Does the 737 MAX Have a Unique Tendency to Pitch Up?
 

If this is why a software fix with a MCAS system is required, why wasn’t the plane designed not to pitch up?

If there will always be a lifetime lingering issue, I would go with the A321neo. (plus A321neo superior comfort & public perception)

We try to build perfect airplanes but have not yet been able to achieve it.

If AF447 has been a B777, instead of an A330, the accident would likely not have happened because the control forces would not have allowed the F/O to hold full nose-up control input for the majority of the descent.

If OZ214 had been an A330, instead of a B777, the accident would likely not have happened because the auto-throttle logic, and alpha-floor protection, would not have allowed them to get so slow.

The 737-10 MAX doesn't yet exist. I have no idea what its approach speed will be. They are making changes to the main gear design which will increase tail clearance and, possibly?, reduce approach speeds.

That's what people thought about the DC-10, but it never recovered.

There were these statements on the internet:

“... as the nacelle is ahead of the CofG this causes a pitch-up effect which could in ..”

“Specifically, the new 737 MAX showed a tendency to pitch up”

“MCAS was a band-aid to fix the pitch up problem caused by the relocated and heavier new engines”


It would seem to me that if the heavier engine's nacelle is ahead of the Center of Gravity that the plane should pitch down, not up?

No, not with the information we have now. Despite the frequent complaints about the product, United is not a third world operator. It's not like the Ethiopian MAX crash was some incredible anomaly; it was the third 737 Ethiopian has crashed in the last decade, from a fleet of only 30 or so 737 aircraft.

United has good training and pilots who will fly the airplane.

Much confusion about this from media who doesn't understand the first thing about aircraft design, much less any details. The high-AoA behavior is aerodynamic from the lift off the nacelle (which is ahead of the CG). The location of the engine isn't moving in flight, so there's no associated CG shift in flight.

Both I and all the various certification authorities around the world disagree with your opinion here; a DAL C system doesn't need redundant sensor inputs on every sensor. The single input at a time AoA has been standard for years on a variety of systems, including the stick shaker. It's a pilot training issue that the pilots are not recognizing runaway pitch trim and following the runaway pitch trim procedure.

Ethiopian has crashed 10% of their 737 fleet in the last decade. I don't think there's any question the US airline pilots are better trained.

In my opinion - this is very true. I still can't get over the Ethiopian co-pilot only had 200 hours experience.

If I read it right, Southwest flew 41,000 MAX flights - and 88,000 flight hours - not a trivial matter.

The question is how critical? Clearly not DAL A. The assumption was with existing training and procedures it should be DAL C. And in both cases the crew could mitigate the failure via well established procedure and failed to.

Both crashes were at third world airlines with dismal crash records. Ethiopian has crashed 10% of their 737 fleet in the last decade. This isn't like Qantas is crashing the MAX.

Last decade... Addis Ababa, Beirut, and ?

Did you read the following post by one of our resident pilots?

Accra