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Originally Posted by spin88
(Post 30877905)
OTOH, Airbus - with the A320 being designed in the 80s - does not have the same magnitude of problems that Boeing has. First, the Aircraft is higher off the ground, so adding newer/larger engines did not cause problems with ground clearance, second, the base model (the A320) was two stretches size larger than the base model of the 737 (the 737-100 which seated 85). So the A321neo is a single stretch of the A320, while the MAX9 is three stretches of the original 737 frame, and the new "base" MAX8 is two stretches.
Witness AF447 - the A330 where mode confusion played a role in response to the stall after the pitot tube which had been known to have a faulty design iced over - enough so that AF ordered them replaced just before the crash. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/busi...ight-447-crash I remember a number of fliers worried about the Airbus after that incident. |
Originally Posted by cerealmarketer
(Post 30878513)
You don't need an engine placement issue to run into trouble with human response to automated flight systems.
Witness AF447 - the A330 where mode confusion played a role in response to the stall after the pitot tube which had been known to have a faulty design iced over - enough so that AF ordered them replaced just before the crash. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/busi...ight-447-crash I remember a number of fliers worried about the Airbus after that incident. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birgenair_Flight_301 |
Originally Posted by cerealmarketer
(Post 30878513)
I remember a number of fliers worried about the Airbus after that incident. |
Originally Posted by jsloan
(Post 30878407)
Your implicit trust in statements by PRC authorities who are currently engaged in a trade war is noted. If these statements are accurate, those authorities should have acted long ago.
I am not saying that a trade war did/did not impact their decision to ground the planes (which has now been seconded the EU, so not out in left field...) but I find no reasonable situation where the CAAC would lie about having reports from Chinese pilots of similar issues.
Originally Posted by cerealmarketer
(Post 30878513)
You don't need an engine placement issue to run into trouble with human response to automated flight systems.
Witness AF447 - the A330 where mode confusion played a role in response to the stall after the pitot tube which had been known to have a faulty design iced over - enough so that AF ordered them replaced just before the crash. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/busi...ight-447-crash I remember a number of fliers worried about the Airbus after that incident.
Originally Posted by AirbusFan2B
(Post 30878629)
Yes, and now many of us are worried about the Boeing as there seems to be no proactivity from Boeing or UA following 2 nearly identical total disasters (unlike the single AF disaster with A330 where airline and manufacturer were on the case.) |
Originally Posted by spin88
(Post 30878701)
Yes, and as AB Fan noted, Airbus swung into action, going so far as to spend Millions of $$$ to raise the plane off the south Atlantic sea floor. Boeing seems to have gone into a defensive crouch with the LionAir Crash - which I assumed from their statements was a one off, failure of Lion Air to train in a new system. Now that this turns out to be a suspect statement - with a new reflash of the system coming in a few weeks - Boeing has frankly substantially decreased my trust in them. I am getting a sneaking suspicion that having cut corners on the MAX (being beated out of the box by the neo, and lacking the will and engineering resources for a new aircraft) and with it being about 70% of sales, that Boeing is not exactly being forthcoming.+1
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Originally Posted by spin88
(Post 30878701)
Yes, and as AB Fan noted, Airbus swung into action, going so far as to spend Millions of $$$ to raise the plane off the south Atlantic sea floor. Boeing seems to have gone into a defensive crouch with the LionAir Crash - which I assumed from their statements was a one off, failure of Lion Air to train in a new system. Now that this turns out to be a suspect statement - with a new reflash of the system coming in a few weeks - Boeing has frankly substantially decreased my trust in them. I am getting a sneaking suspicion that having cut corners on the MAX (being beated out of the box by the neo, and lacking the will and engineering resources for a new aircraft) and with it being about 70% of sales, that Boeing is not exactly being forthcoming.
Even during the best of times, it's prudent & standard practice to assume every executive is lying or withholding crucial information--assume everything is a lie until one can independently verify it. Whether there is an issue or not or if they know it or not, at this point, their position will be the same--namely, the aircraft is safe. |
Originally Posted by AirbusFan2B
(Post 30878629)
Yes, and now many of us are worried about the Boeing as there seems to be no proactivity from Boeing or UA following 2 nearly identical total disasters (unlike the single AF disaster with A330 where airline and manufacturer were on the case.) Your question should be posed to WN and AA |
Just a data point here, I'm scheduled to fly the MAX 9 tomorrow from OGG to LAX. I'm on the phone with UA right now and being told that the pilots are well trained and the MAX 8 is not the same as the 9, and so on. Resistance to changing me to a different flight (on a 772) even though there's tons of room and it's listed as K9 (I have a K class ticket). Anyone else have a different experience?
Update: After the rep consulted with a supervisor the change was made. |
Originally Posted by EWR764
(Post 30878740)
....as far as "cutting corners" in aerospace engineering, well, stick to what you know.
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Originally Posted by JNelson113
(Post 30878799)
Just a data point here, I'm scheduled to fly the MAX 9 tomorrow from OGG to LAX. I'm on the phone with UA right now and being told that the pilots are well trained and the MAX 8 is not the same as the 9, and so on. Resistance to changing me to a different flight (on a 772) even though there's tons of room and it's listed as K9 (I have a K class ticket). Anyone else have a different experience?.
Update: After the rep consulted with a supervisor the change was made. Edit: Just saw your update. Looks like the word is slowly getting down to the agents. |
Originally Posted by FlyngSvyr
(Post 30878838)
HUCA. That is not what UA put out yesterday. Maybe she was just trying to allay any fears you had, not necessarily denying you the change? UA was actually the first domestic airline to say they would "work with" anyone who had concerns flying on a MAX (even though they do not fly the MAX 8)
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Originally Posted by JNelson113
(Post 30878799)
Just a data point here, I'm scheduled to fly the MAX 9 tomorrow from OGG to LAX. I'm on the phone with UA right now and being told that the pilots are well trained and the MAX 8 is not the same as the 9, and so on. Resistance to changing me to a different flight (on a 772) even though there's tons of room and it's listed as K9 (I have a K class ticket). Anyone else have a different experience?
Update: After the rep consulted with a supervisor the change was made. |
Originally Posted by blueman2
(Post 30878825)
create a software solution to resolve the resulting tendency to pull up in certain situations
The MCAS has been sufficiently demonized, but at the end of the day it's a safeguard to provide stall protection in a very narrow area of flying. The Lion Air crash did not involve a unique set of circumstances that had never been contemplated, nor did it give rise a situation pilots were not equipped to handle. The mechanism of the presentation of the failure was unique to the MAX, and I argue the system can theoretically be made safer with certain modifications. But that's not to say it would have changed the ET302 outcome, and it's not evidence that Boeing "cut corners" in the design process. No manufacturer is immune to incidents and accidents which expose weaknesses in a design; we've seen it constantly throughout aviation history, in varying degrees of severity. The hallmark of safety in this industry has been the deliberate, careful process by which accidents are investigated, studied and analyzed, with recommendations made to prevent future occurrences. This also extends to litigation, which has identified flaws in investigations and initial investigative findings. The point is, drawing conclusions in the immediate wake of these events is simply foolish. |
Oh man, you all will just love this. The CSR comes back on and says that she made the change, but "my supervisor said that there is nothing wrong with the plane and if there were the FAA would have grounded them. That crash happened because the pilots made mistakes and in those countries the pilots aren't well trained. So everyone here is perfectly safe flying the MAX." This made me VERY angry and I said that it was outrageous and unfair for them to blame the pilots while the investigation is ongoing and that she and her supervisor should not be saying this to people. She then just said "okay okay" to get me off the phone.
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Originally Posted by EWR764
(Post 30878876)
Every single airplane in commercial aviation uses software solutions to correct inherent aircraft tendencies, some of which are unpleasant or even deadly. FBW systems even correct human tendencies in control inputs.
The MCAS has been sufficiently demonized, but at the end of the day it's a safeguard to provide stall protection in a very narrow area of flying. The Lion Air crash did not involve a unique set of circumstances that had never been contemplated, nor did it give rise a situation pilots were not equipped to handle. The mechanism of the presentation of the failure was unique to the MAX, and I argue the system can theoretically be made safer with certain modifications. But that's not to say it would have changed the ET302 outcome, and it's not evidence that Boeing "cut corners" in the design process. No manufacturer is immune to incidents and accidents which expose weaknesses in a design; we've seen it constantly throughout aviation history, in varying degrees of severity. The hallmark of safety in this industry has been the deliberate, careful process by which accidents are investigated, studied and analyzed, with recommendations made to prevent future occurrences. This also extends to litigation, which has identified flaws in investigations and initial investigative findings. The point is, drawing conclusions in the immediate wake of these events is simply foolish. |
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