YuropFlyer

I will NOT board an aircraft that is deciding to CRASH and KILL everyone aboard just because a sensor failed despite the hardest and best effort by it's pilots.

Give me European Airbus or Chinese COMAC at any time.

American Boeing? Thanks, but no thanks, I'd like to keep on living

YVR Cockroach

Having just one component that controls something that can intervene in flight control is pretty bad. Pretty much ever Boeing engineer has said they'd normally have redundancy but someone high up decided it wasn't necessary.

I used to be a Boeing fan but am not so sure anymore, actually not sure at all.. I hadn't followed the MAX development until after the ET crash. My take is that this crash due corner-cutting may have sounded the death knell of U.S. commercial aerospace supremacy.

LarryJ

Systems having a single data input is the norm, not the exception.

Only systems that are rated high in the safety assessment process and hazard analysis would have dual, or triple, inputs.

For example, each set of flight instruments, and each autopilot, receives all of their data from single sources (one pitot/static system, one IRU, etc.). The other set of flight instruments, and autopilot(s), receives data from a separate set of single sources. Redundancy is provided by recognizing the discrepancy and switching away from the compromised system(s). In the case of autopilots, the only time the airplane is being flown using multiple data input sources is during an autoland. A dual-system will use two autopilots and be classified as fail-passive. A triple-system will use three autopilots and be classified as fail-active.

YVR Cockroach

Whatever the technicalities that you may try to use to absolve Boeing, permanent damage to Boeing's reputation has been done (this might well be the equivalent of the Comet's square windows). To have a system reliant on the one sensor, that would put the a/c into a nose dive if faulty, and not inform pilots and/or airlines that such a device exists so that they can switch it off......

LarryJ

This has nothing to do with Boeing. It is the same on Airbus and every other manufacturer's airplanes. Despite all of the inaccurate media reports, this design is common and in complete compliance with certification regulations.

The link I provided gives an overview of how these determinations are made.

Boraxo

+1 At this point I would not make a permanent vow to avoid the MAX but will want to see a track record and also have explained what will happen when the next sensor fails.

+1 Boeing gives me zero confidence so far in terms of design, response, or even understanding why their planes are grounded. I won't avoid other Boeing jets but certainly need to see much more than just a "software fix" and better pilot training.

Maybe it is irrational like not flying Malayasia anymore but we only get one shot at life and it is not an inconvenience for me to avoid the MAX or Malaysia Air. If Southwest went to an all-MAX fleet then I would be inconvenienced.

DenverBrian

"We've always done it that way" doesn't work for me when a plane's original design dates from 1967. We're talking air travel here, not a typewriter or a stove.

LarryJ

This is also true of brand new A350s, A320neos, A220s, E175s, etc. It is the way transport jets are designed. It has nothing to do with Boeing or the 737.

DenverBrian

No other transport jet has an MCAS. @:-)

LarryJ

The 767 tanker does, but I wasn't talking about MCAS. I was talking about single-source inputs which are the norm for most systems such as flight instrument displays, flight directors, and autopilots. The MAX's MCAS is just one more system with operated based on a single data input.

DenverBrian

Southwest is the domestic airline that stands to have the most "inconvenience." They're already pretty much off my list until the MAX flies successfully for a year or two. UA has far less exposure, at least for now. AA has some exposure but at least seems to be empathetic towards the passenger experience and was allowing pax to swap from the MAX before its grounding.

84fiero

But it's a system that, it appears from preliminary reports, was a significant part of the error chain in two fatal crashes. Boeing has admitted the need to change the software and has subsequently done so. Thus it hardly seems unfair to be critical of the system or question the decisions surrounding it. Especially in light of revelations about how Boeing handled the design and implementation, as well as its notifications/communications to regulators and airlines from the initial fielding to the post-accident timeframes of both crashes. None of which paints Boeing in a very favorable light regarding its approach to the MAX or the MCAS system. The latest leaked audio from the AA pilots meeting certainly shows concern from the time of the LionAir crash.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/boeing-...es-2019-05-14/

LarryJ

So is the autopilot and the autopilot has far more control over the aircraft than does MCAS. People are outraged that a system would rely on a single input but systems that rely on single inputs are the norm, not the exception, in aircraft design.

serfty

I would suspect that 12 months ago many more Pilots would be aware of the existence of the autopilot than those that may have been aware of the existence of MCAS.

DenverBrian

One of the things that's become apparent on the various MAX threads is that certain pilots have a mission to convince the world that nothing is wrong with the MAX and that we should all just move along. It is turning into nothing but shilling for Boeing. And it seems to be an attempt to sweep 350 lives under the carpet as inconsequential. It's troubling.