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Originally Posted by mduell
(Post 30922057)
How many times has United, with a 737 fleet ten times the size, run it off the runway leading to a writeoff and hospitalization in the last decade?
They don't have to kill everyone on board every time to show that they're not an example of a good operator. Is it really any different if they've merely killed everyone on board only 7% of their 737 fleet in the last decade? |
Originally Posted by mduell
(Post 30922035)
Redundant systems with verification is neither cheap nor easy. An AoA disagree indicator is an option on the MAX; CNBC said it's $80k.
Aircraft have redundant systems where it makes sense to take on the complexity and cost to design and build them right and certify them. Are your HA data systems certified? Does it cost $80k to put a disagree light on them? Plenty of things could be done to improve the safety of air transportation, but there's a cost (and schedule) tradeoff for every one of them. It doesn't make sense to gold plate every system on the plane in case the crew throws their training out the window. I’m not suggesting a recovery system by any means; I agree that’s excessive in many cases. But on inputs that have redundancy, there could very easily be a system to scrub through them at some frequency and if sensor A and B have disagreeing output, outside of tolerance, it could just post a warning to the display. “Pitot disagree - check output” ”Airspeed disagree - check output” Just something - not in critical path - to bring attention to sensors that should agree, but don’t. It’s easy enough to do if the sensors already exist. |
Originally Posted by DenverBrian
(Post 30922070)
Perfect. Let's start.
One thing we SHOULDN'T be doing is adding unnecessary complexity in 21st Century aircraft. @:-) |
Originally Posted by fly18725
(Post 30922169)
We better ground the 787 and A350 stat. And we actually DID ground the 787 for far less. |
Originally Posted by DenverBrian
(Post 30922177)
If there is unnecessary complexity in those planes, we should. So far, we haven't seen two of those planes kill everyone five months apart.
And we actually DID ground the 787 for far less. |
Originally Posted by fly18725
(Post 30922227)
When does complexity become unnecessary? If you're just completing takeoff, you're 800 feet above the ground, and the nose suddenly pitches down unexpectedly because the damn engines are too far forward and Boeing decided a computer would have to handle the COG issue...that's too complex IMO. Nope, not a pilot. Just a lowly passenger. Luckily, a still-alive one. |
I think the MAX's fate will be determined by the foreign carriers that have them on order. After most of the foreign carriers grounded their MAX's then the USA did. If most of the foreign carriers were to cancel their orders, then there would be pressure on US airlines to cancel.
Some analysis have said the MAX is too big to be cancelled. By does it make sense to build 4,000 of these for use over the next 45 years. I agree with others, in today's time - a flawed design should not have happened. If Boeing knew it was flawed and then proceeded to continue with it - then that is an issue. I just don't see 4,000 of these being built. More carriers will cancel. US airlines may stick with it, but Boeing will be forced to replace it with a new design over the next 5 years. |
Originally Posted by cova
(Post 30922415)
I think the MAX's fate will be determined by the foreign carriers that have them on order. After most of the foreign carriers grounded their MAX's then the USA did. If most of the foreign carriers were to cancel their orders, then there would be pressure on US airlines to cancel.
Some analysis have said the MAX is too big to be cancelled. By does it make sense to build 4,000 of these for use over the next 45 years. I agree with others, in today's time - a flawed design should not have happened. If Boeing knew it was flawed and then proceeded to continue with it - then that is an issue. I just don't see 4,000 of these being built. More carriers will cancel. US airlines may stick with it, but Boeing will be forced to replace it with a new design over the next 5 years. The business case for the MAX - pilots not needing training on a new type, and substantial parts commonality, but with 15% higher fuel burn, exists regardless of the fact that the A/C is a dog. SWA or RyanAir are not going to add a second/new airbus type to their fleet. I think Boeing will lose a few orders, and perhaps will lose a few new orders they otherwise might have gotten to the neo (or the new C series jets) but overall the business case does not change. Boeing will (a) change the software, (b) tie it to the second AoA sensor, and have an indication to the pilot if they disagree, and (c) will provide more training, problem solved. I think the only real impact we see may be on the MAX10. It has further risks with its telescoping landing gear, and is not so hot of a plane to start with. If there are cancellations, that is where I would expect to see them. |
Originally Posted by DenverBrian
(Post 30922177)
If there is unnecessary complexity in those planes, we should. So far, we haven't seen two of those planes kill everyone five months apart.
And we actually DID ground the 787 for far less. There IS a way to deal with MCAS @:-) More than one pilot posted about that. LiOn battery catching on fire? Not so much @:-) Luckily this did not happen in flight. Lucky on oh so many fronts ..... |
Originally Posted by EmailKid
(Post 30922486)
Um, NO.
There IS a way to deal with MCAS @:-) More than one pilot posted about that. LiOn battery catching on fire? Not so much @:-) Luckily this did not happen in flight. Lucky on oh so many fronts ..... The 737MAX DID kill 350 people before it was grounded and (possibly) fixed. And when it returns to the air (hopefully with proper training, including purpose-built simulators, if not outright different type certification), I'll wait a year or so to ensure that no one else augers into the ground. <shrugs> |
Originally Posted by spin88
(Post 30922481)
The business case for the MAX - pilots not needing training on a new type, and substantial parts commonality, but with 15% higher fuel burn, exists regardless of the fact that the A/C is a dog. SWA or RyanAir are not going to add a second/new airbus type to their fleet.
Did you actually mean "lower fuel burn"? |
Originally Posted by DenverBrian
(Post 30922084)
Air France killed everyone on board with 17% of their Concorde fleet. Is Air France not an example of a good operator?
The ET crash in Beirut was also a pathetic job of flying a plane, and then to have the Ethiopian authorities completely disregard all evidence in an effort to protect ET’s brand makes me wonder why everyone is after Boeing and the FAA, when clearly the operators in both crashes have shown an inclination towards poor operational standards.
Originally Posted by dmurphynj
(Post 30922132)
Way, way more than $80k to make sure those systems are data integral. Built plenty of multi-million dollar HA (not even fault tolerant) systems in my time ... Protecting the data (something’s wrong here, I’m not going to write any suspect data) is a much different problem to solve than trying to recover from the fault. I can almost guarantee you've used one or more of the systems I've built (without knowing it of course) - can't get into details about what or why, but it's not governmental... but certified, yes. I've had to sign off to people who care about such things on the level of redundancy and integrity in the design. I’m not suggesting a recovery system by any means; I agree that’s excessive in many cases. But on inputs that have redundancy, there could very easily be a system to scrub through them at some frequency and if sensor A and B have disagreeing output, outside of tolerance, it could just post a warning to the display. “Pitot disagree - check output” ”Airspeed disagree - check output” Just something - not in critical path - to bring attention to sensors that should agree, but don’t. It’s easy enough to do if the sensors already exist. |
Originally Posted by dmurphynj
(Post 30917585)
That's an extreme overreaction and wholly unnecessary.
Is there a problem? Clearly, yes. Has the root cause been identified? Yes. Is a fix feasible and practical? Yes. Will it be implemented quickly? Also, yes. This is not a structural integrity issue; it's a software and wetware problem. That said... the new MOM aircraft (i.e. 757X) can't get here quickly enough. |
Originally Posted by wanderingkev
(Post 30923564)
The thing that I am not happy about in this unfolding story,is that there seem to be fundamental items for controlling the systems that were sold as upgrades
If the people running an airline are too stupid or too cheap to buy systems appropriate for the experience and training of their pilots, why should this be blamed on Boeing? It's not Boeing's responsibility to protect them from their own bad choices. It's not like they're selling aircraft directly to hobby pilots who wouldn't be expected to know anything about the systems. More choice should be better. |
A long article, but some useful (prescient?) thoughts with a more general view about aircraft automation, control damping and how pilots react to (rarely) encountered problems nowadays.
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/busi...ash?verso=true (My apologies if it is linked here, but I didn't see it in a quick search.) |
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