The charts are here: Ethiopian 302 ? Even Without Answers, The Data Tells a Story ? Visual Approach

It appears they did re-engage the electric trim (which it appears did reengage MCAS inputs) What is not clear is whether manual trim inputs were effective and that is why the electric trim was re-engaged or if the plane was flying too fast and manual trim was difficult? IDK

No, it is not! It is rather an aircraft design that forces pilots to jump through a number of (previously unknown) hoops to keep the MAX from crashing due to a flawed system that will happily fly the plane nose first into the ground.

Talked to some ("first world") pilots today and most of them agree that the single sensor AOA sensor design should have never made it into a commercial airliner and that the AD is very badly written. The one thing that is stressed there is to set the switch to "CUTOUT" and keep them on "CUTOUT". By the time they would find out that manual trimming does not work, it is already too late to reactivate electric trimming, which will also reactivate MCAS.

Took too long to identify the problem (putting them way out of trim) and then turning electric trim back on after disabling it (not found in the runaway trim procedure) suggests pilot error to me.

I believe there are 2 aoa sensors on the max. At least that is what the FDR output shows.

Indeed. One is used at a time for all Flight Control Computer and MCAS functions, same as the prior 737s.

Sure, but they had plenty of other automated control systems. The MCAS has gotten a lot of attention due to the specific nature of these failures, but "a computerized system to help steer the aircraft" is not a new idea, and the 737 MAX is far from alone in operating one.

At the end of the day, the 737 is not a fly-by-wire aircraft; it can be flown with all pilot assist systems turned off. Boeing needs to address the tendency of the MAX to put the pilot into a dangerous situation more frequently than other models do, and they appear to be doing so. However, at the end of the day, the control belongs to the pilot. I have no wish to speak ill of the dead, but given the preliminary details that have come out so far, I believe responsibility will ultimately be shared between the plane and the pilots.

I also think there is little to be gained by continuing to try to figure out exactly what percentage of blame belongs where when the investigations are still underway. I think it is far more productive to wait and to see what is done to address the problem and to certify the updated plane. At this point, until new information is available (and possibly not even then), I don't think anyone is going to change anyone else's minds.

Hey Everyone - I asked this back on post #1061 and didn't see an answer so if anyone could help me out here, that't be awesome. I just don't understand all the forces involved; here's my question:

"Pardon my ignorance with the next question as I am not an ATP or even multi-engine pilot. If you lockout the stab in full "nose-down" deflection, then hold the yoke as far back as possible, all other forces being equal, would you be able to fly the aircraft at least somewhat nose level ? Or, once that stab is fully deflected down, is your 737 "going down" as well ?"

AF 447 flew straight into the ocean with input from 3 ADIRUs and the crew couldn't figure out how to get control of that plane either.

Article in USA Today - probably not very informative [for us] but it is bringing up more doubts and questions to the general public: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/...em/3378703002/

It's a relevant comparison. The co-pilots flying that aircraft didn't know how to respond to a series of anomalies and put the aircraft in a stall from which it couldn't recover. We don't know the final outcome of the two MAX crashes at this time, but in addition to the Boeing design failures, I suspect there will be findings similar to AF 447, which cited a lack of experience of both co-pilots is hand flying the aircraft and poor training.

I don't know why you would suspect that there will be similar findings - the preliminary report seems to indicate that the pilots were well trained and followed all procedures until they were stuck in an unrecoverable situation. From the report, they seem competent - expecting anything more is both unreasonable and unrealistic.

The Lion Air plane that crashed was saved from crashing the day before because of a pilot who knew what to do in that specific emergency. I'm not saying the pilots who perished were incompetent. I'm saying that it is highly likely that they weren't properly trained to respond to the conditions they encountered, and likely didn't spend a lot of time hand flying their aircraft. The latter is something my brother - a DL Captain with well over 15,000 hours - believes is a growing and dangerous trend for all airlines.