Sounds bad, but only because the people reading it don't have the context of being 737 pilots.

The MAX is not significantly different than the NGs that it replaced. Cockpit displays are a lot better and convey more information in a better format. The weather radar is significantly better. The gear handle doesn't have an "OFF" position so you have to be careful that you don't try to put it in "OFF" after takeoff as you do in an NG. Then there are some behind the scenes changes that improve handling with full flaps (the NG would roll back and forth with flaps 40), help you land in the correct attitude (to prevent the nose gear from touching down first), and to maintain a consistent control feel with the NGs.

What has not changed is the runaway stabilizer procedure. That has existed since the first 737 rolled off the assembly line in the 1960s and in every airliner since the 1950s. The change is that there is an additional system which also has the capability to produce a runaway stabilizer situation if it activates when it shouldn't.

Back in 2012 I earned my B757/B767 type rating (for a different airline). All of my simulator training was in B767 simulators. In fact, all of my sim training was in a B767 simulator with GE (simulated) engines and a first generation FMS (flight management system). My checkride was in a B767 simulator with P&W (simulated) engines and Pegasus (3rd generation) FMS. When my checkride was fished I received type ratings for both the B767 and the B757. While the 757 and 767 cockpits are very similar, the airplanes have significant differences particularly in the hydraulic systems, steering system, flight controls, and equipment cooling. The handling characteristics during takeoff and landing are also quite different. Similarly, an A320 type rating qualifies a pilot on the A318, A319, A320, and A321. Short courses are available for A320 pilots to transition to the A330 or A340 with just a few days of training (an initial course lasts about 6 weeks). So, it really isn't unusual for a short differences course to gain qualifications on a new variant of the same type aircraft.

Thank you for sharing your amazing experience. But don't you think if you weren't told about a critical system that has the potential to bring down an aircraft, you would feel the need to be trained properly on it? I am in the cybersecurity space and it has been a proven fact that CBTs (Computer Based Training) is not as useful as to exposing an user to a real threat in a simulated environment and providing the appropriate education/guidance at the point of failure. Similarly, in this case, if MCAS could bring a plane down and completely hiding it from folks who fly it won't really help them - instead, it would hurt them, which, unfortunately, in this case, hurt 350+ souls. Having a self-guided training is good, but let the pilots get a feel of the actual system in action on a Sim.

As a 737 pilot, I have learned quite a lot about the MCAS system since the Lion Air accident. That information has proven very helpful to me in engaging in conversations about the airplane and the two accidents but it doesn't help me fly the airplane. It hasn't changed how I would fly the airplane. It doesn't change how I would respond to a similar failure. That is what, IMO, people are missing.

I believe that you are referring to the AoA indicators and AoA Disagree indication.

Some airlines have a heads-up display (HUD) in their 737s. They use them for lower-than-standard takeoffs and landings, i.e. CAT II/III landings. Those are the airlines that have the AoA indicators/disagree options. I believe that the AoA indicators/disagree is REQUIRED in order to hand-fly CAT II/III landings with the HUD. (I'll update if I find out otherwise).

Other airlines use the autopilot's autoland function for CAT II/III landings. Those airlines do not have the AoA options because they don't conduct operations which require them.

If UA's management (the pilots have nothing to do with aircraft buying decisions) knew that that MCAS system was (a) on the plane, (b) was tied to only a single sensor, and did not have redundancy with the other sensor, then I think that they made a horrible decision and have a lot of explaining to do. My strong guess is that those buying the plane at United has no clue that Boeing would be so negligent as to have an automated system that was tied to only a single sensor, a sensor that had nearly caused other air-crashes, and as such no need for the extra warning/safety systems.

So yes, I agree the optics for UA are bad, but my guess is they knew as little about the MCAS system and how it worked as did the pilots, and can't fairly be faulted.

I just find this to be stunning. Given that the second AoA sensor is standard equipment, tying together the two sensors and using a processor to sourt out disagreements and display a warning, can't have cost more than $5K/plane, likely much less. Yet, Boeing was asking an airline like UA to pay an extra $12M. You can bet that Boeing gouging its customers for a "safety feature" that is only needed because of their own grossly negligent design is going to be exhibit 1 if any of the death cases ever go to trial. Really, really, really bad fact for Boeing.

You are missing the entire point. Yes, on the NG that was what the AoA indicators was for. But on the MAX Boeing tied a single AoA sensor to a system that would - unless the pilots figure out what the hell was going on - crash the plane as it overrode the pilots inputs, when as history shows they would, the AoA sensor had a bad reading. On the MAX this additional safety equipment was vital to address the flaw in Boeing's design of the MAX.

Again, I doubt that United (or any airline for that matter) knew how crappy of a design, and how dangerous of a design Boeing had for the MCAS system, a system designed to make up for flaws in the air-frames handling as Boeing over stretched the design, but a system - which was an "option" on the MAX, and a profit center for Boeing at $80K/plane - was vital on the MAX.

Is this not the whole point? This is a critical component, because 2 planes have literally crashed, killing hundreds of people.
How else do you define 'critical'?

What is a good airplane from a customer or UA / Airline are different matters.

Yes UA cares about customer comfort and thinks like cabin space etc. etc. but never forget customers have voted with their $ mostly, cheapest and most convenient ticket to where they want to go dominates most passengers choice, not plane or carrer.

The 737-Max debacle will soon be forgotten

As an engineer it is clear the Max can fly safely in almost all conditions when things are reasonably okay given the number of planes and time it has already flown.
A terrible tragedy that at the corners of the envelope, call it a six sigma condition in combination with poorly trained crews and equipment failures and hidden software / automation intervention the crashes occured.

Flying has to be totally safe and understandable airlines will now noodle cancelling, its PR and business combined.

But look at the airlines, the short haul point to point business is exploding, the number of narrow body fuel efficient airplanes needed is crazy, just look at the backlog for the 320 NEO and 737-max are what > 3K and 5K respectively. Airlines that cancel will either stand back of the line at Airbus and likely pay more as Airbus knows what it's got, and wait even longer for deliver crimping the airlines revenue and growth and bottom line businesm

No in the end BA will have a huge egg on its face, get dragged thru the mud, stock will fall maybe even to the low 300s. The engineers there and software are working 7x24 and will produce a solution, the path is obvious
1) Triple redundance to the inputs to the software
2) Realtime indicators to the pilot
3) Sensible over-rides, maybe even more software to automatically suspend the software, LOL
4) Training and more training

I highly doubt any 737-max pilot doesn't now know what is happening when his plane climbs un-intentionally nor what to do, sadly how it became required knowledge is tragic and BA PR problem
BA will be on the hook for years and billions of in liability and class action, will have to compensate billions for the grounded airlines lost revenue, and by next year everything will be in the rear view mirror and hopefully a deep lesson for the AI/software engineers working on driverless cars!

NO UA will keep their order as most airlines and they will be extracting some serious $ out of BA, that is what I'd do for my business in their shoes!

Simulation and real world crisis when you are at low altitude, end of flight envelope and real seconds away from what appears to be death is a far different thing then simulation flying at envelope corners in well staged extreme emergency states or standard flying conditions. Its the same reason many solders train for war and battle but in real battle the true performers and hero's are hard to predict as the mind and muscle in moments of stress are impossible to simulate. Thus why we all fee more comfortable with captains and pilots with thousands of hours in real seats and not simulators and training.

I've talked to a pilot friend who has flown all 737 for 7 years then 757, 767, 777 and now his new gig the 787 on UA his opinions BA and UA are frightening.

Garuda just canceled their entire order - while I'm no fan of Boeing right now after years of chanting "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going", I refuse to allow public hysteria to fuel these decisions. Much of our security theater is due to pandering to this kind of nonsense.

Garuda management, Lion air management, Ethiopian management, United management - these are all adults who wear big boy pants, and went through endless hours of cost benefit analysis with regard to all available systems, avionics and configuration options (thanks to the news, we only know of one - but there are others). I hope Boeing is able to force Garuda to either complete the order, or pay dearly for the cancelation - and to passengers who refuse to fly the MAX - at this point, with everything that is known, the aircraft is much safer given the laser focus on this design element.

Again, I am not being a Boeing cheerleader, I think their certification/ process was flawed, the FAA was complicit in permitting self certification which is total nonsense (what if Pfizer was allowed to self certify a new arthritis drug?), but the airlines were also complicit in not ensuring their crews were aware of the inherent risks with this system - ie, an online self-study guide without simulator time that calls out, among other potential issues, MCAS issue or runaway stab trim, come on, that is beyond ridiculous. That's like my having experience driving around a 50' RV and then "self-certifying I can drive a transport truck after watching a bunch of videos and CBT scenarios.

Either way, we must not allow an uninformed general public to sink an otherwise good aircraft due to hysteria.

Furthermore, if you think the 737MAX is potentially dangerous, just wait until you start digging around the various computer managed systems on an Airbus!

What characteristics would make the MAX10 "worst"?
And would that mean that the MAX9 is "worse" than the MAX8?

I haven't seen this asked so far, but apologies if it has.

Why have MCAS operational during an initial climb? Both flights had issues within the first 2 minutes. How much risk of a stall is there during the climb while accelerating?

Or where two crashes of the same brand new model plane within five months, killing 300 people, simply exists as fact. @:-)

that statement is laughable. tell it to the 300+ who were killed because of poor engineering/design/approval