737-Max 8 safety concerns
#166
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The goal was for pilots to be able to maintain dual-qualification on both the MAX and NG fleets. If the MAX was deemed to be "too different" from the NG then the FAA would not have allowed the dual-qualification and an airline that operates both variant would have to split the fleet with pilots qualified on either the NG or MAX, but not both.
The FAA did decide that pilots couldn't be qualified on the 737 Classics (737-300/400/500), NG (600/700/800/900), and the MAX (-7/8/9/10). SWA previously operated the Classic and NG as a dual-qualification. They had to retire the Classics before they introduced the MAX, if they wanted to maintain universal pilot qualification with the NG.
#167
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I beg to differ.
Please allow me to quote one of our resident MAX pilots, @LarryJ, from another thread:
A properly trained pilot would have followed the runaway stabilizer procedure. The deadheading pilot on the Lion Air plane the day before it crashed knew what to do, he was properly trained.
Please allow me to quote one of our resident MAX pilots, @LarryJ, from another thread:
A properly trained pilot would have followed the runaway stabilizer procedure. The deadheading pilot on the Lion Air plane the day before it crashed knew what to do, he was properly trained.
https://ecair.fr/pilot-account-loss-...i-on-falcon-7x
#168
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There's never been any question that the MAX would require Differences training. The only question is what that Differences training would involve.
Regarding MCAS, there isn't very much to know. It's a system that is transparent to the pilots. We don't see it. We can't control it. We have no way of knowing when/if it is activating. The only thing we need to know is that it has the potential to cause a runaway stabilizer and, if it does, the existing runaway stabilizer procedure will stop it. We've all already practiced the runaway stabilizer procedure in our initial training.
Regarding MCAS, there isn't very much to know. It's a system that is transparent to the pilots. We don't see it. We can't control it. We have no way of knowing when/if it is activating. The only thing we need to know is that it has the potential to cause a runaway stabilizer and, if it does, the existing runaway stabilizer procedure will stop it. We've all already practiced the runaway stabilizer procedure in our initial training.
Last edited by Herb687; Apr 2, 2019 at 5:30 pm Reason: trimmed quote to most relevant portion
#169
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Differences training is the "minimal training" that you are talking about.
The goal was for pilots to be able to maintain dual-qualification on both the MAX and NG fleets. If the MAX was deemed to be "too different" from the NG then the FAA would not have allowed the dual-qualification and an airline that operates both variant would have to split the fleet with pilots qualified on either the NG or MAX, but not both.
The goal was for pilots to be able to maintain dual-qualification on both the MAX and NG fleets. If the MAX was deemed to be "too different" from the NG then the FAA would not have allowed the dual-qualification and an airline that operates both variant would have to split the fleet with pilots qualified on either the NG or MAX, but not both.
The urge by Boeing to prevent the necessary disclosure and more-extensive training is, IMO, the key factor to how over 350 people died in two preventable crashes.
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I continue to agree with myself that Boeing will have to completely rid himself of the word "Max." Wasn't there a Max in "The Sound of Music" who was saying to Captain Von Trapp that the Nazi takeover was just inevitable and he should go with the flow? Boeing's Max will have to go wherever that guy went. They'll do some kind of cosmetic change in addition to what they do for safety reasons and presto, it gets another model name. If they don't they won't be able to sell very many.
You know you've got a problem when people start calling the airline wanting to know if their flight is on one of those planes and saying they won't take it if so.
You know you've got a problem when people start calling the airline wanting to know if their flight is on one of those planes and saying they won't take it if so.
#171
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Apparently the pilot dis-engaged MCAS and still couldn't get the plane to recover. Eventually he re-engaged it but obviously that didn't help either.
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#174
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[QUOTE=The urge by Boeing to prevent the necessary disclosure and more-extensive training is, IMO, the key factor to how over 350 people died in two preventable crashes.[/QUOTE]
That might be a little too harsh, but I believe this is definitely a contributing factor. I won't be flying on any MAX aircraft for a long time, if ever.
That might be a little too harsh, but I believe this is definitely a contributing factor. I won't be flying on any MAX aircraft for a long time, if ever.
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/ethiopi...em-11554263276
#176
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Non-firewalled link
https://arstechnica.com/information-...rned-on-again/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...737-max-flight
Hypothetically, the Ethiopian Airline pilots tried to trim manually and was in rapidly deteriorating situation. So the pilot re-enables the trim motor to try to do it faster.
That's when MCAS re-engages (after being turned off once) and down goes the plane into a deadly dive which kills everyone on board.
From a software design perspective, it is a pretty bad design to have software that was forcibly shut off automatically restart just because one component (trim motor) was re-enabled.
If there's a procedure for forced-shutdown, the software should REMAIN shut down unless specifically activated or when the whole system restarts (like after the plane lands).
https://arstechnica.com/information-...rned-on-again/
Both Reuters and The Wall Street Journal report that the air crew followed procedures laid out by Boeing following the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX in October, according to officials briefed on the initial findings of the investigation. But the pilots failed to regain control of the system, and the MCAS was reactivated again—triggering yet another automated correction of the aircraft’s stabilizers that would have pushed the nose of the plane down.
...
To prevent the MCAS from continually pushing the nose down in the event of bad sensor data or some other software failure, Boeing instructed pilots to deactivate the system using procedures already in place for dealing with runaway stabilizer control systems in other 737 aircraft—flipping two stabilizer trim “cutout” switches to the “cutout” position. Failure to do so could result in the system pushing the stabilizers to their movement limit—putting the aircraft into a steep dive. The pilots of the Ethiopian Airlines flight did flip the cutout switches, and they cranked the controls to attempt to regain positive stabilizer control. But they continued to have difficulty controlling the aircraft.
It is not clear at this point whether the pilots purposely reactivated the MCAS’ stabilizer control or if the software reactivated on its own after shutdown. While a Wall Street Journal source said that it appeared the pilots turned the system back on in hopes of regaining control over the stabilizers, Reuters reports that the software may have reactivated without human intervention, and further investigations of that possibility are ongoing.
...
To prevent the MCAS from continually pushing the nose down in the event of bad sensor data or some other software failure, Boeing instructed pilots to deactivate the system using procedures already in place for dealing with runaway stabilizer control systems in other 737 aircraft—flipping two stabilizer trim “cutout” switches to the “cutout” position. Failure to do so could result in the system pushing the stabilizers to their movement limit—putting the aircraft into a steep dive. The pilots of the Ethiopian Airlines flight did flip the cutout switches, and they cranked the controls to attempt to regain positive stabilizer control. But they continued to have difficulty controlling the aircraft.
It is not clear at this point whether the pilots purposely reactivated the MCAS’ stabilizer control or if the software reactivated on its own after shutdown. While a Wall Street Journal source said that it appeared the pilots turned the system back on in hopes of regaining control over the stabilizers, Reuters reports that the software may have reactivated without human intervention, and further investigations of that possibility are ongoing.
The flight crew on the Ethiopian Airlines aircraft followed at least part of a protocol set by planemaker Boeing Co. to manually disable an automated anti-stall system as they tried to save the 737 Max jet, a person familiar with the situation said as Ethiopian authorities prepare to release a preliminary report on the accident Thursday.
However, the pilots didn’t perform another critical part of the checklist, said another person familiar with results of the Ethiopian investigation. Before cutting power to a motor operated by the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, they failed to adjust the plane so it wasn’t set to dive. That made it more difficult to fly the plane and may have hastened the fatal plunge that occurred later in the flight, said the person, who wasn’t authorized to speak and asked not to be identified.
The pilots later switched power back on to the so-called trim motor, said the person. That runs counter to the warning Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration issued last November after the first crash of a 737 Max aircraft in Indonesia. The FAA’s emergency directive says switches controlling power to the trim system should be set to “CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight.”
...
MCAS engaged numerous times during the short flight, one of the people said. The software feature, which is programmed to push down a plane’s nose to help prevent aerodynamic stalls in some situations, is a focus of concern by regulators and lawmakers after 346 people died in crashes of Boeing’s newest version of the 737 flown by Ethiopian and Lion Air less than five months apart.
....
The American Airlines pilots who flew Boeing simulators last week were surprised at how fast the plane’s trim system tried to push the nose down when MCAS activated, said Dennis Tajer, spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association, which represents pilots at the carrier.
“They were able to disconnect it and were able to use the manual trim, but they said it was a handful. This is a complex emergency,” he said. “To get my trust and confidence in the new software, I have to have some trust issues revisited.”
However, the pilots didn’t perform another critical part of the checklist, said another person familiar with results of the Ethiopian investigation. Before cutting power to a motor operated by the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, they failed to adjust the plane so it wasn’t set to dive. That made it more difficult to fly the plane and may have hastened the fatal plunge that occurred later in the flight, said the person, who wasn’t authorized to speak and asked not to be identified.
The pilots later switched power back on to the so-called trim motor, said the person. That runs counter to the warning Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration issued last November after the first crash of a 737 Max aircraft in Indonesia. The FAA’s emergency directive says switches controlling power to the trim system should be set to “CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight.”
...
MCAS engaged numerous times during the short flight, one of the people said. The software feature, which is programmed to push down a plane’s nose to help prevent aerodynamic stalls in some situations, is a focus of concern by regulators and lawmakers after 346 people died in crashes of Boeing’s newest version of the 737 flown by Ethiopian and Lion Air less than five months apart.
....
The American Airlines pilots who flew Boeing simulators last week were surprised at how fast the plane’s trim system tried to push the nose down when MCAS activated, said Dennis Tajer, spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association, which represents pilots at the carrier.
“They were able to disconnect it and were able to use the manual trim, but they said it was a handful. This is a complex emergency,” he said. “To get my trust and confidence in the new software, I have to have some trust issues revisited.”
That's when MCAS re-engages (after being turned off once) and down goes the plane into a deadly dive which kills everyone on board.
From a software design perspective, it is a pretty bad design to have software that was forcibly shut off automatically restart just because one component (trim motor) was re-enabled.
If there's a procedure for forced-shutdown, the software should REMAIN shut down unless specifically activated or when the whole system restarts (like after the plane lands).
Last edited by Plato90s; Apr 3, 2019 at 9:46 pm
#177
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Hit Object?
https://www.standard.co.uk/news/worl...-a4108941.html
The doomed Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX which crashed shortly after take-off, killing 157 people on board, was struck by a mystery object or bird, according to a leaked report. ...
#178
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That would explain how two AoA vanes/sensors failed in such a short period of time. One failed and one was damaged by an object/bird strike.
#179
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I might be wrong on that, but if that's true then that's my biggest gripe with Boeing right there, and why I (and most people that I speak to) aren't going to start flying MAXs anytime soon, even if they do get cleared.
#180
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I thought that one of the biggest issues around MCAS was that if the two AoA sensors disagreed then it acted on the 'worst case' reading - so only one of the sensors failed/got damaged, but when the readings disagreed the MCAS acted on the failed/incorrect sensor.
I might be wrong on that, but if that's true then that's my biggest gripe with Boeing right there, and why I (and most people that I speak to) aren't going to start flying MAXs anytime soon, even if they do get cleared.
I might be wrong on that, but if that's true then that's my biggest gripe with Boeing right there, and why I (and most people that I speak to) aren't going to start flying MAXs anytime soon, even if they do get cleared.
One of the changes that Boeing started to make after the Lion Air accident was to disable MCAS if the two AoA sensors disagreed.