2013 Westbound TATL 757 "Short Stops"
Jan 22, 2013, 5:18 am
#76
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The 757 was from another era. It was highly over-engineered and was designed to be able to do everything 727-200 did, and more. It was have the power for short runways, more seating capacity, be able to climb quickly, and also fly trans con (including BOS-SFO/SEA, or SEA-MIA) and also do south/central American routes with the 60 min divert rule (pre ETOPS rule).
Because it (and the 762/2) was a leap in fuel efficiency/capacity, and it had no direct narrow body competitor, Boeing was able to have it do everything.
Today, airlines don't want to pay for that, and with fuel costs so key, caring arround the extra fuel/weight for more capacity makes little sense, which is why the 737/320/321 have less capacity.
Because it (and the 762/2) was a leap in fuel efficiency/capacity, and it had no direct narrow body competitor, Boeing was able to have it do everything.
Today, airlines don't want to pay for that, and with fuel costs so key, caring arround the extra fuel/weight for more capacity makes little sense, which is why the 737/320/321 have less capacity.
But my point is that since Boeing stopped making the 757 a demand has developed for narrow-body ETOPS aircraft, one that wasn't there while the plane was still being manufactured.
Perhaps this niche is too small to even warrant a 739 MAX version truly capable of the same range as the 752? That must be the reason Boeing isn't developing a new plane to replace the 752.
However, I am sure airlines would welcome a newer, more fuel-efficient alternative to the 752.
In any case, I don't think we will see airlines abandoning the 752 on their TATL routes for quite some time.
As you pointed out, other two-engine a/c have been used TATL. PrivatAir flew 737 BJ's (essentially a 73G) and single-aisle Airbuses TATL for LX and LH, but this has been discontinued (PrivatAir's scheduled service currently only serves Europe to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa).
BA uses the all-J A318 LCY-JFK, but in the cases of PrivatAir and the BA A318, these a/c have a far less dense configuration than the 752's used by a number of airlines TATL. These lower density layouts increase their range.
BA's A318 does make a fuel stop at Shannon westbound, but this is not because of the a/c's range limitation, but because of MTOW rules at LCY, meaning that the plane cannot take off with a full fuel load.
Jan 22, 2013, 7:35 am
#77
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That's absolutely a violation of the FTR.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=...bu7exGKj8AwkEA
"It is important to note that choosing the Discounted Government (“DG”) fare, also called the “me too” fare, is not permitted by the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR). Federal travelers cannot choose a DG fare, even if it is lower than a CPP fare unless there the CPP carrier is full or no CPP carrier exists in the area you are traveling to."
Picking a lowest available, on the other hand, is permitted, though agency rules govern the use of lowest available vs. refundable.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=...bu7exGKj8AwkEA
"It is important to note that choosing the Discounted Government (“DG”) fare, also called the “me too” fare, is not permitted by the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR). Federal travelers cannot choose a DG fare, even if it is lower than a CPP fare unless there the CPP carrier is full or no CPP carrier exists in the area you are traveling to."
Picking a lowest available, on the other hand, is permitted, though agency rules govern the use of lowest available vs. refundable.
Jan 22, 2013, 7:55 am
#78
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I was shocked to see the TXL-EWR being operated by 757s again. It's a hazard to fly a 757 on this route. The last few winters they flew 762s.
It's funny -- This is my perspective when I discuss the issue on A.net. All the ex-CO New Jersey people come out of the woods and pull the glass is half full mentality -- "Well at least CO flew to these destinations, would you rather have it the other way?" It's ridiculous because you can only defend CO so much until you read about that sketch memo the EWR manager sent to pilots about 757s declaring fuel emergencies to skip the land queue. Or the lack of fleet planning that eventually made CO merge with United. They were a small company that had they stayed indy, would have gone irrelevant by the time they got their 787 deliveries.
You are right. Its not an emotional decision. PMCO was a small company, and it had a certain number of captive elites, it did not have enough reach to fly certain routes with a wide body and it also did not have/buy the wide bodies to do routes that it could have done with widebodies as its fleet planning did not anticipate the spike in overseas lift that was needed. As such it stuck 752s on the routes and since they were not subject to COMPETITION they were able to do a nitch product. However, in doing so CO passed up much high value traffic that went to other airlines not flying 752s to main (not secondary) cities.
With the merger they immediately upgaged the flights using PMUA equipment, which is what they should have done before, just CO had done a piss poor job of fleet planning (inefficient 762s, now sent off to the desert and few larger 764s, no 763s)
The problem was that they then tried to use 752s to replace the UA AC they had pulled. They lost lots of corporate traffic, and also lost the US GOV contract on certain routes. They faced competition out of IAD.
They did not plan to give up what they gave up in business (much like they did not intent to take the post 3/3 hammering they have taken at LAX, and to a lesser degree ORD and SFO with corporate accounts and high value fliers bailing).
It was a bad business decision, and like a lot of the cross-fleeting ended up being a bad operational decision. It hurt the brand and hurt business unrelated to this route. Revenue performance is not up, its in the toilet.
That you can't see that says a lot.
UA had been barely competing on the PS routes, and had clearly let product quality slide. That escalated post the merger, the soft product in C/F went down hill as did maintenance. Part of this was that the new CO management wanted to kill PS. Having looked at the books they were convinced not to do it, but it took a while and things festered. I recall one discussion with a CO exec who expressed amazement at the number of premium fares on UA, the CO folks had never seen it, no one was paying full F on CO.
I think that the CO folks were unused to competition, and the idea of a F product (and having to spend the money) did not appeal to them. I think that they also saw AA in distress, and nothing else on the route.
Today DL has a much better transcon product that UA BF (and has added SEA to the mix), and AA is doing new planes with F/C, and VX has joined the fray. My guess is that UA is giving up traffic, and of the type they will regret over time.
With the merger they immediately upgaged the flights using PMUA equipment, which is what they should have done before, just CO had done a piss poor job of fleet planning (inefficient 762s, now sent off to the desert and few larger 764s, no 763s)
The problem was that they then tried to use 752s to replace the UA AC they had pulled. They lost lots of corporate traffic, and also lost the US GOV contract on certain routes. They faced competition out of IAD.
They did not plan to give up what they gave up in business (much like they did not intent to take the post 3/3 hammering they have taken at LAX, and to a lesser degree ORD and SFO with corporate accounts and high value fliers bailing).
It was a bad business decision, and like a lot of the cross-fleeting ended up being a bad operational decision. It hurt the brand and hurt business unrelated to this route. Revenue performance is not up, its in the toilet.
That you can't see that says a lot.
UA had been barely competing on the PS routes, and had clearly let product quality slide. That escalated post the merger, the soft product in C/F went down hill as did maintenance. Part of this was that the new CO management wanted to kill PS. Having looked at the books they were convinced not to do it, but it took a while and things festered. I recall one discussion with a CO exec who expressed amazement at the number of premium fares on UA, the CO folks had never seen it, no one was paying full F on CO.
I think that the CO folks were unused to competition, and the idea of a F product (and having to spend the money) did not appeal to them. I think that they also saw AA in distress, and nothing else on the route.
Today DL has a much better transcon product that UA BF (and has added SEA to the mix), and AA is doing new planes with F/C, and VX has joined the fray. My guess is that UA is giving up traffic, and of the type they will regret over time.
Jan 22, 2013, 8:00 am
#79
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I think that this is nub of the issue.... No one is complaining about JFK/EWR-MAN or FJK/EWR-EDI or similar. England is closer, far less risk of divert, and there is not the traffic for a widebody.
What CO has been doing (EWR-LON, and then IAD-CDG) was doing two (or more) flights on 752s rather than one on a widebody.
Anyone who thinks that this makes financial sense needs to have their head examined. 4 pilots rather than two, two landing/take off/gate fees, and fuel and AC expanse for two 752s rather than a 777 or 763/764 is a loosing proposition for UA.
CO did this as they did a poor job of fleet planning, had too little widebody lift, extending it to IAD was a mistake, and they lost reputation/HVFs.
And then trying to do the same thing to 2ndary markets (like Berlin) which are another 300-500 miles or more away is just a mistake. That plus that EWR is further than JFK is where CO has gotten in trouble.
As others have noted, UA is converting UA 763 domestic/Hawaii lift into 763 international lift. Clearly this is a recognition that doing things the CO way was a disaster. Too bad they damaged the brand/corporate accounts before they reversed course.
What CO has been doing (EWR-LON, and then IAD-CDG) was doing two (or more) flights on 752s rather than one on a widebody.
Anyone who thinks that this makes financial sense needs to have their head examined. 4 pilots rather than two, two landing/take off/gate fees, and fuel and AC expanse for two 752s rather than a 777 or 763/764 is a loosing proposition for UA.
CO did this as they did a poor job of fleet planning, had too little widebody lift, extending it to IAD was a mistake, and they lost reputation/HVFs.
And then trying to do the same thing to 2ndary markets (like Berlin) which are another 300-500 miles or more away is just a mistake. That plus that EWR is further than JFK is where CO has gotten in trouble.
As others have noted, UA is converting UA 763 domestic/Hawaii lift into 763 international lift. Clearly this is a recognition that doing things the CO way was a disaster. Too bad they damaged the brand/corporate accounts before they reversed course.
Jan 22, 2013, 10:55 am
#80
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I was shocked to see the TXL-EWR being operated by 757s again. It's a hazard to fly a 757 on this route. The last few winters they flew 762s.
It's funny -- This is my perspective when I discuss the issue on A.net. All the ex-CO New Jersey people come out of the woods and pull the glass is half full mentality -- "Well at least CO flew to these destinations, would you rather have it the other way?" It's ridiculous because you can only defend CO so much until you read about that sketch memo the EWR manager sent to pilots about 757s declaring fuel emergencies to skip the land queue. Or the lack of fleet planning that eventually made CO merge with United. They were a small company that had they stayed indy, would have gone irrelevant by the time they got their 787 deliveries.
It's funny -- This is my perspective when I discuss the issue on A.net. All the ex-CO New Jersey people come out of the woods and pull the glass is half full mentality -- "Well at least CO flew to these destinations, would you rather have it the other way?" It's ridiculous because you can only defend CO so much until you read about that sketch memo the EWR manager sent to pilots about 757s declaring fuel emergencies to skip the land queue. Or the lack of fleet planning that eventually made CO merge with United. They were a small company that had they stayed indy, would have gone irrelevant by the time they got their 787 deliveries.
I respect your opinion but if you are going to make an argument, at least base some of it on fact.
Jan 22, 2013, 10:59 am
#81
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It clearly isn't - the aircraft will not leave the ground unless there is a flight plan in place that includes legal minimums for fuel, conditions at alternate airports in case of emergencies, etc. Which of these factors is being ignored, resulting in hazardous operations? Have you informed the FAA?
The amount of hyperbole this subject brings out is incredible.
Jan 22, 2013, 11:01 am
#82
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http://consumerist.com/2008/04/17/co...nes-at-newark/
I'll except your apology for the OPer.
Jan 22, 2013, 2:56 pm
#83
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can't access the original WSJ version, but will this make you happy? ... actually two memos...
http://consumerist.com/2008/04/17/co...nes-at-newark/
I'll except your apology for the OPer.
http://consumerist.com/2008/04/17/co...nes-at-newark/
I'll except your apology for the OPer.
If you want to talk about the practicality of TXL-EWR, shady re-dispatch points enroute, and creative alternate selections that's one thing but there has never been a directive to use "emergency fuel" as a dispatch tool. If that was a regular practice, the FAA would have an absolute field day with that one.
Ever been the pilot of an airliner coasting in on fumes...NO? Neither have I; if we need more gas, we get it. Not putting my ticket at risk for an on time arrival. If I get there safely, so do you!
Spin88...just to give you the benefit of the doubt I went through the pilot memo archives from 02/07 and 10/07 as referenced by the "Consumerist." There were no such documents.
Last edited by clubord; Jan 22, 2013 at 3:26 pm
Jan 22, 2013, 4:34 pm
#84
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I'm a United/Continental pilot and the last person in the world to defend the company but I've been flying the B757/767 for 8 years now and that memo never existed.
If you want to talk about the practicality of TXL-EWR, shady re-dispatch points enroute, and creative alternate selections that's one thing but there has never been a directive to use "emergency fuel" as a dispatch tool. If that was a regular practice, the FAA would have an absolute field day with that one.
Ever been the pilot of an airliner coasting in on fumes...NO? Neither have I; if we need more gas, we get it. Not putting my ticket at risk for an on time arrival. If I get there safely, so do you!
Spin88...just to give you the benefit of the doubt I went through the pilot memo archives from 02/07 and 10/07 as referenced by the "Consumerist." There were no such documents.
If you want to talk about the practicality of TXL-EWR, shady re-dispatch points enroute, and creative alternate selections that's one thing but there has never been a directive to use "emergency fuel" as a dispatch tool. If that was a regular practice, the FAA would have an absolute field day with that one.
Ever been the pilot of an airliner coasting in on fumes...NO? Neither have I; if we need more gas, we get it. Not putting my ticket at risk for an on time arrival. If I get there safely, so do you!
Spin88...just to give you the benefit of the doubt I went through the pilot memo archives from 02/07 and 10/07 as referenced by the "Consumerist." There were no such documents.
The fact that TXL-EWR went back to a 757, after the German press went after CO, is actually quite insane.
Jan 22, 2013, 4:59 pm
#85
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The point is that CO had no business operating an aircraft on a handful of routes that are too much range for a 757. They needed more 764s, they should have ordered them (or taken the options for the extra 10 that they converted.)
The fact that TXL-EWR went back to a 757, after the German press went after CO, is actually quite insane.
The fact that TXL-EWR went back to a 757, after the German press went after CO, is actually quite insane.
Jan 22, 2013, 5:28 pm
#86
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I'm a United/Continental pilot and the last person in the world to defend the company but I've been flying the B757/767 for 8 years now and that memo never existed.
If you want to talk about the practicality of TXL-EWR, shady re-dispatch points enroute, and creative alternate selections that's one thing but there has never been a directive to use "emergency fuel" as a dispatch tool. If that was a regular practice, the FAA would have an absolute field day with that one.
Ever been the pilot of an airliner coasting in on fumes...NO? Neither have I; if we need more gas, we get it. Not putting my ticket at risk for an on time arrival. If I get there safely, so do you!
Spin88...just to give you the benefit of the doubt I went through the pilot memo archives from 02/07 and 10/07 as referenced by the "Consumerist." There were no such documents.
If you want to talk about the practicality of TXL-EWR, shady re-dispatch points enroute, and creative alternate selections that's one thing but there has never been a directive to use "emergency fuel" as a dispatch tool. If that was a regular practice, the FAA would have an absolute field day with that one.
Ever been the pilot of an airliner coasting in on fumes...NO? Neither have I; if we need more gas, we get it. Not putting my ticket at risk for an on time arrival. If I get there safely, so do you!
Spin88...just to give you the benefit of the doubt I went through the pilot memo archives from 02/07 and 10/07 as referenced by the "Consumerist." There were no such documents.
I don't have a dog in this flight, but I would bet a nice bottle of scotch that if no memos existed and the WSJ piece was wrong, that CO would have asked for and gotten a correction.
I don't know if they were to everyone or what, or if they were removed, but I am skeptical that the WSJ would have made it up and not been corrected.
That said, I don't believe that this is a safety issue, and disagree with anyone who suggests it is. I know the fuel rules, and I trust the pilots to keep me safe. I've been on enough flights where pilots asked for more fuel, and I've had more than a few diverts. And I might add that UAs response on the 787 issue (keep flying till the FAA made them stop) does not exactly instill confidence in UA's current management. I trust the pilots, management not so much....
My concern is not that a plane will end up in the ditch, but that a major airline ought not to be doing any kind of route with an AC that require diverting on a regular basis. [Or continuing to fly the 787 when others have grounded them waiting until the FAA pulls the plug.] Doing so hurts UAs reputation far more than any money they are making.
As a personal example, my last flight on CO before I ditched them in 2006 (for UA) was a "fuel stop" on IAH-SFO. Despite being on a B fare I did not get upgraded as it was a 735, CO would not put me on an earlier flight, I hung at IAH for 4 hours, they switched my seat to a middle seat (I was a 4 year PLT) and could not get me back my original isle then as we boarded they said that we would be making a fuel stop in Amarillo, TX. We then left an hour late, I got home 2 1/2 hours late, and got to see Amarillo, TX from a middle seat. Joy, Joy.
I booked my first UA flight in 5 years the next day, and never looked back.
Jan 22, 2013, 5:33 pm
#87
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http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...memo_FINAL.pdf
Straddling pages 2-3, you will see reference made to the CAL bulletin (not memo) to which I made reference.
I have excerpted it here:
"In a February 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines officials expressed concerns with the higher-than-expected number of fuel stops pilots were making due to unusually strong headwinds on flights from Europe into Newark Liberty. The bulletin stated that it was the airline’s strong desire to reduce the number of 757 fuel stops. In an October 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines stated that there continued to be an opportunity to reduce unwarranted crew-initiated fuel additions. This bulletin further stated that adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding."
The DOT document goes on to add:
"We [DOT] were concerned that these types of bulletins might put pressure on pilots to either not stop for fuel when needed or to carry insufficient amounts of fuel."
Jan 22, 2013, 6:38 pm
#88
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CO has gotten caught by the German press, the American press, the FAA, and their own customers on throwing 757s onto routes where they are simply not the correct aircraft. Their CDG downguage blew up in their face and they took an appropriate shalacking for it.
The CO sympathizers have always had trouble with any facts that undermine their smoke and mirrors operations, but this is getting to be just ridiculous. Even the company, the company has internally admitted to the corporate accounts who ran away that the CDG embarrassment was, in fact, a short sided and misguided decision. 1Kpath's account was not the only one who had this message relayed to it. This was a disaster for United, and the fact you have some blue in the face still trying to apologize for this is beyond comprehension.
Jan 22, 2013, 7:12 pm
#89
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Here is the pdf of the U.S. DOT letter to Frank Lautenberg.
http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...memo_FINAL.pdf
Straddling pages 2-3, you will see reference made to the CAL bulletin (not memo) to which I made reference.
I have excerpted it here:
"In a February 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines officials expressed concerns with the higher-than-expected number of fuel stops pilots were making due to unusually strong headwinds on flights from Europe into Newark Liberty. The bulletin stated that it was the airline’s strong desire to reduce the number of 757 fuel stops. In an October 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines stated that there continued to be an opportunity to reduce unwarranted crew-initiated fuel additions. This bulletin further stated that adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding."
The DOT document goes on to add:
"We [DOT] were concerned that these types of bulletins might put pressure on pilots to either not stop for fuel when needed or to carry insufficient amounts of fuel."
http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...memo_FINAL.pdf
Straddling pages 2-3, you will see reference made to the CAL bulletin (not memo) to which I made reference.
I have excerpted it here:
"In a February 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines officials expressed concerns with the higher-than-expected number of fuel stops pilots were making due to unusually strong headwinds on flights from Europe into Newark Liberty. The bulletin stated that it was the airline’s strong desire to reduce the number of 757 fuel stops. In an October 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines stated that there continued to be an opportunity to reduce unwarranted crew-initiated fuel additions. This bulletin further stated that adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding."
The DOT document goes on to add:
"We [DOT] were concerned that these types of bulletins might put pressure on pilots to either not stop for fuel when needed or to carry insufficient amounts of fuel."
However, my point is that at no time did the airline ever issue a memo or directive to its pilots to declare "minimum fuel" to circumvent the landing queue at Newark as was claimed by a previous poster, which includes the 02/07 & 10/07 memos.
Jan 22, 2013, 8:18 pm
#90
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Here is the pdf of the U.S. DOT letter to Frank Lautenberg.
http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...memo_FINAL.pdf
Straddling pages 2-3, you will see reference made to the CAL bulletin (not memo) to which I made reference.
I have excerpted it here:
"In a February 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines officials expressed concerns with the higher-than-expected number of fuel stops pilots were making due to unusually strong headwinds on flights from Europe into Newark Liberty. The bulletin stated that it was the airline’s strong desire to reduce the number of 757 fuel stops. In an October 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines stated that there continued to be an opportunity to reduce unwarranted crew-initiated fuel additions. This bulletin further stated that adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding."
The DOT document goes on to add:
"We [DOT] were concerned that these types of bulletins might put pressure on pilots to either not stop for fuel when needed or to carry insufficient amounts of fuel."
http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...memo_FINAL.pdf
Straddling pages 2-3, you will see reference made to the CAL bulletin (not memo) to which I made reference.
I have excerpted it here:
"In a February 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines officials expressed concerns with the higher-than-expected number of fuel stops pilots were making due to unusually strong headwinds on flights from Europe into Newark Liberty. The bulletin stated that it was the airline’s strong desire to reduce the number of 757 fuel stops. In an October 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines stated that there continued to be an opportunity to reduce unwarranted crew-initiated fuel additions. This bulletin further stated that adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding."
The DOT document goes on to add:
"We [DOT] were concerned that these types of bulletins might put pressure on pilots to either not stop for fuel when needed or to carry insufficient amounts of fuel."
We are mission oriented individuals so we want to get you to your destination. Any pushback on adding fuel is defeated by captain's authority. Memos about pension funding didn't change that. Btw I still don't see any reference to a member of CAL management calling the 757 the wrong airplane for the Transatlantic.