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Originally Posted by PVDtoDEL
(Post 30959186)
Did you miss the part about how they were unable to control the aircraft after turning MCAS off? Boeing didn't build this system for no reason - they built it to meet a certification requirement for the aircraft. Depending on their elevator and trim position when they cut out the electric trim, it could have been nearly impossible to manually trim for level flight.
If the pilots followed their checklists and training (which it sounds like they did) and still weren't able to control the aircraft, then I don't see this as pilot error. Maybe they could have gotten a better result with more/better training, but keep in mind that ET shelled out for a MAX simulator that didn't even simulate MCAS because Boeing didn't want to push out the details about the system. It's hard to train for a failure the manufacturer doesn't want you to know is possible... |
Originally Posted by halls120
(Post 30959515)
There is no doubt that Boeing screwed up in their design and training, but the Lion Air flight the day before did not crash because a check pilot knew what to do. Same airplane, different outcome, which is apparently because a properly trained pilot correctly diagnosed this issue and the plane did not crash.
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Originally Posted by BF263533
(Post 30959560)
The pilot on the first Lion Air flight was an avid surfer who knew how to deal with roller-coasting or porpoising. Knowing how to ride the wave is key to safely flying the 737 MAX.
We don’t know why the Ethiopian airplane could not climb. Having that problem when electric trim is disengaged indicates another issue. As with every incident, we are seeing a chain or human and technical problems unfold. |
Originally Posted by jmastron
(Post 30959697)
Maybe we just need to require an experienced third pilot to be present on all MAX flights (imagine the airlines screaming at the costs).
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Originally Posted by halls120
(Post 30959515)
There is no doubt that Boeing screwed up in their design and training, but the Lion Air flight the day before did not crash because a check pilot knew what to do. Same airplane, different outcome, which is apparently because a properly trained pilot correctly diagnosed this issue and the plane did not crash.
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Originally Posted by DenverBrian
(Post 30959983)
"hey, the plane ALMOST crashed but didn't because a check pilot happened to be in the cockpit," ....certainly isn't my standard for flight safety. I don't want even a HINT of this sequence of events to be possible when I'm on board a MAX.
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Originally Posted by fly18725
(Post 30959878)
I think you’re distracting from the discussion by continuing to suggest porpoising is an inherent natural condition of the MAX. It is not. The profile seen in the Lion Air incident is the result of the repeated engagement and disengagement of MCAS, which was relying on a faulty sensor. If fully disengaged, it seems like the aircraft should have climbed normally. We don’t know why the Ethiopian airplane could not climb. Having that problem when electric trim is disengaged indicates another issue. As with every incident, we are seeing a chain or human and technical problems unfold. From a Youtube video I watched last week of a simulated trim runaway, the electric trim moves the stabilizer a *lot* faster than the manual trim wheels. Despite some of the statements here, it isn't just disengaging the electric trim -- once that's done it can take a ton of spinning to get it back to level, all while the plane requires a lot of elevator force to keep flying level. If the pilots followed the training and checklists, were spinning and spinning the trim back but it didn't seem to be helping, they could felt that re-engaging the electric trim was their last resort. Perhaps even relying in Boeing's statement that MCAS should disengage if pilot-electric-trim commands are given. Clearly a lot is not yet understood about the actual interaction between MCAS and pilot inputs, how it presents itself to the pilots, and the human factors around reactions and procedures. It's clearly not as simple as "those 3rd world pilots didn't follow runaway trim procedures like *I* would have" |
Originally Posted by danielSuper
(Post 30958716)
This reinforces itself and results in a pitch-up tendency which if not corrected can result in a stall.
MCAS does not operate when flaps are extended because you don't have the lighter pitch-feel with flaps. MCAS also doesn't operate when the autopilot is engaged because the autopilot doesn't care what the pitch "feels" like. This discussion is being filled with speculation and conclusions based on incomplete data. I'm not going to attempt to address that. I will continue to answer any technical or procedural questions that are asked. |
Originally Posted by fly18725
(Post 30959878)
I think you’re distracting from the discussion by continuing to suggest porpoising is an inherent natural condition of the MAX. It is not. The profile seen in the Lion Air incident is the result of the repeated engagement and disengagement of MCAS, which was relying on a faulty sensor. If fully disengaged, it seems like the aircraft should have climbed normally. We don’t know why the Ethiopian airplane could not climb. Having that problem when electric trim is disengaged indicates another issue. As with every incident, we are seeing a chain or human and technical problems unfold. If you believe that Piper’s alleged chief engineering test pilot is incorrect in his assessment of the 737 MAX having a "predilection for roller-coastering, " then explain with a scientific assessment or quote from an expert's opinion or quote from reference to an expert why he is likely to be wrong. The 737 MAX having a "predilection for roller-coastering" is Mr. Webb's alleged conclusion based on actual experiences with airplanes and engine placement. I put that statement out there to be discussed & analyzed, then challenged or supported by posters in this forum. Mr. Webb’s statement may on its face sound logical to me, and if it is dismissed, it should be done so with reference to credible & admissible professional opinion and other evidence. On its face, Jack Webb appears to be an expert with actual experience on impact of placement of large engines on an aircraft. He is one source of alleged evidence, and on the surface appears reasonably credible. Again, I am welcoming discussion based on scientific evidence / analysis, -- refuting or supporting Mr. Webb's professional opinion. |
Originally Posted by LarryJ
(Post 30960346)
The lift from the nacelles, and other factors, result in a lighter pitch-feel in high angles-of-attack and steep turns. It does not result in negative static stability, which is what you describe. This has been reported incorrectly frequently over the past weeks. The best way to describe it is how the steering wheel "feel" in your car can get "lighter" when driving over a slick surface. The MCAS trim input introduces a nose-down bias so as to eliminate the "too-light" feel.
MCAS does not operate when flaps are extended because you don't have the lighter pitch-feel with flaps. MCAS also doesn't operate when the autopilot is engaged because the autopilot doesn't care what the pitch "feels" like. This discussion is being filled with speculation and conclusions based on incomplete data. I'm not going to attempt to address that. I will continue to answer any technical or procedural questions that are asked. |
Originally Posted by BF263533
(Post 30960804)
It is not my suggestion, I am just quoting the suggestion of Jack Webb who allegedly was Piper’s chief engineering test pilot during most of the Piper Cheyenne development process. Cheyenne allegedly had "SAS." a “stability-augmentation system” that would push the nose down if it got too high when its big engines were placed forward in an old airframe originally designed for piston engines. “Webb believes that, based on his experience with the Cheyenne, these fixes won’t eliminate the plane’s [737 MAX] predilection for roller-coastering. …….."
If you believe that Piper’s alleged chief engineering test pilot is incorrect in his assessment of the 737 MAX having a "predilection for roller-coastering, " then explain with a scientific assessment or quote from an expert's opinion or quote from reference to an expert why he is likely to be wrong. The 737 MAX having a "predilection for roller-coastering" is Mr. Webb's alleged conclusion based on actual experiences with airplanes and engine placement. I put that statement out there to be discussed & analyzed, then challenged or supported by posters in this forum. Mr. Webb’s statement may on its face sound logical to me, and if it is dismissed, it should be done so with reference to credible & admissible professional opinion and other evidence. On its face, Jack Webb appears to be an expert with actual experience on impact of placement of large engines on an aircraft. He is one source of alleged evidence, and on the surface appears reasonably credible. Again, I am welcoming discussion based on scientific evidence / analysis, -- refuting or supporting Mr. Webb's professional opinion. |
Having difficulty understanding the nature of the MCAS "reset" phenomena being discussed in the aviation press
It resets to its original trim position or advances after the pilot resists by pulling the yoke? Is the trim a series of stops or continuous? Continues to the max 2.5 degrees? |
Something doesn't make sense between the report linked by [MENTION=88376]rdchen[/MENTION] and the assumptions made by those who assert the MAX has an inherently faulty design. The issue cited by those who claim the MAX is inherently faulty or unstable is increased lift from the engine placement but the reason the flight crew presumably turned the electrics (including MCAS) back on was that they couldn't get the aircraft to climb. Those are polar opposite conditions -- which means something else was responsible for the situation. If anything the MAX design should have helped them with the lack of lift when they turned off the electrics.
As for Mr. Webb's assertion of predilection for roller-coastering or porpoising, the downward portion of that behavior would happen after stall -- they have to get the upward climb to get to that stall condition in the first place. He may be quite correct in the plane design overall but be completely irrelevant to this particular situation. As [MENTION=10236]LarryJ[/MENTION] said, this discussion is filled with speculation based on incomplete data; we need more information. |
Originally Posted by luckypierre
(Post 30961088)
Having difficulty understanding the nature of the MCAS "reset" phenomena being discussed in the aviation press
It resets to its original trim position or advances after the pilot resists by pulling the yoke? Is the trim a series of stops or continuous? Continues to the max 2.5 degrees? |
Originally Posted by halls120
(Post 30960112)
I guess you missed the part where I said Boeing screwed up in its design and training requirements for the new max aircraft. That said, pilot training and pilot experience apparently played a part in the two crashes, given that when the airplane involved in the second crash couldn’t operate normally, a trained experienced pilot was able to operate the plane safely. |
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