Unfortunately, one of the dearest beliefs of most Americans is that years of focused study in a university renders people worthless to society, but that a few hours or few days of paraprofessional "training" grants special insight into the workings of the universe, and transfers into pre-eminent expertise in virtually any other subject matter

Would you please repeat that in English, Ronny?

Obviously this is an area where I have some concerns as well. I know that it is kind of shakey in the research support area, but it is a service I believe can make a significant difference in keeping the bad guys out.

Very few people know what a BDO is or does. So intimidation is not really a factor. As far as harassment, well most folks here would say that an odd look is harassment. So I hope you don�t mind if I take that with a grain of salt, or two.

Okay, let's try applying the same screening credentials to medicine.

"Here is a machine that can test for glioblastoma, an extremely rare form of cancer. I can't tell you how it works--that's secret. I have no data to show that this machine is effective, safe, sensitive, or specific. Let's make everyone go through the machine."

Although I could go on for days about this, screening technologies rely on specific criteria: it has to be a common enough disease, the screening test has to be sensitive and specific, the test has to be acceptable to the study population, and so on.

Here we have a screening test for a very rare "disease." The test has no published data, yet the test is in widespread use. From a scientific perspective: social, behavioral, medical, or hard sciences... this is unacceptable.

It's well worth reading Anne Murphy Paul's "The Cult of Personality." It's about personality testing and its misuse. It's very much analogous to behavioral detection.

X-Ray is only as good as the individual reading the image. Behavior Detection is not a technology, it�s a process, and it also is only as good as the one applying it. I don�t know enough about it, and honestly I don�t think anyone here really does, to give definitive any answers about its effectiveness.


We have the 3D X-rays at my airport. They still cant tell what�s in the bottle, and never will be able to. Interpretation of the image is why humans are a mandatory part of the picture, along with all their flaws.

Unfortunately those shortcomings you mention are always going to be there, no matter the technology added. Humans are and must be a part of the equation, machines cannot make judgment calls.

TSA is finally getting a budget. Congress has blessed us with an actual appropriations bill of our very own. You would be surprised how much difference a little money will make.

There is far more to the BDO program than you might think. Give it a little thought and you might be able to glean some of the same tidbits of information that I have.

The harassment I'm talking about is the real intimidation that real people feel when confronted by someone looking very official in a police-like uniform. Kippie himself stated that the blue uniforms and shiny badge were designed to command public respect, or something close to that. "Commanding public respect" is a codeword for raising the intimidation factor. I've got to believe that anyone except the most seasoned FTer (like a lot of us) would believe that they are in some kind of trouble if anyone in a TSA uniform starts questioning them and risk arrest if they don't answer all his or her questions.

That's a very good point: psychological testing is a powerful technology that has been around for almost a century, and its production is governed by strict ethics and protocols. Any high stakes test must be subjected to validation studies which can take many years, and will almost certainly require substantial refinements and alterations. Psychological testing can be very useful, but requires substantial training in order to be administered and interpreted correctly, for example the WAIS-R. Despite all this, testing abuse is rampant, especially in high stakes stiutations (think NCLB), and among gatekeepers in organizations (think HR morons), the latter of whom are usually low-rank administrative personnel and often lack the aptitude or motivation to be trained in proper test use. This is not to say that TSO's lack the aptitude or motivation to do proper BD, but rather that the potential for abuse is just as great as in other organizations, if not greater, given the apparent need to treat the testing technology as SSI.

What does that say about you and your colleagues when a 90% failure rate is the norm?


Just like most of the items in the x-ray machine, you missed on this one.

The point was that the TSA could be using the millions in salary and training done for SPOT and apply them to proven technology, such as x-ray.


You conveniently omitted my line about the computer and other electronics, so I'll take that as being on the mark.

The point is, the technology IS out there on the liquids. The TSA has been busy buying strip-search machines and new uniforms instead of putting safety as a priority.


Another sobering comment considering how many times we see failures of GAO tests.



TSA has always had a budget. The TSA has always had the need to update its resources, but have chosen to try and buy respect over securing the traveling public.

The fact of the matter is, technology should be replacing humans at the TSA. The "secure flight" program essentially takes out the need for one "team" at a checkpoint. With the demise of SSSS, the TSA doesn't need the staffing it once did (in evidence with all the jetway staring contests and gate searches). That's hundreds of thousands of dollars in salary taht can be saved every year and spent on new technology. But the TSA is clearly trying to stay relevant and bloated.


A nearly three year-old article written by an "adviser" to the TSA is hardly objective. There have been more, and recent, articles that point out the shortcomings of the program.

Given how the TSA regularly fails at what is supposed to be its core competency, they should concentrate on the basics, namely catching ALL of the prohibited items.

No, it's not a process it's a methodology the -ology part being the key. It could be applied by the most expert of practitioners and still be ineffective.

Somebody mentioned psychology. That's only part of it; you are dealing with physiology and anthropolgy and a couple of more arcane disciplines as well. BD&E can be useful and give results in a controlled environment, it can not pick a "bad guy" out of a line of passengers from across the lobby which AIUI is the BDO's modus operandi.
Maybe, maybe not. If you really are fascinated, put aside your bias and study the subject. The internet is just a start but more definitive (and less hysterical) information is in the local Public or, even better, University library.

If any methodology is used incorrectly, it gives incorrect results. Mostly; even spotniks can get lucky.

ibid. above.


Absolutely untrue. If I can determine the chemical composition of neurotransmitters in a spinal cord in a living human being in real time, we can easily figure out what's in the bottle. And we can. Without taking the lid off the thing. It just costs a lot of money.




I think you need to go to the local used bookstore and buy your self a copy of a book written in 1948 by George Orwell. The name of the book is 1984. Read it carefully and take notes. Be particularly cognizant of the concept of thought police.

Sincerely,

greentips, PhD

Bolding above mine. Really????? Congress has thrown literally how many billions upon billions of dollars at this agency in the past 7+ yrs & he has the absolute $&*#(@$@ to make a comment like this???

(Again, where is the smiley beating its little head against the wall for comments like this one...?)

Which is part of it's inherent flaw, really and why it's not a very good tool for the woefully awful TSA, never mind more competent organisations.

Not that I expect you to admit to that..

Ron,
I would say that governments have oppressed more people then nukes have. Add in that nukes are used by governments to oppress.

-Mike

Exactly.

Given the questionable quality of a huge segment of the TSA workforce and of the TSA's leadership, an unacceptable level of incompetent results are to be expected of the TSA.

I think it's a problem of execution rather than principle. I'd rather have security people, in principle, be looking for the weapon wielder rather than the weapon. Lots of things can be used as weapons, but all of them require a wielder. Security people in general should be looking for him/her.

Whether the TSA should be doing this is as is certainly cause for debate and discussion.