WSJ: United Sent Safety Warning to Pilots
#46
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: ORD-LAS
Programs: UA MM 1K, Hyatt Globalist, Marriott Titanium Elite
Posts: 4,419
I've noticed a common theme mentioned on a few of your posts...
Just a FYI, sUA did not adopt all of sCO policies and procedures. Not sure where you got that information but it isn't exactly correct.
The reality is there are procedures from each carrier that are now SOP. Both the legacy UA and CO pilots have new procedures they've adopted that were never part of the previous subsidiary.
Just a FYI, sUA did not adopt all of sCO policies and procedures. Not sure where you got that information but it isn't exactly correct.
The reality is there are procedures from each carrier that are now SOP. Both the legacy UA and CO pilots have new procedures they've adopted that were never part of the previous subsidiary.
#47
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: FL 290 through FL390
Posts: 1,687
Quote:
Originally Posted by bocastephen
Plus 1 - the claim that CO flight training and operational procedures are somehow less safe or thorough than PMUA is hyperbolic. Mistakes are made by pilots every day, regardless of their former employer - why? Because pilots are human beings, not autobots.
It's downright ridiculous IMO.
Quote:
Originally Posted by freshairborne
And PMUA training has been recognized worldwide in the commercial aviation community as the best on the planet.
FAB
Care to provide proof?
No dog in the fight just always entertained by the UA vs CO dynamic on here.
Originally Posted by bocastephen
Plus 1 - the claim that CO flight training and operational procedures are somehow less safe or thorough than PMUA is hyperbolic. Mistakes are made by pilots every day, regardless of their former employer - why? Because pilots are human beings, not autobots.
It's downright ridiculous IMO.
Quote:
Originally Posted by freshairborne
And PMUA training has been recognized worldwide in the commercial aviation community as the best on the planet.
FAB
Care to provide proof?
No dog in the fight just always entertained by the UA vs CO dynamic on here.
FAB
#48
Join Date: Sep 2012
Location: COS
Programs: United 1K & 1MM, IHG Plat Elite, Hyatt Gold, Marriott GE, Hertz 5*, National Exec
Posts: 270
On a recent Rj flight we de iced, took off for a bumpy climb out. It's 5-10 minutes and We hadn't broken thru yet and I'm a bit surprised. We banked hard left and the power was cut back. Odd. I'm on the left side window and we are not nearly as high as we usually are. Like I can see rows in the fields and it's got texture- like 5,000 feet or so.
We level off and throttle up and eventually break out on top. We land in CVG and one of the pilots is waiting for bags and I ask him about the climb out. He pauses and thinks back " No, we went to ten thousand", with the subtext 'dumbass'.
And I'm thinking, we departed DEN.....
We level off and throttle up and eventually break out on top. We land in CVG and one of the pilots is waiting for bags and I ask him about the climb out. He pauses and thinks back " No, we went to ten thousand", with the subtext 'dumbass'.
And I'm thinking, we departed DEN.....
#49
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: FL 290 through FL390
Posts: 1,687
To clarify some of the things being discussed here, I'll say a few things for folks to chew on.
The training philosophies between sUA and sCO are vast. The way training has changed for both groups is vast. The personnel changes in higher-up levels in the training departments is vast. We use a lot of procedures from both pre-merger companies, and yes, as pilots, any change from something that has worked in the past seems to be unnecessary. But there's as much perception as reality here.
We have seen SOP things get changed, then changed back again. We all wonder who's method was right. They can't both be...actually, they can. Or they can both be wrong. They can certainly be different from each other as well.
sUA has typically taken a Boeing, Douglas, or Airbus procedure and modified it to try and refine it. A lot of other airlines use an essentially untouched manufacturer procedure.
Example: the 727 had three hydraulic systems, operating under about 2,000 PSI. You spring a leak in one and it's likely going to shoot its juice in an instant. United's Immediate Action Procedure on that had about 15 steps, all in an attempt to trap some juice to use it later, like for putting flaps out or putting the wheels down for landing.
Boeing's procedure was, watch it stabilize (as in, go to zero pressure), then use the other redundant system(s) to fly home safely.
The whole time that I was trying to memorize that IAP as a new-hire in training, I might as well have had flash cards taped to the inside of my eyelids. My check ride in the sim of course had that scenario, and the juice squirted out faster than you can say, "look at that cow standing over that flat rock".
sCO used procedures that were closer to the manufacturer than we did. Some stuff is like they did it, some stuff is like we did it, some stuff is just plain different. Better or worse, there are 12,000+ different opinions.
Does anybody think that one of these internal memos doesn't get sent to some pilot group or another every day? they do. This one was at the wrong place at the wrong time. All it takes is for some aviation expert to be having a slow news day and something like this lands on his or her desk, and things get sensationalized.
FAB
The training philosophies between sUA and sCO are vast. The way training has changed for both groups is vast. The personnel changes in higher-up levels in the training departments is vast. We use a lot of procedures from both pre-merger companies, and yes, as pilots, any change from something that has worked in the past seems to be unnecessary. But there's as much perception as reality here.
We have seen SOP things get changed, then changed back again. We all wonder who's method was right. They can't both be...actually, they can. Or they can both be wrong. They can certainly be different from each other as well.
sUA has typically taken a Boeing, Douglas, or Airbus procedure and modified it to try and refine it. A lot of other airlines use an essentially untouched manufacturer procedure.
Example: the 727 had three hydraulic systems, operating under about 2,000 PSI. You spring a leak in one and it's likely going to shoot its juice in an instant. United's Immediate Action Procedure on that had about 15 steps, all in an attempt to trap some juice to use it later, like for putting flaps out or putting the wheels down for landing.
Boeing's procedure was, watch it stabilize (as in, go to zero pressure), then use the other redundant system(s) to fly home safely.
The whole time that I was trying to memorize that IAP as a new-hire in training, I might as well have had flash cards taped to the inside of my eyelids. My check ride in the sim of course had that scenario, and the juice squirted out faster than you can say, "look at that cow standing over that flat rock".
sCO used procedures that were closer to the manufacturer than we did. Some stuff is like they did it, some stuff is like we did it, some stuff is just plain different. Better or worse, there are 12,000+ different opinions.
Does anybody think that one of these internal memos doesn't get sent to some pilot group or another every day? they do. This one was at the wrong place at the wrong time. All it takes is for some aviation expert to be having a slow news day and something like this lands on his or her desk, and things get sensationalized.
FAB
#50
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: China
Posts: 1,553
In the case you give (hydraulic system leak) the Boeing procedure does seem inherently safer. KISS is a good principle, rather than learn a 15 step checklist that doesn't look to add to the safety margin of the aircraft.
#51
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: FL 290 through FL390
Posts: 1,687
Truly, I'm glad that at least that part of the "good ol' days" are over. There are other parts that are sorely missed, but they ain't got nuthin' to do with training
FAB
#52
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: NYC: UA 1K, DL Platinum, AAirpass, Avis PC
Posts: 4,599
Does anybody think that one of these internal memos doesn't get sent to some pilot group or another every day? they do. This one was at the wrong place at the wrong time. All it takes is for some aviation expert to be having a slow news day and something like this lands on his or her desk, and things get sensationalized.
FAB
FAB
Playing it up as some calculated master plan memo is just naive.
#54
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: FL 290 through FL390
Posts: 1,687
Yep. The "sCO training" is exactly what's to blame here.
Honestly, a lay frequent flyer's forum is really no place for meaningful analysis of flight safety and training issues based on anecdotal evidence and newspaper articles.
For the most part, all fleets except the 747 and 787 are pretty well homogenized now, and the 76T (which is comprised of the sUA 757/767) pilot group is being integrated into the 756 fleet. There has been a great deal of movement in the pilot ranks, but transition training to a new fleet is quite comprehensive. As a general rule, pilots transitioning to different fleets should not be a widespread safety concern.
Honestly, a lay frequent flyer's forum is really no place for meaningful analysis of flight safety and training issues based on anecdotal evidence and newspaper articles.
For the most part, all fleets except the 747 and 787 are pretty well homogenized now, and the 76T (which is comprised of the sUA 757/767) pilot group is being integrated into the 756 fleet. There has been a great deal of movement in the pilot ranks, but transition training to a new fleet is quite comprehensive. As a general rule, pilots transitioning to different fleets should not be a widespread safety concern.
FAB
#56
Join Date: Jul 2005
Posts: 2,324
How about bringing back the wide body heavy checks from Asia? Or Airbus and 737 lines back in house? Because to be fair, those were some decisions championed by Tilton & Co. (And frankly the rest of the domestics desperate for any cost savings). I'd be a lot less worried about the pilots than the questionable 'work' that goes on at these scab outfits.
#57
Join Date: May 2005
Programs: Million Miler, 1K - Basically spend a lot of time on planes
Posts: 2,202
- No one on here can say whether it was one side or the other. Who knows if it was Continental pilots or United making the errors.
- What we do know is that the things being complained about have ZERO to do with things that are affected by the level of training being discussed on here.
- The problems being discussed are not items that could have fallen between the cracks between the differences in training programs
- Cockpit management is rule 101. If they are not adhering to this, then training has very little to do with it. Not paying attention to the point that you nearly fly into the ground ??? this is not found in between the different training programs.
- Captain is 100% in charge, they assert this often, and therefore have to take 100% of the responsibility for what happened, and not start shifting blame towards the other side's training program.
- There is not one captain flying for either of these airlines that can say that they were not trained properly in cockpit management.
- There is not one captain flying for either of these airlines that can say that they were not trained to pay attention to what's going on to avoid crashing into terrain.
Stop blaming the other side's training, take responsibility for your own actions.
#58
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: DFW
Programs: UA 1K, AA Platinum, Hilton Diamond, Bonvoy Gold
Posts: 466
Quote:
Originally Posted by PushingTin
On a recent Rj flight we de iced, took off for a bumpy climb out. It's 5-10 minutes and We hadn't broken thru yet and I'm a bit surprised. We banked hard left and the power was cut back. Odd. I'm on the left side window and we are not nearly as high as we usually are. Like I can see rows in the fields and it's got texture- like 5,000 feet or so.
We level off and throttle up and eventually break out on top. We land in CVG and one of the pilots is waiting for bags and I ask him about the climb out. He pauses and thinks back " No, we went to ten thousand", with the subtext 'dumbass'.
And I'm thinking, we departed DEN.....
Yep. I've witnessed many mistakes by the RJ pilots lately and it's only a matter of time before it ends in disaster.
Originally Posted by PushingTin
On a recent Rj flight we de iced, took off for a bumpy climb out. It's 5-10 minutes and We hadn't broken thru yet and I'm a bit surprised. We banked hard left and the power was cut back. Odd. I'm on the left side window and we are not nearly as high as we usually are. Like I can see rows in the fields and it's got texture- like 5,000 feet or so.
We level off and throttle up and eventually break out on top. We land in CVG and one of the pilots is waiting for bags and I ask him about the climb out. He pauses and thinks back " No, we went to ten thousand", with the subtext 'dumbass'.
And I'm thinking, we departed DEN.....
Yep. I've witnessed many mistakes by the RJ pilots lately and it's only a matter of time before it ends in disaster.
#59
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: DAY/CMH
Programs: UA MileagePlus
Posts: 2,474
I'm guessing the poster was mixing up AGL (above ground level) and MSL (mean sea level) elevation. If a passenger had somehow gotten the notion that departing aircraft have to climb to 10,000 ft AGL, then being only around 5,000 ft above the ground near Denver would seem to be a mistake.
#60
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Midwest
Programs: UA GS, UA 1.6MM, AA LT PLT, AA 2.6MM, Intercontinental Royal Ambassador
Posts: 838
I fly four to six segments a week and lately about half of those are on UA Express. Your comment above caught my attention. Are you saying that the UAX pilots are undertrained and therefore you are almost certain that a fatal crash is inevitable? Is the same situation true at the regional feeders for AA and DAL? Thanks in advance for any insights or details.