I looked at that video posted earlier ( ) and I can see why a lot of people say "what is the problem, must be bad pilot training" as disconnecting the power to the trim was like the 4th step in the memory item for runaway stabilizer (once you have determined that is the problem).

However, I can't help wonder if this whole "third world bad training" attitude contributed to Boeing's initial arrogance (even after the 2nd crash) and is even being exploited by Boeing somewhat? Would this have been different if ET's flight did not carry so many people from first world countries (or if the Lion Air flight carried a lot of first world citizens)? Is Boeing offending its "third world with bad training" customers in the process?

Part of my job is software testing and I work with developers whose initial attitude is "works as designed, user error" and developers whose initial attitude is "let's find the root cause and see what needs to be fixed". When the system is life-and-death, I certainly hope more people take the latter approach.

This is something that is happening all the time while hand-flying. The nose becomes too heavy, or too light, and you re-trim. I can't think of any reason why they would not re-trim in an unschedule MCAS scenario. It is the normal response to a nose-heavy airplane.

After watching the 737 falling out of the sky since it started flying 52 years ago I just can't help but feel that there are some stability issues. But a lot of that has to do with observing these 737s for 50 years

I believe it's been mentioned in this thread (multiple times?) that ADD is a captain-only airport for arrivals and departures.

I don't see it anywhere else in this thread (but it is a long thread), and there are multiple discussions all over the internet. Do you have a primary source for this?

Not sure what that has to do with my post, but as has been discussed elsewhere, there are lots of reasons why that may not have been so easy. I won't rehash them here.

The LionAir aircraft that crashed escaped a few days earlier from a runaway stab situation simply by flipping two switches. Here is what a college classmate of mine said about this matter. Almost forgot to add, he flew for Delta for over 30 years and is still a 737 SME:

The MCAS system in question is an augmentation to existing anti-stall systems which already existed. It was not highlighted in the manuals (not sure if there was no mention at all...DAL doesn't have the MAX). The effects that these two flights appear to have encountered from the faulty angle of attack (AOA) sensor, or maybe within the software itself, resulted in stabilizer trim (the horizontal part of the tail) running automatically nose down, because the computer thought the plane was too nose-high and stalling. Runaway Stabilizer Trim, which is what was happening on the flight deck, is an existing checklist which all pilots are required to commit to memory, for just this situation. You don't have time to go through the book, even the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) which is right at the pilot stations. The action for pilots is to attempt to counteract the trim by pushing the control column opposite to the runaway. If that fails, turn off the stabilizer trim electrical inputs with two switches right next to the throttles. The day before the Lionair crash, the jumpseater on the same plane guided the pilots to the switches and averted a crash. My major concern with all of this is not that Boeing did or did not give the details of MCAS to MAX pilots. Most pilots don't read the manuals in that detail. My concern is that the "acceptable" level of English language for pilots worldwide is not enough for many pilots whose first language is not English to be able to understand and retain information for systems and procedures. I have seen it too many times in my years managing pilots outside the US. The books are challenging enough as it is.

I shared the above with my brother, who is still a Delta Captain, and he said my classmate was right. He is critical of Boeing for charging extra for safety measures that should have been standard, and for not providing enough training on the 737Max, but in the end, he says the pilots need to understand how to fly the plane, not just learn to rely on pushing buttons and letting the computer fly the plane. He believes that we will see more and more of these events, and not just on Boeing planes, because newer pilots don't spend enough time flying their aircraft by hand.

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The language barrier was what popped into my mind on day two. While I didn't want to be the first to bring this up here, I did post about it on a small closed travel board.

Just as the video showed, the runaway trim needs to be committed to memory. While not related directly to this crash, it has been written about mainland Chinese pilots landing in HKG attempting to communicate in Chinese (yes, I realize that Cantonese is spoken in Hong Kong and Mandarin and its dialects are more common on the mainland, but I report what I read from memory a few years back) and Hong Kong ATC would force the Chinese pilots to speak in (their words) broken English.

I don't mean to be culturally insensitive (I sorta feel I can broach the subject as i did not learn to speak English until my teenage years and my parents speak with pretty thick English accents. And I spent much of my life in a medical setting, so elected on my own to learn some Spanish to communicate with those that did not speak English).

So you have to learn something in a foreign language and foreign script .... and then also speak English on Int'l flights, though I suspect as some German pilots speak German with towers in Germany it probably is that way in other countries that share a common language.

Interesting article I read a few days ago.

"The story begins nine years ago when Boeing was faced with a major threat to its bottom line, spurring the airline to rush a series of kludges through the certification process — with an underresourced Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) seemingly all too eager to help an American company threatened by a foreign competitor, rather than to ask tough questions about the project."

https://www.vox.com/business-and-fin...ndal-explained

Any article that states such bald falsehoods or oversimplifications ("the FAA deemed ...") probably isn't going to be worth the time to read. The PRC is trying to make inroads in the international aviation market and everything they do is tinged with central planning in mind. The fact MCAS was activated in the ET accident is enough to suspect (not confirm!) there was a problem with Boeing's software but I'm also suspicious that Beijing looked at the two accidents as a propitious opportunity to make their own aircraft seem more competitive on the market. This is a government that takes advantage of any opportunity to steal IP but their motives for making a competitive aircraft undesirable are completely clean? I don't think so.

Concerning your last statement: In Germany, they do not. It is all in English, except for greetings.

Re the language barrier: many pilots are not native speakers, so documentation should not expect them to be able to act like one. Manufacturers have to make adjustments.

It was mentioned several times in the pprune thread that ADD is Captain's only at ET. I think one of the posters was an ET pilot. I'll see if I can dig it up.