One question that remains is why they had to be in the conditions they encountered and what the manufacturer could do (or could have done) to avoid that? We will see as the investigation progresses.

Absolutely. Boeing is going to be writing a lot of very expensive checks, thanks to their cheapness on the front end, and perhaps they will learn their lesson. Whether the regulatory bodies do something on the experience/training aspect is something we also need to monitor. Computer-aided flying is great until it isn't, and that's why pilot experience is so important.

And they lost a lot of confidence in their products and maybe orders, too.

"If it's not Boeing, I'm not going" took a huge hit.

Boeing says : less...stability [for] fuel efficiency
 

Where is the FAA limit in the tradeoff between “fuel efficiency” vs “Augmentation” ? The trend is to design airplanes with less stability to gain fuel efficiency. (Boeing's own words if link is Boeing and not some hacker in Russia) The 737 MAX's use of this approach apparently hit the breaking point.

https://www.boeing.com/commercial/ae...y/fo01txt.html

2 Flight Control Computers and Stability Augmentation
The trend in the design of modern airplanes is to have less static longitudinal stability--frequently referred to as relaxed static stability (RSS)--to capture the benefit of improved fuel efficiency. Simply stated, some airplanes are now designed to be aerodynamically efficient, and stability is augmented electronically so that stick force gradients will meet certification requirements. Many methods exist for augmenting stability. For example, the Boeing 777 and MD-11 use flight control computers that adjust the elevator actuator positions to give the appearance of more longitudinal stability than the airplane actually has. In other words, computers absorb the extra workload caused by flying with RSS.
Copyright � The Boeing Company. All rights reserved.

This is just about verbatim what my brother told me after AF 447. The airlines want more fuel efficient airframes, and manufacturers are heeding the call.

14 CFR 25.173 et seq

That's not quite right. Boeing had never documented for crews what may have been going on. For all we know, that third pilot may have simply guessed correctly to be able to recover the aircraft. It was only after the Lior Air tragedy that Boeing came out with some instructions on what to do and the jury is out on whether those instructions are sufficient for all situations.

You are correct, the third pilot might have guessed the correct procedure. OTOH, he might have been an experienced pilot like my college classmate who is a 737 SME for DL, who told me that if he had been on the flight deck he would have done the same thing as the LionAir jumpseater, based on his over 15,000 hours of multiengine flight time in a variety of Boeing aircraft, which also means he's very familiar with hand flying the aircraft he was type rated to fly.

The third pilot correctly selected the runaway trim procedure when they had the trim running away. Doesn't seem like a big guess, and doesn't need any additional guidance from Boeing.

As the pilots upthread have noted, none of the MCAS information from Boeing has changed what they're going to do in the cockpit when they have runaway trim, MCAS induced or otherwise.

I kind of disagree with this. There were many extraneous factors with AF447 that resulted in that disaster including but not limited to the crew flying directly into in ITCZ thunderstorm as well as a shoddy pitot tube. In the case of the MAX, these were two brand new airplanes flying on otherwise beautiful days which were simply poorly designed from the beginning and rushed into service to maintain pace with a competitor. While I also think the A320neo series is sort of and old, uninspired design, the 737MAX is even worse. It takes lipstick on a pig to a whole new level. One where it actually kills people.

Yes, we know that. OTOH, I don't think anyone in this thread has claimed they've actually dealt with a runaway trim, all the way to the limit a few seconds after takeoff, where they had to manually crank it back into place.

It was more than just a "shoddy pitot tube."



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

This is a red herring. The JT flight the day before was at a higher altitude, less airspeed, and much more time to react. The ET crew effectively followed the same procedure (runaway trim checklist) and it didn't work out so well for them. That doesn't make it pilot error - it could just mean that they were in a less recoverable situation.

I'm not saying that pilot error isn't a possible confounding factor in this crash - just that the pilots did their best, followed the relevant procedures, and still crashed. To me, it seems the primary cause of the crash is a poorly defined aircraft system and poorly defined procedure.

Hopefully the final reports of the two events will have the same level of detail as the AF 447 event, and we'll know the answers.

Yes, however the catalyst of the issue was the pitot tube. It was a very very different situation. The aircraft was also in the cruise/enroute phase of flight. Again, completely different to the issues with the 737MAX. The A330 did not actively try to pitch itself into the ground.