jgreen1024

Take it all with a huge grain of salt. There are a whole bunch of frequent fliers on this site who think they know how to fly a plane. They don't.

cesco.g

With JS not being well liked everywhere at the WSJ as seen in previous reports/articles maybe this story is just another one in this series.

planemechanic

This type of comment is typical when someone has no clue how maintenance works. MRO's have nothing to do with "scabs". MRO's around the world perform maintenance on carriers from around the world, and pretty much every airline outsources some maintenance.

Tell me, how would you manage the swings in workload that happen due to the original delivery schedule of the aircraft, the endless stream of SB's and AD's, the variety of modifications that customers want (new interiors, WIFI, more legroom, etc...). Some years United would need 12-15,000 mechanics, the next few years they would need 6-8,000 mechanics. I have seen the boom and bust hiring and furlough cycles (and the vast amount of bumping and moving that mechanics have to do to stay employed). That is just probably more disruptive to good maintenance than outsourcing some work. You can't staff for the peak, but you can bleed off some work to third parties that can then manage their workload by having multiple customers.

Enough said.

halls120

Actually, very well said. ^^

FlyWorld

When sUA policies and procedures are being changed by {UA} management, is the general intention behind these changes to maintain or improve safety? Or, is the general intention to spend less money so margins can grow so Smisek can get a larger bonus?

JBord

To run an efficient business, I would hope the answer is "both". They don't have to be mutually exclusive.

FlyWorld

Safety is caused, in part, by multiple layers of controls. Something bad happens, a control is in place to protect life. The control fails, another control is in place to protect life. That control also fails, another control is in place to protect life.

This is why people aren't dying all the time. Training, procedures, maintenance, and layers upon layers of controls to protect life when things fail.

If you remove controls to save money, or you cut training to save money, the probability of a catastrophe increases.

WineCountryUA

And where has it been reported that is happening? The pilots have reported procedures and training have changed in the harmonization process. Have not seen any of them reporting a cut in training or procedures. The WSJ article does not make such a claim.

JBord

Removing "controls" and improving margins by cutting cost don't have to be related. You can maintain safety while cutting cost.

I'm no fan of Smisek myself, but saving money doesn't equal reducing safety. I would imagine even he knows that one costly accident due to reduced safety can blow away years of cost cutting.

Maybe it's just that I can't think that way for an airline that I fly on 90 times a year. I've met a lot of CEO's and other execs in my career, and I don't think one of them would say "it's ok if a lot of people die, as long as I get my bonus".

CO_Nonrev_elite

This discussion should have ended at below. Any discussion of this being caused by changes in training is just ridiculous..

• The problems being discussed are not items that could have fallen between the cracks between the differences in training programs
• Cockpit management is rule 101. If they are not adhering to this, then training has very little to do with it. Not paying attention to the point that you nearly fly into the ground ??? this is not found in between the different training programs.
• Captain is 100% in charge, they assert this often, and therefore have to take 100% of the responsibility for what happened, and not start shifting blame towards the other side's training program.
• There is not one captain flying for either of these airlines that can say that they were not trained properly in cockpit management.
• There is not one captain flying for either of these airlines that can say that they were not trained to pay attention to what's going on to avoid crashing into terrain.
  
• Stop blaming the other side's training, take responsibility for your own actions.

freshairborne

Yes to both. Both things are important to the Willis Tower crowd. Within Flight Operations, though, pilots and mechanics will be more interested in increasing safety. Upper management has the last word on everything, including Flight Ops.

FAB

Triple-well-said.

FAB

FlyWorld

"But the union also complained of “shorter and less robust training,” degradation of respect for “captain’s authority,” “pilot pushing”—or pressuring them to skirt rules—and having oversight of flight operations by labor relations instead of a flight-operations executive."

freshairborne

To be clear, the training has changed drastically. I say that as a sUA pilot. I have no first-hand experience with the sCO training. Lots of guys from sUA have gone to 737 training in Houston and come back shaking their heads, though. Just different and vastly less organized, different philosophy on who trains with whom, students having a different instructor every day, etc.

I heard on our crew bus today a guy who just finished 737 training. He was telling my copilot that he showed up for training and couldn't find the designated room that he was told to meet his instructor in. Finally he made a phone call and was told that the room he was looking for was at the training center in Houston; he had been sent to a contract training facility in Miami. That's the "IT Company With Wings". (Smisek said it first).

FAB

WineCountryUA

None of that suggests that monetary concerns are the driver. Change is disruptive but to speculate monetary issues are the primary driver is a bit too provocative for my tastes. Obviously costs are always a factor and obviously there are issues (or the memo would not exists or the above pilot comments) but to connect those and suggesting one causes the other based on the above is a leap too far and unneeded innuendo.

PushingTin

Yes, I understand the difference between AGL and MSL- since I didn't have an altimeter at my seat, 5000 feet would have to be AGL, and I would hope a pilot would have realized that. I've climbed out of DEN on hundreds of RJ flights and that was the slowest climb to altitude that I could remember- and this was in icing conditions and we are bumping around in the clouds. Any one of those things is no cause for concern, but all together with they were odd to the 1% level. I wasn't in my seat screaming, but I just found it odd.

There are a lot of people saying that RJ pilots are undertrained and inexperienced. The guy I talked to was an AA TATL pilot.

I don't know how to fly, and I gave up Holiday Inn Expresses for HGIs. I'm just pointing out odd things I see.

I'd like to point out a Concorde was saved by a passenger insisting that the hole in the wing from runway FOD might be an issue.