Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Apr 13, 2019, 3:25 pm
#2506
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I don't play the A vs B game; I'm fine with both although as a pax I prefer A for comfort. It's not - with the exception of the 7M8 - something I pay much attention to when booking.
That said, your argument is veering into strange territory where having an average pilot - as opposed to an exceptional one - will end up being classified as a "contributing factor".
I suppose the question then is, would these pilots have allowed the aircraft to overspeed in the absence of MCAS. IMHO probably not - they're trained to fly things. If that's the case, does that then make MCAS a contributory factor in overspeed? In which case, how do you balance it against pilot error and vice versa.
The overall problem seems to be that MCAS can overwhelm most (ie "average") pilots. What these pilots did is therefore irrelevant. Another set of pilots might have missed something else. In essence, their being merely qualified/competent would in itself become a contributory factor.
To what end? At some point, the responsibility belongs solely on the company that created a system that overwhelms most pilots. I wouldn't call that boeing hating.
Apr 13, 2019, 3:47 pm
#2507
Join Date: Aug 2010
Posts: 3,130
Neither of which is necessarily true. Like I said, it comes across as obfuscation. Even if the ET pilots had done what Juan Thinks they should have done, that aircraft should have been grounded. And it wasn't, because when JT happened, Boeing (and others) chose to blame the pilots instead of grounding the aircraft till the fix was ready.
Apr 13, 2019, 3:54 pm
#2508
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YXU
Programs: AC SE100K, National E/E, HH Diamond, IHG Diamond, MB, Avis PC
Posts: 970
BTW, in regard of one of your posts: you've stated that you design marine equipment for living. So what happens to the ship's bow when you cut power?
Apr 13, 2019, 4:14 pm
#2509
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,167
Here's a cutout from the preliminary report. As I read this, I see them correctly not exceeding Vmo - at least not until the final MCAS activation which puts the plane into a dive. Do you see something different? Is so, please explain where/when. If not, then please help me understand why you keep talking about the plane being overspeed.
Apr 13, 2019, 5:07 pm
#2510
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
That would hold true for a subset of the general population. It should hold less true for a subset of pilots who're trained to fly NGs and MAXs. Unless you're arguing that the ET pilots were not trained to fly NGs and MAXs. Or incapable of performing complex physical or mental tasks.
Neither of which is necessarily true. Like I said, it comes across as obfuscation. Even if the ET pilots had done what Juan Thinks they should have done, that aircraft should have been grounded. And it wasn't, because when JT happened, Boeing (and others) chose to blame the pilots instead of grounding the aircraft till the fix was ready.
The fact is that irrespective of whether or not the 737 should have been grounded at the time of the crash, it wasn't. Why it wasn't grounded is a separate issue. The pilots found themselves in an emergency situation and a crash resulted. In my opinion, if the pilots had maintained control of the airspeed and had they kept the MCAS breakers open as stipulated in the AD, they might have gotten the aircraft under control.
If you don't agree, then let's agree to disagree.
Apr 13, 2019, 5:11 pm
#2511
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YXU
Programs: AC SE100K, National E/E, HH Diamond, IHG Diamond, MB, Avis PC
Posts: 970
This is going around in circles. I maintain what I say that not all pilots are equally skilled, irrespective of whether that's due to ability or training or both. I previously quoted Sullenberger's remark that 200 hours of flying time is absurdly low for an airline pilot and I agree with that. Why a pilot could be behind the controls of a commercial airliner with only 200 hours of flying time is a separate issue.
The fact is that irrespective of whether or not the 737 should have been grounded at the time of the crash, it wasn't. Why it wasn't grounded is a separate issue. The pilots found themselves in an emergency situation and a crash resulted. In my opinion, if the pilots had maintained control of the airspeed and had they kept the MCAS breakers open as stipulated in the AD, they might have gotten the aircraft under control.
If you don't agree, then let's agree to disagree.
The fact is that irrespective of whether or not the 737 should have been grounded at the time of the crash, it wasn't. Why it wasn't grounded is a separate issue. The pilots found themselves in an emergency situation and a crash resulted. In my opinion, if the pilots had maintained control of the airspeed and had they kept the MCAS breakers open as stipulated in the AD, they might have gotten the aircraft under control.
If you don't agree, then let's agree to disagree.
Apr 13, 2019, 5:16 pm
#2512
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: Ideally YOW, but probably not
Programs: AC SE*MM
Posts: 1,827
I agree with @The Lev that the AD did not tell the pilots to keep the plane to a specifically low speed - and so they would have been following the AD as long as they did keep the plane to a speed of no more than Vmo (the maximum operating airspeed ).
At 05:41:20, the right overspeed clacker was recorded on CVR. It remained active until the end of the recording.
At 05:41:32, the left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording.
At 05:41:32, the left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording.
Apr 13, 2019, 5:18 pm
#2513
Join Date: Aug 2010
Posts: 3,130
This is going around in circles. I maintain what I say that not all pilots are equally skilled, irrespective of whether that's due to ability or training or both. I previously quoted Sullenberger's remark that 200 hours of flying time is absurdly low for an airline pilot and I agree with that. Why a pilot could be behind the controls of a commercial airliner with only 200 hours of flying time is a separate issue.
The fact is that irrespective of whether or not the 737 should have been grounded at the time of the crash, it wasn't. Why it wasn't grounded is a separate issue. The pilots found themselves in an emergency situation and a crash resulted. In my opinion, if the pilots had maintained control of the airspeed and had they kept the MCAS breakers open as stipulated in the AD, they might have gotten the aircraft under control.
If you don't agree, then let's agree to disagree.
The fact is that irrespective of whether or not the 737 should have been grounded at the time of the crash, it wasn't. Why it wasn't grounded is a separate issue. The pilots found themselves in an emergency situation and a crash resulted. In my opinion, if the pilots had maintained control of the airspeed and had they kept the MCAS breakers open as stipulated in the AD, they might have gotten the aircraft under control.
If you don't agree, then let's agree to disagree.
Going on and on about what the ET pilots should or could have done is only relevant if we know for a fact that that is what AC pilots would have done, making he 7M8 safe for operation right now.
As an aside, the fact that the 7M8 wasn't grounded is a lot more relevant to this forum than what ET pilots did or did not do. For one, it raises serious questions about what, if any, lessons AC or TC learned in the aftermath of the first incident.
Apr 13, 2019, 5:26 pm
#2514
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: Ideally YOW, but probably not
Programs: AC SE*MM
Posts: 1,827
In the meantime I'm out.
Apr 13, 2019, 6:07 pm
#2515
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I believe a severely out of trim situation has a much worse impact than the speed by itself. That was the reason for the original roller-coaster SOP for runaway trim on the 737 Jurassic.
BTW, in regard of one of your posts: you've stated that you design marine equipment for living. So what happens to the ship's bow when you cut power?
BTW, in regard of one of your posts: you've stated that you design marine equipment for living. So what happens to the ship's bow when you cut power?
I've never stated that I "design marine equipment for a living". I work for a company that produces marine equipment and I've been in the marine industry for a long time. Not sure what your point is. There is very little similarity between ships and airplanes. What happens to a particular vessel when power is reduced or applied depends on the hull design. Some vessels trim down under power and some trim up. Most vessels also sink deeper into the water as their speed increases. This is called squat. None of this has any bearing on aircraft behaviour.
Apr 13, 2019, 6:16 pm
#2517
Join Date: Aug 2010
Posts: 3,130
Lol, nice revisionism. I'm glad you knew everything wrong with the MAX back in October there Nostradamus. Next time any aircraft type has a crash somewhere in the world that AC "happens to have bought", before the preliminary report or final report or anything else I'll be sure to be looking for you in here demanding immediate grounding and the manufacturers head on a stick.
In the meantime I'm out.
In the meantime I'm out.
Makes one wonder: why did it take a second crash to fully realize the risk? Did everybody just look the other way and assume they would be fine because "third world".
In any cases, how many crashes do we need to establish there's a problem with an aircraft? Three? Five? Seven? Because, frankly, the fact that it took 2 has broken some of the trust in airlines and regulator for many people. The next time A, B of E crash, public opinion might demand quicker action. As skybluesea has pointed out, this is on the verge of becoming political, if it hasn't already.
Apr 13, 2019, 6:40 pm
#2518
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: YVR
Programs: Bottom feeder Star Gold
Posts: 2,652
Originally Posted by yulred
Did everybody just look the other way and assume they would be fine because "third world".
Originally Posted by yulred
As skybluesea has pointed out, this is on the verge of becoming political, if it hasn't already.
Apr 13, 2019, 6:41 pm
#2519
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YXU
Programs: AC SE100K, National E/E, HH Diamond, IHG Diamond, MB, Avis PC
Posts: 970
The AD says to disengage autothrottles in the event of runaway trim. The implication of disengaging autothrottles is that pilot takes control of the throttles and is responsible to fly the aircraft at an appropriate speed. A 737 pilot knows that manually trimming the aircraft is easier at lower speed and eventually becomes impossible as speed increases.So the two issues are related.
I've never stated that I "design marine equipment for a living". I work for a company that produces marine equipment and I've been in the marine industry for a long time. Not sure what your point is. There is very little similarity between ships and airplanes. What happens to a particular vessel when power is reduced or applied depends on the hull design. Some vessels trim down under power and some trim up. Most vessels also sink deeper into the water as their speed increases. This is called squat. None of this has any bearing on aircraft behaviour.
Apr 13, 2019, 6:49 pm
#2520
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YXU
Programs: AC SE100K, National E/E, HH Diamond, IHG Diamond, MB, Avis PC
Posts: 970
To be frank, yes. There has been lots of sentiment to that effect on this forum, and even within certain pilot communities. I think people still think of Geldof whenever they hear "Ethiopia" and simply fail to understand how advanced the airline is. For whatever reason, the ET captain's 8000 hours aren't as equally-regarded as 8000 hours spent flying in a first-world environment.