Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
#2386
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC*SE 2MM
Posts: 16,680
Boeing is reducing 737MAX production and there is speculation that grounding could last significantly longer than ,most have been expecting...
Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding
- Airlines seeking interim aircraft leases of six months.
- At least one sees MAX grounding lasting until November.
#2387
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
Here is another update about the Ethiopian Airlines crash from Juan Brown:
Big (and unanswered) questions in this report are why did the pilots allow the airspeed to get so high and why did they apparently reengage the stabilizer trim. There is no way they could have avoided the crash due to these decisions.
Big (and unanswered) questions in this report are why did the pilots allow the airspeed to get so high and why did they apparently reengage the stabilizer trim. There is no way they could have avoided the crash due to these decisions.
#2388
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,186
Let's start with the speed. The report states:
05:39:42 Level Change mode was engaged. The selected altitude was 32000 ft. Shortly after the mode change, the selected airspeed was set to 238 kt.
05:39:55 The Autopilot disengaged,
05:40:00 Shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units.
05:40:03 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) “DON’T SINK” alerts occurred.
05:39:55 The Autopilot disengaged,
05:40:00 Shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units.
05:40:03 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) “DON’T SINK” alerts occurred.
Given the situation, it may not excuse but it does help to explain why the throttles were never reduced ... they had "set" the speed, and they were kinda busy just trying to keep the plane from actively diving into the ground.
And about re-engaging the stabilizer trim:
05:41:46 the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.
05:41:54 the First-Officer replied that it is not working.
05:43:04 the Captain asked the First Officer to pitch up together and said that pitch is not enough.
05:43:11 about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13,4002 ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU (aircraft nose up) direction. The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.
05:43:20 approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40 nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.
05:41:54 the First-Officer replied that it is not working.
05:43:04 the Captain asked the First Officer to pitch up together and said that pitch is not enough.
05:43:11 about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13,4002 ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU (aircraft nose up) direction. The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.
05:43:20 approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40 nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.
The more I read the report, the less fault I can find with the pilots.
#2390
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,186
@canopus27 I'm not trying to absolve Boeing, but I think an objective review of the entire situation will find that the pilots did not take the best possible actions.
This video comes to mind:
#2392
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I understand, and I'm not claiming that the pilots did everything perfectly ... but I'm trying to evaluate their actions in context.
This video comes to mind:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1fVL4AQEW8
This video comes to mind:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1fVL4AQEW8
I don't have the same feeling in the case of ET302. (Before I'm attacked for having this opinion, I have just as much right to have an opinion as anyone else.)
#2393
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,186
I've watched the movie and that particular clip several times. There is no way for us to know what the outcome of UA1549 would have been with other pilots. I'm sure there would be a range of different outcomes, not all good, depending on who was flying the airplane. Obviously there is no way to know, but I think the passengers of UA1549 were very lucky Sullenberger and Skiles were at the controls.
I don't have the same feeling in the case of ET302. (Before I'm attacked for having this opinion, I have just as much right to have an opinion as anyone else.)
I don't have the same feeling in the case of ET302. (Before I'm attacked for having this opinion, I have just as much right to have an opinion as anyone else.)
For clarity, my point from that clip was less about the skills of the pilot(s) -- and more about the risks of second guessing after the fact, what the pilots had to do in real time.
We have far more information now than the ET302 pilots did in the 6 minutes they were airborne ... and we also don't have fear & adrenaline coursing through our veins and the noise of a stick shaker and ground proximity alerts distracting us. Yes, these are professional pilots ... but they are also humans, and before we judge whether their actions were flawed or not, we need to keep in mind what is reasonable to expect from a pilot in those circumstances.
#2394
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
@bimmerdriver, peace - You absolutely have a right to your opinion
For clarity, my point from that clip was less about the skills of the pilot(s) -- and more about the risks of second guessing after the fact, what the pilots had to do in real time.
We have far more information now than the ET302 pilots did in the 6 minutes they were airborne ... and we also don't have fear & adrenaline coursing through our veins and the noise of a stick shaker and ground proximity alerts distracting us. Yes, these are professional pilots ... but they are also humans, and before we judge whether their actions were flawed or not, we need to keep in mind what is reasonable to expect from a pilot in those circumstances.
For clarity, my point from that clip was less about the skills of the pilot(s) -- and more about the risks of second guessing after the fact, what the pilots had to do in real time.
We have far more information now than the ET302 pilots did in the 6 minutes they were airborne ... and we also don't have fear & adrenaline coursing through our veins and the noise of a stick shaker and ground proximity alerts distracting us. Yes, these are professional pilots ... but they are also humans, and before we judge whether their actions were flawed or not, we need to keep in mind what is reasonable to expect from a pilot in those circumstances.
#2395
Join Date: Aug 2010
Posts: 3,130
IMHO, the pilot issue is a red herring. The system design is the real issue. Even if this crew had somehow morphed into North Americans and saved the day, an MCAS-related accident like this would have, at best, been postponed.
Exceptional individual soldiers may be able to perform miracles even when armed with faulty guns, but it's generally a bad idea to send your army into the field with unreliable equipment. The odds will always be against them.
Nothing these pilots did or did not do changes the fact that the system design, in its current form, is flawed. And that Boeing, not the pilots or their responses, is responsible for exposing passengers to that.
I'm also not convinced that every single AC pilot would have handled this better. I can think of at least 4 with less than spotless records.
Exceptional individual soldiers may be able to perform miracles even when armed with faulty guns, but it's generally a bad idea to send your army into the field with unreliable equipment. The odds will always be against them.
Nothing these pilots did or did not do changes the fact that the system design, in its current form, is flawed. And that Boeing, not the pilots or their responses, is responsible for exposing passengers to that.
I'm also not convinced that every single AC pilot would have handled this better. I can think of at least 4 with less than spotless records.
#2396
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: LotusLand...
Programs: AC Elite50k, BAEC Blue, Amex Plat, RBC Black Tin Visa
Posts: 635
IMHO, the pilot issue is a red herring. The system design is the real issue. Even if this crew had somehow morphed into North Americans and saved the day, an MCAS-related accident like this would have, at best, been postponed.
Exceptional individual soldiers may be able to perform miracles even when armed with faulty guns, but it's generally a bad idea to send your army into the field with unreliable equipment. The odds will always be against them.
Nothing these pilots did or did not do changes the fact that the system design, in its current form, is flawed. And that Boeing, not the pilots or their responses, is responsible for exposing passengers to that.
I'm also not convinced that every single AC pilot would have handled this better. I can think of at least 4 with less than spotless records.
Exceptional individual soldiers may be able to perform miracles even when armed with faulty guns, but it's generally a bad idea to send your army into the field with unreliable equipment. The odds will always be against them.
Nothing these pilots did or did not do changes the fact that the system design, in its current form, is flawed. And that Boeing, not the pilots or their responses, is responsible for exposing passengers to that.
I'm also not convinced that every single AC pilot would have handled this better. I can think of at least 4 with less than spotless records.
#2397
Join Date: Aug 2010
Posts: 3,130
Agreed. What I find "interesting" is that (and obviously I could have missed it..) I have not seen ANY comment from a Canadian or American MAX pilot on experiencing similar difficulties since this plane has been flying. Are the NA aircraft better equipped with safety features than the 2 stricken 737's or, have the NA pilots been told to keep quiet on the subject by their respective companies. If this design issue is a root cause I cannot believe that there would have been zero reports of problems in Canada or the US with the approx 100 frames in service over here. Maybe it is what is NOT being said by pilot community that should raise concerns.....
https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/pilot-complaints-boeing-737-max/index.html
#2398
Join Date: May 2015
Location: Vancouver
Programs: Aeroplan, Mileage Plus, WestJet Gold, AMEX Plat
Posts: 2,026
Agreed. What I find "interesting" is that (and obviously I could have missed it..) I have not seen ANY comment from a Canadian or American MAX pilot on experiencing similar difficulties since this plane has been flying. Are the NA aircraft better equipped with safety features than the 2 stricken 737's or, have the NA pilots been told to keep quiet on the subject by their respective companies. If this design issue is a root cause I cannot believe that there would have been zero reports of problems in Canada or the US with the approx 100 frames in service over here. Maybe it is what is NOT being said by pilot community that should raise concerns.....
#2399
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
@yulred I completely disagree with your suggestion that the skills of a pilot are a red-herring. Pilots are humans and the reality is that humans play an often significant role in the outcome of abnormal situations. If you read what I said, I'm not bringing pilots into the discussion to absolve Boeing of culpability for the design of MCAS and I did not make a comparison with any particular group of pilots, be they AC or western or whatever, but pilot skills or lack thereof are a factor in many, if not most incidents and to suggest that pilot skill had nothing to do with this incident is pretty ridiculous.
@canopus27 Since you invoked Sullenberger, you have you read what he said about this incident? You can find his facebook post easily with google. Among other things, he says 200 hours of experience is, "a small fraction of the minimum in the U.S., and an absurdly low amount for someone in the cockpit of a jet airliner".
@canopus27 Since you invoked Sullenberger, you have you read what he said about this incident? You can find his facebook post easily with google. Among other things, he says 200 hours of experience is, "a small fraction of the minimum in the U.S., and an absurdly low amount for someone in the cockpit of a jet airliner".
#2400
Join Date: Feb 2009
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Posts: 4,748