surram

WSJ broke news just now...that DoT is investigating how FAA 'certified' MAXes in the first place...basically trying to figure out any potential lapses in (FAA's) federal safety approvals for new aircraft. It's about time we do something about this turnstile...

Link:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/faas-73...d=hp_lead_pos4

Duke787

Not to mention in the 10 years since this system was put in place we've had issues with 2/3 of the new or upgraded passenger planes coming from Boeing:

1) 787 battery problems
2) 737 Max 8 problems

Seems the only Boeing jet to avoid issues since the system was put in place is the 748. Doesn't exactly make me confident about the upcoming 777X and the FAAs ability to ensure nothing similar is happening as they stretch and re-engine 777...

Clearly there is an issue here and to pretend otherwise is ignoring the facts and ignoring common sense...

surram

Now, the plot thickens. WSJ is now reporting that the Federal prosecutors are now investigating on top of DoT Inspector Generals. A grand jury in Washington, D.C., issued a broad subpoena dated March 11 to at least one person involved in the 737 MAX’s development, seeking related documents, including correspondence, emails and other messages.

WSJ Article Link:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/faas-73...d=hp_lead_pos4

Boeing and the FAA better prepare for Congressional hearings. I hope the acting FAA cheif can withstand scrutiny. A lot of government agencies are now under the 'acting' heads.

username

It is kind of scary reading the Seattle Times article. Even as a Boeing stock holder, I am glad the US Prosecutors are opening an investigation on this. I am guessing this criminal issue is not going to end with just the US.

I think we all want to know how Boeing made the decision on the flawed design, who/how decided to not document it to make the plane more marketable and if there was any intentional misleading of the authorities.

Unlike the 787 fiasco, a lot of lives were lost and it sounds like this really did not have to happen. Then the initial arrogance... Imagine if you had a loved one on one of these flights - and we did lose quite a few people who were trying to do this world good! People definitely should be held accountable for this.

Now the trust is gone, how are people going to trust some patch that they are rushing out?

On the subject of trust, here is an interesting article Bloomberg had: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ar...737-max-planes

JimInOhio

The 737 MAX8 achieved FAA certification less than two months after Trump's inauguration. More specifically, Elaine Chao took office about six weeks before final certification. Doesn't it seem the FAA's ink was already there and simply drying at the time?

tryathlete

DenverBrian

Plenty. I've had two different conversations with members of my team who travel, who brought up "should I fly on 737s?" all by themselves. I educated them on the MAX vs. other 737 difference.

But at least anecdotally, that indicates to me that the public is afraid of 737s as a result of these crashes. It's not a narrow fear of MAXes; it's concern for all 737s.

mduell

No, you're not reading it right. Pilot can always override MCAS inputs on pitch trim, via several methods. Pitch trim is effected via horizontal stabilizer, where MCAS does not have any "authority" it's merely one possible input.

Dublin_rfk

Your 'average' flying public are basically lemmings. Reacting to the last (and sometimes only) sensationalized news report.

EWR764

Don't you know better than to let facts get in the way of a good conspiracy theory, especially in this hyper-partisan environment?

No doubt the design is not as redundant as other systems which involve basically the same function. Boeing has an issue there, and that will be litigated heavily.

With respect to full AND trim, which is what the wreckage of the ET crash suggests, it can very easily be overcome by disengaging the automated trim function and manually trimming the wheel back to ANU. That didn't happen, and what is looking increasingly likely in the ET case as well as what the JT investigation has shown, the system eventually ran trim to the stops and there wasn't enough elevator to recover from the dive.

n198ua

I don't understand then - how have two planes flown themselves into the ground ? Certainly the pilots are trying - in vain - to pull the nose up with all they've got ? I can only speak for myself, but I'm imagining fight-for-life scenario in the cockpit with the flying pilots desperately trying to fly a plane intent on flying itself into the Earth ?

WineCountryUA

Moderator Note

Let's keep the political commentary for OMNI. While concerns if the FAA did a proper oversight role is an appropriate discussion area, getting into political discussions / inferences / opinions are best in OMNI.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator

spin88

This is a key point, which has now come more fully into view.

I have enjoyed (a) the technical discussion in this thread, and (b) how it has moved over time. I think it helps to review where we are:

(1) Boeing has a 50 year old design in the 737, designed for a different mission. Due to the Board/Management's decision to cut head count and engineering staff, they put off a replacement for the 737 until after the 787 was done. When the 787 - due to offshoring design work in a bid to get back at the Unionized Work Force - program was delayed and then iced due to the battery issues, Boeing put off the 737 replacement again.
(2) Airbus then - with a much newer aircraft which could easily be re-engined - then lapped Boeing with the neo program, Boeing, having waited so long, got serious push-back from major customers on a 737 replacement. They told Boeing that they would not wait for that aircraft (5-6 years later, if all went well) as Airbus was pumping out neos, and further warned Boeing that having waited, a likely more expensive new type of plane would be a hard sell vs the A320neo.
(3) Boeing then switched tacks again, and decided to not only reengine the plane, but to promise buyers that it would not be certified as a new type, but would not require any new training.
(4) however, when the engineers were asked to make what the bean counters had promised work, the plane was too low for new turbo-fan engines, and the tail needed to be reworked. A combo of a lengthened front landing gear, moving the engines forward and up so that they would fit under the 737's 60 year old structure, and the new tail caused a plane that flew very differently, and had a nose up problem.
(5) so to avoid having to retrain pilots to fly a new type of airplane (something that would require simulators to be built, manuals written, and training designed, all of which took time and required additional certifications) Boeing designed the MCAS system to make the MAX feel like it was flying like a NG, while adding a new anti-stall system to push the nose down. However, this was all hidden (i.e there was neither any training on the new system, nor training on flying the MAX w/o it.
(6) Boeing via regulatory capture got the FAA to sign off on the MAX as a carry-over design, w/o the need for training or new certification.
(7) Boeing did not even have a simulator when the MAX was rolled out, and provided no training other than one hour plus on an iPad.
(8) Lion Air goes down. Appeared to be a result of the single level of attack sensor (unlike the Airbus which had two, then with a third as part of the fix to earlier issues) Boeing used, sending a signal to the MCAS that put the plane into a series of dives, from which the pilots were unable to recover.
(9) Yet rather than taking action quickly, Boeing blamed the pilots and rolled out a short training. They did not disable the MCAS system because (your point) they could not and keep the plane certified. W/o the MCAS system, the plane would handle differently and new training would be needed.
(10) Ethiopian pilots all got the training that Boeing rolled out.
(11) since Boeing for reasons that will be the subject of a lot investigation did not change the MCAS system programing, or roll out more robust training, or add a further sensor, the Ethiopian plane was equipped the same as the Lion Air One.
(12) Ethiopian plane had flight path suggesting repeated engagement of the MCAS system drove it into the Ground, and the position of the jackscrew (fully in dive position) suggests MCAS overrode the pilots inputs.

So two crashes, both the result of a well known problem that Airbus had (and fixed) with similar systems. That it took two crashes for the captured FAA to say no to Boeing says all you need to know.

I expect we will see a roll out of (1) new multiple angle of attack sensors to be added, (2) MCAS system modified/reprogrammed, and (3) hopefully new training, including simulator training, on how to address the issues were they to arrive again, and (hopefully) how to fly the plane with the MCAS system disabled if need be.

I think the real issue is going to be how much reputational damages Boeing will be taking......


Yup, no redundant sensor. Airbus had issues with these same systems with TWO sensors. This is an issue that any decent engineer should have put onto a DFMEA (TS16949) process and identified as a critical point early in the design process. Boeing really badly failed in not doing so.

iapetus

Thanks for the summary, spin88! ^ I haven't been able to follow the whole thread through; so that was quite helpful.

Geez, if that's all more or less correct, to say that Boeing needs a radical and immediate culture change doesn't even begin to adequately describe the situation. And NASA is currently having issues with them, too ...

EmailKid

Very nice summary.

But from what I read and understand, there are actually two AoA sensors on MAX, alas only one of them is used by MCAS. Apparently the one that was not functioning properly on Ethiopian 737.