I expected them to stall and say the planes were safe like they did after the first 189 people died. I kind of expected them to slapdash a software "fix" to get the planes rolling off the assembly line again, and only a third crash killing 150-200 would have actually, finally, sunk in.

I want my airplane manufacturers to lean forward and be proactive. <shrugs>

Isn't Boeing going for just a software fix? Sure there will be training, but no statement that they will retest stability and any lift issues at high aoa's. If Boeing felt a very robust MCAS was needed & could not be individually disabled, there must have been some significant factors driving their initial decisions. By admitting liability, providing new software and providing for training, they are cutting off a lot of discovery and investigation into causation.

They did not move in front. They are way way way behind, just ahead of Jussie Smollett.

...and as late as 3/18...https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-03...tion-Community

In addition to the human tolls, this shows how screwed up the company is - with design, with the arrogant attitude, with crisis handling, with integrity and ethics...did they think they could get away with this?

It will be interesting to see what happens at the annual shareholder's meeting later this month. It seems the company really needs a change of leadership.

Do we know if MCAS stops trimming down during the entire time the pilot is holding the electric trim switch (only starting up 5 seconds after the pilot stops), or if it stops for 5 seconds then restarts regardless of whether the trim switch is still being used? That's a critical detail, and I suspect the latter. Does anyone have the full instructions/procedures that Boeing (finally) gave out? Separately, does MCAS turn the trim at a higher or lower *rate* than the electric trim switches?

My understanding from both statements here and watching some videos of runaway stabilizer trim is that from full nose-down: A long time to spin the manual wheel back, longer than you might have at only a couple thousand feet AGL, AND requiring a lot more force than even two pilots might be able to leverage, given they would have had to also apply significant then later overwhelming force to also hold back the yoke in the meantime. Which I suspect is what led the ET crew in desperation, out of other options, to try turning the electric trim back on, praying it worked the first way above.

Re the 777-X mentioned further up: Is that design also sold as "same like older 777 models - no significant pilot retraining required" ??

Also, is this another airframe being stretched and re-engined at the limits of safety for the sake of profits and fuel efficiency?

For those who say "how come they turned the power back on when the checklist did not say to do it", isn't the problem that even after the Lion Air crash and Boeing sort of told people about MCAS, Boeing did not go into how it works exactly (i.e. endless retries with more push each time)?

Even if the ET crew knew that, would it have been too late to recover after what MCAS did? This kind of reminds me of the NTSB hearing scene in "Sully" where multiple crews tried to get a better outcome than the Hudson and could not.

I still don't understand why Boeing designed it this way (never-ending retries and more severe each time - and seems like a design change last minute?) and it seems there is some bigger reason we don't know yet....

Then the lack of redundancy part.... The whole thing makes no sense and really makes you wonder.

I know some companies which try to get rid of more experienced engineers to save money run into experience gaps. Is Boeing suffering from that?

Maybe we should all feel safe now that the CEO risked his life to be on the test flight on Thursday?

It is generally safer to modify what is known then creating something new.

CNN reporting that Boeing mandated that the MAX not require simulator training, saving $1M per plane.

This is all cost shaving. Now they'll pay far, far more in settlements and judgments for 350 innocent people who paid for their misplaced frugality with their lives.

They are being proactive - about their future sales.

Looking ahead long-term, they know that most transport aircraft deliveries will be to non-US / "third-world" countries / China, and have realized that it might not be a good sales tactic to blame the lack of skill, experience and training of pilots in those countries or to imply that only US pilots are skilled enough to handle their finicky planes.

Ironically, I am sure Boeing is now very happy that Airbus' sales have been so robust lately - that has created a big backlog of orders for them.

Big companies also have risk assessment, and at this point, you gotta start thinking that Boeing might consider canceling the MAX.

If they don't, then for years to come, you'll have people screaming in panic to get off a swapped last-minute MAX at UA/AA and especially WN.

The decision will likely be made by which major airline cancels their MAX orders first. After all, the NG is still in production; I'm thinking many airlines will just go with NGs.

Yes Boeing quite a big mess on its hands. It will be interesting to see how they deal with this over the next few years.

Last I heard (which was a week or so ago now so maybe this has changed) they were still rolling new MAXs off the production line and looking for places to store them because they can't deliver any. They might want to shut the line down for a bit, at least until the new planes can be produced with whatever fixes will finally be made.

It's too bad because they are nice planes (well, for a 737). I actually flew on one (on WN) during the couple of days between the ET crash and the US grounding.