Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Apr 8, 2019, 11:19 am
#2431
Join Date: Apr 2005
Posts: 96
Most likely because, in the confusion, they forgot basic things like controlling airspeed. He couldn't manually trim the plane at that speed, and although it is hard to tell from the preliminary report, they made some difficult to understand decisions with the electric trim when it was enabled. And they didn't "follow Boeing's own instructions".
Yes, that is exactly how these things end up working. Always 100% one factor any no other factors involved. And of course we should draw definite conclusions from the preliminary report.
Yes, that is exactly how these things end up working. Always 100% one factor any no other factors involved. And of course we should draw definite conclusions from the preliminary report.
Apr 8, 2019, 12:42 pm
#2432
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: YEG
Posts: 3,925
I don't care for ad hominem as but maybe you're right. Maybe I'm missing the point. I just really don't understand how anyone can comment on whether the ET pilots got it "right" or "wrong" if no one knows what the "right" way was. Maybe there was no "right" way and they were doomed all along. In which case, why bring them up?
Said it before and I'll say it again: the pilot issue is a red herring on this thread. The issue here is that the 7M8 is/was not airworthy in its current form. The only way the pilots become relevant here is if one believes they are the critical variable that could change everything - I.e. replacing them with an AC pilot would result in a different outcome and/or the 7M8 not being grounded in Canada.
I think(?) we agree that that is not the case. So why dwell on it? Motives notwithstanding, it comes across as deflection and obfuscation. I've become wary of that. It was, after all, the insistence "questioning" what JT and its pilots were doing/had done, that led to this grounding being postponed in the first place.
I'm sure lots of items are going to be reviewed and found to be contributing factors. Contributing factors may include items such as:
- MCAS/aircraft design
- aircraft maintenance
- pilot training - pilot's experience/competence
- pilot training - corporate/regulatory side determining what pilots are exposed to in simulator, etc.
- others
One advantage AC has/had over many other airlines is that the Max is the only type of 737 in the fleet, so there are no concerns about maintaining ratings on other types of 737. In AC's case Boeing could have included all of the MCAS information in the initial pilot training as it wouldn't have affected their ability to fly any other aircraft.
Apr 8, 2019, 3:55 pm
#2433
Join Date: Aug 2010
Posts: 3,130
You are ignoring a simple reality of virtually all airline crash investigations, that there is never a single "critical variable that could change everything." It is almost always the alignment of various independent (or sometimes related) variables that lead to a crash, any of which are critical and could have changed everything. Applying the opposite approach (if one were to take the position that this was 100% on the pilots, which is a position I do not take), would be that if the pilots were competent they could have regained control and prevented the crash and subsequent groundings, etc.
I'm sure lots of items are going to be reviewed and found to be contributing factors. Contributing factors may include items such as:
One advantage AC has/had over many other airlines is that the Max is the only type of 737 in the fleet, so there are no concerns about maintaining ratings on other types of 737. In AC's case Boeing could have included all of the MCAS information in the initial pilot training as it wouldn't have affected their ability to fly any other aircraft.
I'm sure lots of items are going to be reviewed and found to be contributing factors. Contributing factors may include items such as:
- MCAS/aircraft design
- aircraft maintenance
- pilot training - pilot's experience/competence
- pilot training - corporate/regulatory side determining what pilots are exposed to in simulator, etc.
- others
One advantage AC has/had over many other airlines is that the Max is the only type of 737 in the fleet, so there are no concerns about maintaining ratings on other types of 737. In AC's case Boeing could have included all of the MCAS information in the initial pilot training as it wouldn't have affected their ability to fly any other aircraft.
I can't shake the feeling that, if we had paid more attention to the aircraft instead of getting fixated with the JT pilots as part of this Swiss cheese exercise, 7M8s would have been grounded a long time ago.
As for AC, maybe their pilots can safely operate non airworthy aircraft. I think the risk is too high. But then again, I'm biased. I booked a flight on a 7M8 in Sept prior to ET302. Nothing I've seen so far makes me feel comfortable about it.
Apr 8, 2019, 3:59 pm
#2434
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: YYJ
Posts: 4,137
They operate a limited domestic flight schedule and if nothing else could have operated their domestic routes with the MAX if commercial reasons were the only factor.
Apr 8, 2019, 6:07 pm
#2435
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I understand the Swiss cheese theory just fine. Point is the 7M8 didn't become unairworthy the moment ET302 happened. It was not airworthy all along. Who the pilots are or what they did has no bearing on the airworthiness of the aircraft.
I can't shake the feeling that, if we had paid more attention to the aircraft instead of getting fixated with the JT pilots as part of this Swiss cheese exercise, 7M8s would have been grounded a long time ago.
As for AC, maybe their pilots can safely operate non airworthy aircraft. I think the risk is too high. But then again, I'm biased. I booked a flight on a 7M8 in Sept prior to ET302. Nothing I've seen so far makes me feel comfortable about it.
1. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS did not operate.
2. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS operated and performed its role as intended.
3. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS failed, but the pilots successfully handled the situation (e.g., by disabling it).
4. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS failed, but the pilots were not able to handle the situation, resulting in a crash.
Of the thousands of flights, the vast majority of them are cases 1 or 2. In these conditions, the 737 MAX is just as airworthy as any other aircraft and MCAS operates (or not) as it was designed. Despite the fact that some people on this board have their hair on fire about the existence of MCAS, IMO, there is nothing wrong with what it's supposed to do. The problem with MCAS is the implementation in failure modes (such as AoA sensor failure). It is a failure of both Boeing and the FAA for certifying MCAS as it was originally implemented.
It seems there are at least a few instances of case 3. I'm sure the investigation of MCAS will identify and investigate these instances. Why were some pilots able to handle the situation, but others were not?
There are two instances of case 4. Why were these pilots not able to handle situation where others were able? There may be mitigating factors, but we don't know.
Obviously AC and other airlines did their own analysis of the situation as it unfolded. If they never experienced a situation where MCAS failed (e.g., due to a failed AoA sensor), then I don't think anyone should find their conclusion (based on thousands of successful flights) that the aircraft was safe (before the clear evidence of MCAS failure was uncovered) surprising.
Last edited by bimmerdriver; Apr 8, 2019 at 10:47 pm
Apr 8, 2019, 9:23 pm
#2436
Join Date: May 2015
Location: Vancouver
Programs: Aeroplan, Mileage Plus, WestJet Gold, AMEX Plat
Posts: 2,026
Well, their press release certainly isn't going to say they're grounding it because they don't trust the regulator's opinion.
They operate a limited domestic flight schedule and if nothing else could have operated their domestic routes with the MAX if commercial reasons were the only factor.
They operate a limited domestic flight schedule and if nothing else could have operated their domestic routes with the MAX if commercial reasons were the only factor.
In the case of AC, until Canada stepped in a banned the aircraft, it just needed to shift some of the routes that MAX was on to avoid European airspace.
I don't think Sunwing or AC would ever come out in a public press release and state they think the aircraft is unsafe when the regulator holds a different position. Other the opening themselves up to a law suit from Boeing what would be gained? If they wanted to ground their fleet they would site "commercial reasons" and refuse to elaborate.
Apr 9, 2019, 8:57 am
#2437
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,804
he whole problem with MCAS itself is that it relies upon primary devices, namely angle of attack instruments, which are inherently unreliable, like virtually all primary instruments, even more so than pitot tubes, because they are more complicated. Thus the "solution" to the stall problem is inherently more unreliable than the problem that it is supposed to solve, with odds that it gets triggered spuriously likely quite a bit higher than the odds of a stall that it is supposed to fix. And equally deadly.
Only good solution is a redesign of engine cowlings, reducing the lift they provide. Which would be easy to retrofit, and might remain consistent with the current certification as the old type.
Apr 9, 2019, 9:51 am
#2438
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: Delta, BC
Posts: 1,646
My understanding is that it the aerodynamic effects of the engine cowlings AND the (new) location of the engines can result in an "upward pitching moment" under certain circumstances. I don't think cowlings alone can compensate for the physics of the thrust vectors generated by the engines due to the current location on the wing.
Apr 9, 2019, 10:17 am
#2439
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,804
My understanding is that it the aerodynamic effects of the engine cowlings AND the (new) location of the engines can result in an "upward pitching moment" under certain circumstances. I don't think cowlings alone can compensate for the physics of the thrust vectors generated by the engines due to the current location on the wing.
It is the moment due to the lift from the engine, with the location of the engines further up front than in previous models. For a while I thought it was the moment due to thrust, but actually it appears the increase in thrust is balanced by the engines being mounted a bit higher. You can lower the moment of the lift by either moving the engines further back, which is not really doable, and/or by reducing the lift. My understanding is that they were not aware of the lift until flight testing. Killing the lift should not be terribly difficult, it being mainly a matter of playing with the shape, and/or destroying the boundary layer.
Apr 9, 2019, 5:08 pm
#2440
Join Date: Aug 2010
Posts: 3,130
There are four situations to consider:
1. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS did not operate.
2. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS operated and performed its role as intended.
3. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS failed, but the pilots successfully handled the situation (e.g., by disabling it).
4. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS failed, but the pilots were not able to handle the situation, resulting in a crash.
Of the thousands of flights, the vast majority of them are cases 1 or 2. In these conditions, the 737 MAX is just as airworthy as any other aircraft and MCAS operates (or not) as it was designed. Despite the fact that some people on this board have their hair on fire about the existence of MCAS, IMO, there is nothing wrong with what it's supposed to do. The problem with MCAS is the implementation in failure modes (such as AoA sensor failure). It is a failure of both Boeing and the FAA for certifying MCAS as it was originally implemented.
It seems there are at least a few instances of case 3. I'm sure the investigation of MCAS will identify and investigate these instances. Why were some pilots able to handle the situation, but others were not?
There are two instances of case 4. Why were these pilots not able to handle situation where others were able? There may be mitigating factors, but we don't know.
Obviously AC and other airlines did their own analysis of the situation as it unfolded. If they never experienced a situation where MCAS failed (e.g., due to a failed AoA sensor), then I don't think anyone should find their conclusion (based on thousands of successful flights) that the aircraft was safe (before the clear evidence of MCAS failure was uncovered) surprising.
1. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS did not operate.
2. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS operated and performed its role as intended.
3. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS failed, but the pilots successfully handled the situation (e.g., by disabling it).
4. The aircraft was flown in a regime where MCAS failed, but the pilots were not able to handle the situation, resulting in a crash.
Of the thousands of flights, the vast majority of them are cases 1 or 2. In these conditions, the 737 MAX is just as airworthy as any other aircraft and MCAS operates (or not) as it was designed. Despite the fact that some people on this board have their hair on fire about the existence of MCAS, IMO, there is nothing wrong with what it's supposed to do. The problem with MCAS is the implementation in failure modes (such as AoA sensor failure). It is a failure of both Boeing and the FAA for certifying MCAS as it was originally implemented.
It seems there are at least a few instances of case 3. I'm sure the investigation of MCAS will identify and investigate these instances. Why were some pilots able to handle the situation, but others were not?
There are two instances of case 4. Why were these pilots not able to handle situation where others were able? There may be mitigating factors, but we don't know.
Obviously AC and other airlines did their own analysis of the situation as it unfolded. If they never experienced a situation where MCAS failed (e.g., due to a failed AoA sensor), then I don't think anyone should find their conclusion (based on thousands of successful flights) that the aircraft was safe (before the clear evidence of MCAS failure was uncovered) surprising.
It would be one thing if AC encountered no. 4 and trained its pilots on how to resolve it under all scenarios to the point that the safety risk is as high or low as on a 320, E90, 777 etc.
It's quite another to have never encountered no. 4 and to assume that it would never happen to them, or that AC pilots would be able to overcome it often enough to the extent that the safety risk is no more than any other aircraft.
I'm just not convinced that the risk was properly assessed. I think we spent a lot of time trying to paint JT610 as a unique Lionair situation, when a great many other airlines, including possibly AC, may not have been in a position to address.
My broader concern is that in the immediate aftermath, we actively promoted complacency. Recall Garneau's initial response:
“So it’s something that they [Canadians] should take seriously, the fact that we have an extremely good safety record in aviation. Our pilots are very well-trained.”
It's this kind of "this could never happen here" rhetoric that makes me fear complacency. AC wasn't alone by any means. But that doesn't make its approach right either.
Apr 9, 2019, 7:13 pm
#2441
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Canada
Programs: *G
Posts: 2,304
https://www.smh.com.au/business/comp...10-p51cl8.html
A NYT sourced piece. Somewhat more of the same, but includes some frank insider views.
A NYT sourced piece. Somewhat more of the same, but includes some frank insider views.
Apr 9, 2019, 9:46 pm
#2442
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I suppose it depends on how one assesses safety risk.
It would be one thing if AC encountered no. 4 and trained its pilots on how to resolve it under all scenarios to the point that the safety risk is as high or low as on a 320, E90, 777 etc.
It's quite another to have never encountered no. 4 and to assume that it would never happen to them, or that AC pilots would be able to overcome it often enough to the extent that the safety risk is no more than any other aircraft.
I'm just not convinced that the risk was properly assessed. I think we spent a lot of time trying to paint JT610 as a unique Lionair situation, when a great many other airlines, including possibly AC, may not have been in a position to address.
My broader concern is that in the immediate aftermath, we actively promoted complacency. Recall Garneau's initial response:
“So it’s something that they [Canadians] should take seriously, the fact that we have an extremely good safety record in aviation. Our pilots are very well-trained.”
It's this kind of "this could never happen here" rhetoric that makes me fear complacency. AC wasn't alone by any means. But that doesn't make its approach right either.
Apr 9, 2019, 9:57 pm
#2443
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
Posts: 4,569
I don't think that asking "we're you lying about what you just said to me" is a level of due diligence we should expect. How r would it be effective against anyone lying to you.
Boeing sold the MAX as a 737 with better fuel efficiency... Implicitly saying it was basically safe to a modern standard. An aircraft not needing pilot retraining vs other 737s. And they sold it at a price where the fuel efficiency delta was good enough to get the likes of AC to not buy 320 NEOs.
The FAA took Boeing's word for it; Transport Canada took the FAAs word for it. And that trust is broken for tomorrow.
Looking back, I'm not sure you can reasonably expect AC to think that Boeing fundamentally lied to them, or had the capacity to discover that no obviously non-fact. AC is not in the business of certifying aircraft as safe, only in buying safe aircraft suitable for some business requirement.
Boeing sold the MAX as a 737 with better fuel efficiency... Implicitly saying it was basically safe to a modern standard. An aircraft not needing pilot retraining vs other 737s. And they sold it at a price where the fuel efficiency delta was good enough to get the likes of AC to not buy 320 NEOs.
The FAA took Boeing's word for it; Transport Canada took the FAAs word for it. And that trust is broken for tomorrow.
Looking back, I'm not sure you can reasonably expect AC to think that Boeing fundamentally lied to them, or had the capacity to discover that no obviously non-fact. AC is not in the business of certifying aircraft as safe, only in buying safe aircraft suitable for some business requirement.
Apr 9, 2019, 9:57 pm
#2444
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
he whole problem with MCAS itself is that it relies upon primary devices, namely angle of attack instruments, which are inherently unreliable, like virtually all primary instruments, even more so than pitot tubes, because they are more complicated. Thus the "solution" to the stall problem is inherently more unreliable than the problem that it is supposed to solve, with odds that it gets triggered spuriously likely quite a bit higher than the odds of a stall that it is supposed to fix. And equally deadly.
Only good solution is a redesign of engine cowlings, reducing the lift they provide. Which would be easy to retrofit, and might remain consistent with the current certification as the old type.
Apr 9, 2019, 10:05 pm
#2445
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I don't think that asking "we're you lying about what you just said to me" is a level of due diligence we should expect. How r would it be effective against anyone lying to you.
Boeing sold the MAX as a 737 with better fuel efficiency... Implicitly saying it was basically safe to a modern standard. An aircraft not needing pilot retraining vs other 737s. And they sold it at a price where the fuel efficiency delta was good enough to get the likes of AC to not buy 320 NEOs.
The FAA took Boeing's word for it; Transport Canada took the FAAs word for it. And that trust is broken for tomorrow.
Looking back, I'm not sure you can reasonably expect AC to think that Boeing fundamentally lied to them, or had the capacity to discover that no obviously non-fact. AC is not in the business of certifying aircraft as safe, only in buying safe aircraft suitable for some business requirement.
Boeing sold the MAX as a 737 with better fuel efficiency... Implicitly saying it was basically safe to a modern standard. An aircraft not needing pilot retraining vs other 737s. And they sold it at a price where the fuel efficiency delta was good enough to get the likes of AC to not buy 320 NEOs.
The FAA took Boeing's word for it; Transport Canada took the FAAs word for it. And that trust is broken for tomorrow.
Looking back, I'm not sure you can reasonably expect AC to think that Boeing fundamentally lied to them, or had the capacity to discover that no obviously non-fact. AC is not in the business of certifying aircraft as safe, only in buying safe aircraft suitable for some business requirement.