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Old Jan 4, 2021, 1:37 am
FlyerTalk Forums Expert How-Tos and Guides
Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html

Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
READ BEFORE POSTING

Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.

Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...

As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.

The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.

Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).

However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.

The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.

Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.

The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).

Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator



United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.

How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:

View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.

The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.

For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.

All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.




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Old Apr 8, 2019, 1:25 am
  #1111  
 
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Originally Posted by halls120
The Lion Air plane that crashed was saved from crashing the day before because of a pilot who knew what to do in that specific emergency. I'm not saying the pilots who perished were incompetent. I'm saying that it is highly likely that they weren't properly trained to respond to the conditions they encountered, and likely didn't spend a lot of time hand flying their aircraft. The latter is something my brother - a DL Captain with well over 15,000 hours - believes is a growing and dangerous trend for all airlines.
One question that remains is why they had to be in the conditions they encountered and what the manufacturer could do (or could have done) to avoid that? We will see as the investigation progresses.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 1:41 am
  #1112  
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Originally Posted by worldclubber
One question that remains is why they had to be in the conditions they encountered and what the manufacturer could do (or could have done) to avoid that? We will see as the investigation progresses.
Absolutely. Boeing is going to be writing a lot of very expensive checks, thanks to their cheapness on the front end, and perhaps they will learn their lesson. Whether the regulatory bodies do something on the experience/training aspect is something we also need to monitor. Computer-aided flying is great until it isn't, and that's why pilot experience is so important.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 2:54 am
  #1113  
 
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Originally Posted by halls120
Absolutely. Boeing is going to be writing a lot of very expensive checks, thanks to their cheapness on the front end, and perhaps they will learn their lesson. Whether the regulatory bodies do something on the experience/training aspect is something we also need to monitor. Computer-aided flying is great until it isn't, and that's why pilot experience is so important.
And they lost a lot of confidence in their products and maybe orders, too.

"If it's not Boeing, I'm not going" took a huge hit.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 4:23 am
  #1114  
 
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Boeing says : less...stability [for] fuel efficiency

Where is the FAA limit in the tradeoff between “fuel efficiency” vs “Augmentation” ? The trend is to design airplanes with less stability to gain fuel efficiency. (Boeing's own words if link is Boeing and not some hacker in Russia) The 737 MAX's use of this approach apparently hit the breaking point.

https://www.boeing.com/commercial/ae...y/fo01txt.html

2 Flight Control Computers and Stability Augmentation
The trend in the design of modern airplanes is to have less static longitudinal stability--frequently referred to as relaxed static stability (RSS)--to capture the benefit of improved fuel efficiency. Simply stated, some airplanes are now designed to be aerodynamically efficient, and stability is augmented electronically so that stick force gradients will meet certification requirements. Many methods exist for augmenting stability. For example, the Boeing 777 and MD-11 use flight control computers that adjust the elevator actuator positions to give the appearance of more longitudinal stability than the airplane actually has. In other words, computers absorb the extra workload caused by flying with RSS.
Copyright � The Boeing Company. All rights reserved.

Last edited by BF263533; Apr 8, 2019 at 4:29 am
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 5:21 am
  #1115  
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Originally Posted by BF263533
The trend in the design of modern airplanes is to have less static longitudinal stability--frequently referred to as relaxed static stability (RSS)--to capture the benefit of improved fuel efficiency..
This is just about verbatim what my brother told me after AF 447. The airlines want more fuel efficient airframes, and manufacturers are heeding the call.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 6:07 am
  #1116  
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Originally Posted by BF263533
Where is the FAA limit in the tradeoff between “fuel efficiency” vs “Augmentation” ? The trend is to design airplanes with less stability to gain fuel efficiency. (Boeing's own words if link is Boeing and not some hacker in Russia) The 737 MAX's use of this approach apparently hit the breaking point.
14 CFR 25.173 et seq
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 6:46 am
  #1117  
 
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Originally Posted by halls120
The Lion Air plane that crashed was saved from crashing the day before because of a pilot who knew what to do in that specific emergency. I'm not saying the pilots who perished were incompetent. I'm saying that it is highly likely that they weren't properly trained to respond to the conditions they encountered, and likely didn't spend a lot of time hand flying their aircraft. The latter is something my brother - a DL Captain with well over 15,000 hours - believes is a growing and dangerous trend for all airlines.
That's not quite right. Boeing had never documented for crews what may have been going on. For all we know, that third pilot may have simply guessed correctly to be able to recover the aircraft. It was only after the Lior Air tragedy that Boeing came out with some instructions on what to do and the jury is out on whether those instructions are sufficient for all situations.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 7:13 am
  #1118  
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Originally Posted by JimInOhio
That's not quite right. Boeing had never documented for crews what may have been going on. For all we know, that third pilot may have simply guessed correctly to be able to recover the aircraft.
You are correct, the third pilot might have guessed the correct procedure. OTOH, he might have been an experienced pilot like my college classmate who is a 737 SME for DL, who told me that if he had been on the flight deck he would have done the same thing as the LionAir jumpseater, based on his over 15,000 hours of multiengine flight time in a variety of Boeing aircraft, which also means he's very familiar with hand flying the aircraft he was type rated to fly.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 7:57 am
  #1119  
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Originally Posted by JimInOhio
That's not quite right. Boeing had never documented for crews what may have been going on. For all we know, that third pilot may have simply guessed correctly to be able to recover the aircraft. It was only after the Lior Air tragedy that Boeing came out with some instructions on what to do and the jury is out on whether those instructions are sufficient for all situations.
The third pilot correctly selected the runaway trim procedure when they had the trim running away. Doesn't seem like a big guess, and doesn't need any additional guidance from Boeing.

As the pilots upthread have noted, none of the MCAS information from Boeing has changed what they're going to do in the cockpit when they have runaway trim, MCAS induced or otherwise.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 8:12 am
  #1120  
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Originally Posted by halls120
It's a relevant comparison. The co-pilots flying that aircraft didn't know how to respond to a series of anomalies and put the aircraft in a stall from which it couldn't recover. We don't know the final outcome of the two MAX crashes at this time, but in addition to the Boeing design failures, I suspect there will be findings similar to AF 447, which cited a lack of experience of both co-pilots is hand flying the aircraft and poor training.
I kind of disagree with this. There were many extraneous factors with AF447 that resulted in that disaster including but not limited to the crew flying directly into in ITCZ thunderstorm as well as a shoddy pitot tube. In the case of the MAX, these were two brand new airplanes flying on otherwise beautiful days which were simply poorly designed from the beginning and rushed into service to maintain pace with a competitor. While I also think the A320neo series is sort of and old, uninspired design, the 737MAX is even worse. It takes lipstick on a pig to a whole new level. One where it actually kills people.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 8:34 am
  #1121  
 
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Originally Posted by mduell
The third pilot correctly selected the runaway trim procedure when they had the trim running away. Doesn't seem like a big guess, and doesn't need any additional guidance from Boeing.

As the pilots upthread have noted, none of the MCAS information from Boeing has changed what they're going to do in the cockpit when they have runaway trim, MCAS induced or otherwise.
Yes, we know that. OTOH, I don't think anyone in this thread has claimed they've actually dealt with a runaway trim, all the way to the limit a few seconds after takeoff, where they had to manually crank it back into place.

Last edited by JimInOhio; Apr 8, 2019 at 9:52 am
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 8:37 am
  #1122  
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Originally Posted by cmd320
I kind of disagree with this. There were many extraneous factors with AF447 that resulted in that disaster including but not limited to the crew flying directly into in ITCZ thunderstorm as well as a shoddy pitot tube.
It was more than just a "shoddy pitot tube."

On 5 July 2012, the BEA released its final report on the accident. This confirmed the findings of the preliminary reports and provided additional details and recommendations to improve safety. According to the final report,[224] the accident resulted from the following succession of major events:
  • temporary inconsistency between the measured speeds, likely as a result of the obstruction of the pitot tubes by ice crystals, causing autopilot disconnection and reconfiguration to alternate law;
  • the crew made inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path;
  • the crew failed to follow appropriate procedure for loss of displayed airspeed information;
  • the crew were late in identifying and correcting the deviation from the flight path;
  • the crew lacked understanding of the approach to stall;
  • the crew failed to recognize the aircraft had stalled and consequently did not make inputs that would have made it possible to recover from the stall.[215]
These events resulted from the following major factors in combination:[224]
  • feedback mechanisms on the part of those involved made it impossible to identify and remedy the repeated non-application of the procedure for inconsistent airspeed, and to ensure that crews were trained in icing of the pitot probes and its consequences;
  • the crew lacked practical training in manually handling the aircraft both at high altitude and in the event of anomalies of speed indication;
  • the two co-pilots' task sharing was weakened both by incomprehension of the situation at the time of autopilot disconnection, and by poor management of the "startle effect", leaving them in an emotionally charged situation;
  • the cockpit lacked a clear display of the inconsistencies in airspeed readings identified by the flight computers;
  • the crew did not respond to the stall warning, whether due to a failure to identify the aural warning, to the transience of the stall warnings that could have been considered spurious, to the absence of any visual information that could confirm that the aircraft was approaching stall after losing the characteristic speeds, to confusing stall-related buffet for overspeed-related buffet, to the indications by the Flight Director that might have confirmed the crew's mistaken view of their actions, or to difficulty in identifying and understanding the implications of the switch to alternate law, which does not protect the angle of attack.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 8:55 am
  #1123  
 
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Originally Posted by halls120
The Lion Air plane that crashed was saved from crashing the day before because of a pilot who knew what to do in that specific emergency. I'm not saying the pilots who perished were incompetent. I'm saying that it is highly likely that they weren't properly trained to respond to the conditions they encountered, and likely didn't spend a lot of time hand flying their aircraft. The latter is something my brother - a DL Captain with well over 15,000 hours - believes is a growing and dangerous trend for all airlines.
This is a red herring. The JT flight the day before was at a higher altitude, less airspeed, and much more time to react. The ET crew effectively followed the same procedure (runaway trim checklist) and it didn't work out so well for them. That doesn't make it pilot error - it could just mean that they were in a less recoverable situation.

I'm not saying that pilot error isn't a possible confounding factor in this crash - just that the pilots did their best, followed the relevant procedures, and still crashed. To me, it seems the primary cause of the crash is a poorly defined aircraft system and poorly defined procedure.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 9:13 am
  #1124  
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Originally Posted by PVDtoDEL
This is a red herring. The JT flight the day before was at a higher altitude, less airspeed, and much more time to react. The ET crew effectively followed the same procedure (runaway trim checklist) and it didn't work out so well for them. That doesn't make it pilot error - it could just mean that they were in a less recoverable situation.

I'm not saying that pilot error isn't a possible confounding factor in this crash - just that the pilots did their best, followed the relevant procedures, and still crashed. To me, it seems the primary cause of the crash is a poorly defined aircraft system and poorly defined procedure.
Hopefully the final reports of the two events will have the same level of detail as the AF 447 event, and we'll know the answers.
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Old Apr 8, 2019, 10:43 am
  #1125  
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Originally Posted by halls120
It was more than just a "shoddy pitot tube."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
Yes, however the catalyst of the issue was the pitot tube. It was a very very different situation. The aircraft was also in the cruise/enroute phase of flight. Again, completely different to the issues with the 737MAX. The A330 did not actively try to pitch itself into the ground.
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