjunction with the xray. That has the ability to tell the difference. I was not specifying that, but ok, there you go.
The organization is moving towards the 100%, I have nothing else to give you on that, because it is not in my sphere of influence.
1. Remains an impossibility because of the new policies (if all involved respond the way they are supposed to). The most likely scenario will involve an IED blowing the plane up or killing a handful of people near the bomber.
2. Remains a viable threat. The best way to screen the shoes is xray.
3. Is a viable threat. Watch the videos I posted earlier in the thread, there is even one that details how simple it would be to circumvent the screening in place now. This makes a fairly compelling case to ramp up the tech or ban all LAG. I want the tech rolled out to help the checkpoint, but that is not in the budget right now. When it is, I think we could see some constructive direction on the ban.
The organization is moving towards the 100%, I have nothing else to give you on that, because it is not in my sphere of influence.
1. Remains an impossibility because of the new policies (if all involved respond the way they are supposed to). The most likely scenario will involve an IED blowing the plane up or killing a handful of people near the bomber.
2. Remains a viable threat. The best way to screen the shoes is xray.
3. Is a viable threat. Watch the videos I posted earlier in the thread, there is even one that details how simple it would be to circumvent the screening in place now. This makes a fairly compelling case to ramp up the tech or ban all LAG. I want the tech rolled out to help the checkpoint, but that is not in the budget right now. When it is, I think we could see some constructive direction on the ban.
Liquid bombs are not a viable threat. You're ignoring the fact that liquid explosives need highly controlled environments for mixture and transport. This stuff can't be cooked up in someone's apartment, tossed in a shampoo bottle, carried to the airport, taken on a plane and then detonated undetected. It doesn't work that way.
These lab and controlled demos are useless. Show me a demo where someone creates such a bomb in a totally uncontrolled environment using accessible ingredients, is transported just like any baggage and then detonated in a way which would not be detected by others and stopped.
Sep 11, 2009 | 10:39 am
#38
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: Greensboro
Programs: TSA
Posts: 2,496
Nonsense. Planes did not fall from the sky thanks to shoe bombs when the shoe carnival was not mandatory before August 2006, when TSA completely lost its mind; nor are they falling from the sky thanks to shoe bombs in any of the other countries that do not have a mandatory shoe carnival. There is no threat from shoes, and when TSA says that there is such a threat, it is lying.
Sep 11, 2009 | 10:44 am
#39
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: FrostByte Falls, Mn
Programs: Holiday Inn Plat NW gold AA gold
Posts: 2,157
Other than Richard Reid, please point to another country with planes falling out of the sky due to shoe bombs. Even Canada allows you to fly everywhere, except the US, while wearing your shoes. It is a myth and a lie told often enough doesn't magically become the truth.
Sep 11, 2009 | 10:45 am
#40
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: Greensboro
Programs: TSA
Posts: 2,496
But can you not see that the increasingly intrusive policies at the checkpoints while cargo is still not 100% is like putting more expensive locks on your front door while the back door has a huge hole in it? If someone can walk through the back of the house, more locks at the front doesn't add a layer, it's just stupid and expensive.
As I pointed out over here, in July 2007 Kip Hawley said there would be a solution to this "in the near future." In October 2008, Blogdad Bob said it would "Fall 2009." Now USAToday quotes your people saying "at least another year."
So first of all, why has TSA been making these promises for over two years if, as you say, there's no budget for the technology? And secondly, if for the third year it's still at least another year away, why should we believe that this will ever be deployed? It's just as likely that in 2015 your management will still be saying "next year we plan to deploy technology for liquids."
As I pointed out over here, in July 2007 Kip Hawley said there would be a solution to this "in the near future." In October 2008, Blogdad Bob said it would "Fall 2009." Now USAToday quotes your people saying "at least another year."
So first of all, why has TSA been making these promises for over two years if, as you say, there's no budget for the technology? And secondly, if for the third year it's still at least another year away, why should we believe that this will ever be deployed? It's just as likely that in 2015 your management will still be saying "next year we plan to deploy technology for liquids."
I have no info on the plans for rollout of the new tech. I know that there are probably some problems with testing (they have to test the equipment in a location that is consistent with a checkpoint), and I know there are problems with money. Again, I have nothing else to give you on what is holding up the deployment of the tech other than what I can think of that seems to be a normal reason for delay.
Sep 11, 2009 | 10:46 am
#41
A FlyerTalk Posting Legend
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: LAX/TPE
Programs: United 1K, JAL Sapphire, SPG Lifetime Platinum, National Executive Elite, Hertz PC, Avis PC
Posts: 47,163
What makes them a viable threat? The actions of one lone lunatic? Bra bombs were tried too - why are they not an equal threat?
Anus bombs? How about the next stage in terrorist concealment - having plastic explosives surgically implanted?
Where do you identify "likelihood" and draw a line to balance risk and probability?
Sep 11, 2009 | 10:49 am
#43
Join Date: Apr 2009
Posts: 2,195
Some of these things involve transporting an unstable liquid, EMI interference between the initiator and the transmitter, transmission harmonics, metal shielding the transmitter, etc. Building bombs is an extremely dangerous job, get it wrong only once and chances are you will not survive the error. Many would-be terrorists have found this out.
This does not make accomplishing the job impossible, just quite a bit more complicated than you seem to understand.
Sep 11, 2009 | 10:51 am
#44
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 30,961
As far as cargo, I don't understand the problem or hold up other than logistics. The only info I have at this point is we are on track to be 100% by our mandate. I can't give you anything else on that because I don't have it. I will agree with you that the cargo is a soft spot right now, and we do need the 100% screening asap.
I have no info on the plans for rollout of the new tech. I know that there are probably some problems with testing (they have to test the equipment in a location that is consistent with a checkpoint), and I know there are problems with money. Again, I have nothing else to give you on what is holding up the deployment of the tech other than what I can think of that seems to be a normal reason for delay.
I have no info on the plans for rollout of the new tech. I know that there are probably some problems with testing (they have to test the equipment in a location that is consistent with a checkpoint), and I know there are problems with money. Again, I have nothing else to give you on what is holding up the deployment of the tech other than what I can think of that seems to be a normal reason for delay.
Also no need for document checkers, they add nothing to security.
Sep 11, 2009 | 10:53 am
#45
A FlyerTalk Posting Legend
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: LAX/TPE
Programs: United 1K, JAL Sapphire, SPG Lifetime Platinum, National Executive Elite, Hertz PC, Avis PC
Posts: 47,163
You should. The technical requirements for what you propose are far more difficult to overcome than you might think. The terrorist that does not think of these things is likely to find himself in the middle of a premature detonation of his own device, thereby not hitting his intended target.
Some of these things involve transporting an unstable liquid, EMI interference between the initiator and the transmitter, transmission harmonics, metal shielding the transmitter, etc. Building bombs is an extremely dangerous job, get it wrong only once and chances are you will not survive the error. Many would-be terrorists have found this out.
This does not make accomplishing the job impossible, just quite a bit more complicated than you seem to understand.
Some of these things involve transporting an unstable liquid, EMI interference between the initiator and the transmitter, transmission harmonics, metal shielding the transmitter, etc. Building bombs is an extremely dangerous job, get it wrong only once and chances are you will not survive the error. Many would-be terrorists have found this out.
This does not make accomplishing the job impossible, just quite a bit more complicated than you seem to understand.