I think it is also worth noting that the Seattle Times started their investigation on this issue prior to the second crash.

If the article is correct, then it was much worse than what is mentioned above, as the system would reset itself each time there was a corrective pilot input, effectively allowing "endless" MCAS manipulation.
The proposed software update was/is to only allow a one-time automatic manipulation.
This, coupled with only one sensor being used for the MCAS evaluation and not both, and also not checking for sensor comparison errors pre-departure (Lio nAir sensors were apparently off by 20 degrees prior to take-off), tells me that there was some serious logic failures at Boeing.

I was thinking about that also & saw some discussion that Airbus had redundant systems.

I am not letting Boeing off the hook, but the certification process for the 777X should be very different than for the MAX, where Boeing tried to sneak an airplane with very different handling and systems under an existing certification. I assume Boeing will have to do a full training program to fly the 777X, if not, then that is a big problem IMHO.

The neo program did not make any fundamental changes to the air-frame in the same way that Boeing did for the MAX. They basically just added new engines and did some clean up and weight reduction. The sharklets and some of the clean up was already on late model ceo models. My understanding is that the actual plane flies exactly like a sharklet (out since about 2010) equipped A320/321. The first round of changes (to the ceo, with sharklets) over time reduced the fuel burn by about 5%, then adding the new turbo-fan engines (making it the neo) allowed a further 10% reduction in fuel burn.

Boeing OTOH had to put new front landing gear, changed the tail, and moved the engines up and forward, all of which changes the aerodynamics and as such how the plane flies. The MCAS system was designed to mask these changes in how the plane flew. Airbus did not have to do something like this.

In fairness, I don't think that the FAA would have done anything different if told it was 2.5 degrees, given the degree of regulatory capture that Boeing has, but the lawyers (and congress) will have a field day with this.

What I think that this shows is how much different that the MAX is from the NG. They needed a full 2.5 degrees.

I am surprised to hear that the software update will to allow only one-time activation. The change to two-channel fail-safe architecture and inhibition of the function with AOA or airspeed disagree is pretty elementary and should have been there from day 1. OTOH, if the MCAS function is limited to one cycle of nose-down trim input, it's much less useful as an active stall prevention feature and might be better served as an aural or tactile warning to pilots in the same vein as a horn or stick shaker.

There is no shortage of disgruntled current and former Boeing employees in the Seattle area, so there's little doubt it would be easy to find anonymous sources and sufficient content for this investigative piece. There is a fair amount of uncertainty in the article, especially as it pertains to to the post-flight testing data, emphasis mine:

Nobody to date has actually seen what was submitted, with certainty, and can point to a smoking gun. If it's out there, rest assured it will be located.

With that said, the article hits on the lack of redundancy we have been discussing for nearly a week:

This, IMO, is the biggest problem for Boeing. There is a reasonable alternative design that would not have been prohibitively expensive to implement, and for whatever reason, it wasn't.

In almost every other country in the world (including Europe), it is completely normal for FOs to start flying after 150 hours or so of flying time. This ET FO who had 350 hours of flying time was no doubt inexperienced, but it is the norm in most countries and OEMs need to design aircraft and training keeping this fact in mind.

Most countries don't have general aviation like the US does, so pilot training is prohibitively expensive and difficult. Airlines usually pay for training for pilots with no experience (cadet system). It is not realistic to expect the airline to pay for 1000+ hours of flight training before getting their pilots on the line. The overall safety record of aviation worldwide seems to show that this system works reasonably well.

Aye, I agree from a pure logical viewpoint.

Prior to the Colgan crash the FO could be a commercial pilot. Following the legislature that passed, FOs are now required to be ATP certified. This was a very poor, reactive, and short-sighted move.

In addition, I think it is important to note the pilot had 8,000 flight hours with 1,500 as a pilot. It is not like it was just the FO flying by himself. How do you expect FOs to get flight hours. I personally would have thought that would be flying with an experienced pilot....

A FO under previous rule, which permitted a FO to have a CPL (250 hours), still meant the pilot would undergo training with the airline in systems and maneuvers, and would serve in that capacity (not an aircraft commander) until reaching the 1,500h threshold for an ATP, which did not change. Now, in order to serve as a FO for a US Part 121 carrier, an ATP is required. So it's not an issue of type- or operator-specific training, but rather overall experience.

The rule is controversial, but as a general matter it is premised on the theory that more hours = more experience = better/safer pilot. Importantly, it's not to say that 1500 hours = safe pilot, or 1500 hours = well-trained pilot, but there is no doubt that an ATP must demonstrate a higher degree of proficiency to earn the ticket.

To answer that would be pure speculation until we have the reports from the accident investigation authorities.

The FO would still be trained and type-rated on the aircraft and perfectly capable of operating it safely.

Disagree with you here. The engineering mistakes and decisions will look bad, but are not the worst.

The worst was the decision to downplay the existence of the system. Had pilots been trained to recognize the failure they would not have spent precious minutes making useless trim adjustments that the MCAS would revers shortly afterwards. Cuting the electiic trim control completley and mechanically wheeling it in would presumably have worked in both cases.

So Boeing made a human decision to conceal that the MAX was more difficult to handle, and that decision cost lives.

The public can understand an issue like that a lot better than they can understand the concept of giving too much authority to the automated systems.

And at the end of the day, the public really does matter.