There was radical change a long time ago as well. Take a look at a 737-300 vs a -200. Radical stretch / change from the cigar engines to the then larger forward weighted ones used until the Max.

And the 737-200 had its own flaws. Very prone to pitch up - was a factor in the stall that led to the Air Florida crash in DC (and also one as recently as 2012 in Pakistan). Pilots ultimately responsible, and a sensor was also involved, but the design of the aircraft and its unique handling characteristics played a memorable role.

Lots that can be done better - but are we certain a clean sheet airframe would be free of its own boundary pushing and flaws. Remember the induction of the Airbus A320 and its fly by wire.

I'll bet most of us though would have rather seen the 757 be updated.

They are not loaded questions at all. There is a lot of really good information in this thread unfortunately it's buried within some dramatic, purely speculative nonsense.

I have to be honest, just don't remember the exact pitch/power scenarios we used for the runaway trim training, it's been a long time since I was in that aircraft. However I do recall the training exercise was more than just hitting the cutoff switches after turning the automation off. You had the re-trim the aircraft, add or reduce power to get the plane stable for the procedure to be complete. There were full trim deflections both up and down that were demonstrated and recovery had to be made from both.

In regards to your question about surprise runaway trim. The B737 is very easy to diagnose. For argument's sake, lets just assume a pilot would not recognize the situation by the excessive force on the yoke required to climb, descend, or maintain level flight; probably clue #1 . An obvious secondary sign would be the trim wheel going nuts, spinning uncontrollably inches from your left or right knee. The trim wheel moves as electric trim on the yoke is applied, rarely does it move more than 3 or 4 seconds at a time. Anything more would get my attention.

Hope this helps.

It's 2019, not 1959. We have computer simulations unthinkable even 20 years ago. Wireframe construction unthinkable 50 years ago. I absolutely demand a much higher level of safety today than a decade ago or a half century ago.

Boeing made the conscious decision that they could get by, and make MORE MONEY, by cheating the design of the old 737. That's not as safety conscious as they could be or should be. Full stop.

Sorry but that's a fantasy world. Yes, we can mod/sim all sorts of things today and still wind up surprised that the simulations don't live up to the real world. I would lay great odds that Boeing did a ton of computer simullations in the process of of both desiging the mods that led to the MAX and in building the software to make it feel like an NG when under manual control. Of course, I don't know if they ever saw these kinds of results in their sims and they probably won't (yet) release information on what exactly they saw in design sims or computer-aided testing but I'm sure that will come out.

Computer simulations are only as good as the imagination AND coding capability of the simulator -- and are often quite worse. I'll bet Tesla never bothered to simulate a driver watching a movie on his phone while letting the automobile self-navigate. You can do a wonderful photorealistic simulation if you want to shoot a movie. That is NOT the same as simulating performance with 5000 different variables at play.

It's one thing to say say Boeing missed something in their design. It's a whole other thing to charge they beta-test the product with passengers.

And you're getting it.

Look up some statistics on things that are likely to kill you. Even including the MAX crashes, many things you do in your daily life are far, far more likely to kill you, unless you actually live aboard a 737 max and never leave it. Even then, you'll probably go from heart disease first because you probably wouldn't get much exercise living aboard a plane.

I freely admit that I walk through the world not as Spock, but more as McCoy. <shrugs>

I've OFTEN quoted the safety record of air travel to nervous friends. My focus here is quite specifically on the 737MAX. All the info I'm reading so far leads me to the conclusion that Boeing dropped the ball on this particular model. It should have been a completely new type certification. Simulator training should have been provided. MCAS should have been more clearly explained. And yes, because 350 humans died after first being subjected to minutes of sheer terror, the EFFECT is that Boeing beta tested on passengers. (Of course no one sat in a room and said, "let's get this rushed out, if it crashes, we'll learn then.")

Ya, believe AS has some unfilled 737-900 ordets and there are probably others.

If a Tesla makes an error, it results in the death of 1 or 3 or 5 people. If a passenger jet makes an error, 150 or 300 or 500 people die. That definitely calculates into any risk assessment and MUST increase the focus on safety first.

I flew a lot of those Air Florida 737-200s. Cute video of the hypothetical United 757-100 at minute 5:05.
Allegedly Boeing did not get any orders for the 160 seat 757-100 and went for the 757-200. The 757 MAX with the 160 seat version, and updated 200 and 300 series would have been a far more aerodynamically stable and flexible option than the 737 MAX.

At a time.

But the number of people who die due to our extremely lax attitudes toward wheeled motor vehicle operation is enormous. Approximately 3000 people *every month* die in motor vehicle related incidents in the US, most of which could probably be prevented if we improved the rigor of our operator training and testing. And while you may feel like you're in control of your own vehicle, someone else who isn't in control of theirs could easily kill you. In New York City alone, hundreds of people are struck by cars every year *while standing on the sidewalk*.

Try being a little more like spock and look at the stats. Commercial passenger aviation, including Boeing, focuses way more on safety than you clearly seem to realize. That we can count the number of annual casualties *worldwide* in the hundreds (and in the US on one hand) is a testament to that. I suspect that everybody at Boeing understands perfectly well that any sort of safety failure on their part is likely to be far more damaging economically than almost any savings they might make on the unit cost of a part or aircraft.

I am more concerned about food recalls due to Salmonella and Listeria. But to each their own.

Per a thread tracking this on airliners.net, the last AS 737-900ER was delivered yesterday.

There are maybe about two dozen airline 737NGs (plus a handful more military variants on a separate production line) left to be delivered (I can't find the exact up-to-date total, but it's probably around that number). That's half a month of production, tops.

The irony here being that caring less about the 1 or 3 or 5 allows those 1s and 3s and 5s to add up to way more than the couple hundred that might die in one go in a plane crash.

Problem with the 757 was that it was too heavy and expensive a platform to start from. It was designed around performance that wasn't really possible with the 737 engines from the early 1980s. Once the 737 became capable enough to fill most of those 757-specific missions (as well as the A320/321 coming around), there wasn't much of a reason for airlines to buy the 757. Yes, it could fly a few more people a few more miles, but the extra capacity and range came at a significant cost compared to flying a 737. When doing a cost/benefit analysis, the essentially unanimous decision by airlines was that the 757 wasn't worth it. Hence, orders completely dried up, and Boeing had to end production. Even now, with significant improvements in engine efficiency and airplane weight with composites, Boeing is struggling to find a business case for a new "middle-of-market" plane which is why its launch has been delayed until at least 2020.

Boeing's launch of the 737 MAX 10 with United actually eats up a lot of the remaining 757 replacement market. Sure, we could all argue that a hypothetical 757 MAX would perform "better" than the 737 MAX, but if that better performance costs a few million dollars extra per plane to buy and to fly, for a bunch of missions that are mostly within the capability of the 737, what actual incentive do airlines have to buy it?

Thse are all good points and they add up to the 757, in today's environment, being over-engineered. However, the 737 MAX program is under a microscope now and people may come to view it as under-engineered which would be disruptive to the market. Along with the penalty of greater weight, the 757 has a lower landing speed coupled with twice as many tires to brake the aircraft. There may come a day when that's valued.

I am clearly focused on this particular model of 737.

Meaning that this single model of aircraft is responsible for 30-50% of all air fatalities worldwide in the last 12 months. @:-)

Well, sure - they do now. How about after the Lion Air crash? Are you telling me there was absolutely nothing Boeing could do to prevent the Ethiopian air crash?