This appears to be the emotional response the NYT article was seeking.
My analogy was purely a response to the poor journalism, not the subject.

Responsible journalism wouldn't rely on anecdotal reports of "debris" left behind on new planes, but would investigate how such incidents at
Boeing's 787 N. Charleston plant compare to Boeing's other planes, other plants, and other manufacturers (such as Airbus, Bombardier, Comac, UAC, Embraer, etc...)

The purpose of the final inspection is to find faults in manufacture and/or improper cleaning of the final product.
In the cited paragraph, the inspector found and removed the left-over items.

Why are these items "left over?" In a solid process, wouldn't these items not be "left over" in the first place? Why would Qatar reject planes from this particular factory? Where is the six-sigma quality control - heck, it should be approaching seven-sigma for planes.

Why are whistle-blowers routinely denigrated as "disgruntled workers?"

I'll take this journalism, thank you. I. want. my. planes. safe.

That's a GREAT question, and one that a good journalist would have pursued and included in the article!
:cool:

Apparently, true process work for airplanes is expensive too. This article pretty much sums up my current feelings that the 737MAX is inherently, by design, an unstable aircraft.

How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer - IEEE Spectrum

I wonder if any of this is internal battle between SEA and CHS which really started from day one.

I don't know enough about the process but you would think it is hard for an outsider to get to the bottom of the problems at CHS other than relying on FAA data, airline customer statements and employee interviews, right?

Remember, even after the ET crash, Boeing swore up and down their planes are safe. So, at least to the general public, Boeing has a credibility issue. Worse, they only took the problems at CHS more seriously after they have lost credibility on the 737 MAX.

If the customer inspectors are finding FOD, that means your own inspectors (and workers) aren't doing their jobs. The workers shouldn't be leaving tools and debris, and your own inspectors should be finding it if they are. In many cases FOD isn't "improper cleaning" it's bad work habits - leaving tools is a big no-no, and depending on the environment, shavings may need to be vacuumed immediately or the operation even done with an operating vacuum sucking them up as they form.

It's truly a shame this whole Max issue has been taken over by ill informed media looking for viewers and clicks and self proclaimed "experts" with no relevant experience other than having sat in the back of airliners for many, many miles. Rather than blame the reactions of the pilots to an abnormal aircraft state, media goes for the half truth and scare tactics which apparently do work based on many posts here which are full of emotion vs facts. A faulty MCAS would present itself to the crew like a runaway stabilizer trim event which is trained in the simulator already and a checklist procedure exists to remedy the undesired aircraft state. If the pilots incorrectly diagnose or fail to carry out the proper procedure, how is that the airplane's fault? Boeing does deserve blame in that the MCAS activation is not subject to multiple sensor inputs as are most other systems so that any erroneous sensor input can be evaluated and cross checked before the airplane system reacts. The 2nd angle of attack sensor input should never have been "optional". However, even with an erroneous activation, the plane should not crash if it is being operated by properly trained and experienced pilots just as if an engine failure at rotation can either be essentially a non event or a smoking hole based on the training and experience of the pilots.
Back away from the media sensationalism and look at the facts.

So then Boeing is still at fault for selling an aircraft to airlines with inadequately trained crew? That is sarcasm on my part.

Boeing changed the aircraft and made a sensor optional and sold the plane as if it were the same as existing aircraft on which the pilots had been trained. The two airlines involved are not having 737 (non MAX) planes diving into the ground with everyone on board being killed. 300 people lost their lives and after the first tragedy Boeing and the FAA both said nothing to worry about here and then the second tragedy involved a very experienced pilot (many flying hours from what I read).

I am not an engineer, I am not a technician, I am not a pilot. I am a member of the flying public who expects the FAA would protect the interests of the flying public.

IMO, based on the reports I have read and based on the response of other flying agencies elsewhere in the world, it is not the dead pilots and not the airlines that purchased an aircraft sold to them as the same model when in fact it was a different model that are at fault. The blame/fault for the 300 people who are dead rests solely with Boeing and the FAA.

Exactly!
And this would have been such a good angle for a half-decent journalist to pursue.

First establish [with evidence] that there is an unusually high occurrence at North Charleston for this inadequacy, and then ask and hopefully answer the WHY.
Disgruntled employees are quick to blame "management", but is that REALLY the cause, and what precisely does that mean??

- Does Boeing deliberately employ unskilled workforce to save money it would have to spend on better trained staff?
- Is the education system of the U.S. tradesman abysmally poor?
- Are the unions too self-absorbed and not promoting or demanding quality work from their members, but instead letting them cruise along with little accountability?

A good journalist will dig deep. A lazy and crappy journalist will quote Twitter.
And it matters naught: no one cares and mediocracy rules.

South Carolina is a right-to-work state; the North Charleston facility is an open shop (union membership is optional). This (a) was a big selling point for management, and (b) is a large reason for cultural tension between Seattle and South Carolina.

There is no question who would have the most to gain by innuendo, and it's not management, the airlines, the workers, or the press.

These were touched on in the article - Boeing didn't bring out workers from Everett because they didn't want the SC employees to see what the union shop was getting, and there's not a big aerospace assembly experience base in SC. The workers could be perfectly fine skilled workers, but if they're coming from a different manufacturing and assembly environment, they aren't likely to have the same kind of work habits that you expect in an aircraft plant, and they're all learning at the same time. Everett has a well established aircraft assembly base of workers, so new workers coming in will learn good habits from the current workers. If the Charleston workers are coming in cold, they won't get that.