I was wrong when I stated earlier (on this thread or another one, not sure) that the acceptable ID list was going to be better. It is not really any different, the only difference that is better is that IDs that are less than 12 months expired are acceptable. There should be less confusion as to what is acceptable, because the list is smaller. And yes, BDO's or STSO's now have to get involved when someone doesn't have an ID. Though ID is still not required to fly, they are making it more difficult to fly without ID.

So a smaller list ultimately leads to increased intervention from supes and LEO, which means more delays and more hassles for pax. That doesn't sound like less confusion.

A smaller list of approved IDs that increases the number of people hassled by the TSA for ID-related reasons. Definitely a mess that will lead to more confusion just like you said.

This whole ID checking by the TSA should just be scrapped since ID checking by the TSA is not security and does nothing to prevent weapons and explosives that could be done by the TSA doing its job properly in screening persons and their belongings for prohibited items -- a task which is easier than behavioral detection yet one at which they routinely still fail -- instead of wasting resources hassling passengers with questions because of ID-related reasons.

If they dont check ID then how are they to know that someone on the no-fly list is using someone elses ticket?

Even if they check ID, they don't necessarily know if someone is on the no-fly list or not.

The US government blacklists as they are applied to aviation are quite incompetently managed anyway and their implementation even -- hard as it may be to see -- more retarded.

Have you thought about why are people on a government no-fly list if they aren't guilty enough to be prosecuted for a crime and convicted? This kind of nonsense of denying otherwise free US persons travel rights domestically needs to be re-thought -- actually they need to think first.

Unless the TSO ID checker has every name on the no-fly list committed to memory, that TSO is not checking against any list at all. All they can check for is to see if perhaps the ID is fraudulent, which is not security for air travel.

At IAH on Wednesday and EWR on Thursday, my PortPass still worked, even though an expiration date is not easily ascertainable (and neither TSO found it).

They wouldn't. Which is why everyone is thoroughly screened. Supposedly. A person on the list who is not armed and is not carrying explosives is not a security threat. Why is that so hard to understand ?

Exactly; "re-thought" gives this nonsense too much credit... It leads to the incorrect conclusion that any thought was put into this policy in the first place.

Im sorry, I meant less confusion for the TDC.

I don't know about you, but I have never seen the no-fly list. Nor have I ever been told to check IDs against the no-fly list.

I disagree. Atta and his cohorts orchestrated several dry runs, presumably sans anything that was banned at that time (yeah, I'm familiar with the whole box cutter argument. Their mere actions represented a security threat, one which they exploited quite spectacularly. Checking IDs is indeed a valid security measure. The method by which it's currently implemented, with the lack of a real time means to compare names to a database, certainly doesn't enhance security by any stretch of the imagination.

TB

I wouldn't call it hard to understand, but more not widely known. People might say its obvious why you can't carry swiss army knives on planes, afterall you could attack someone with one. If they then realize that the cockpit door is locked and fortified, then they might be wondering why you can't carry the knives.

What "mere actions" are you talking about ? If simply making multiple airline trips represents a security threat then there's a whole bunch of suspects right here on FT. Since they all had acceptable IDs they exploited nothing whatsoever with regard to ID; what they exploited was the boxcutter loophole and the cooperation paradigm extant at the time.

Checking IDs is only a valid security measure if you do not trust the TSOs to discover weapons and explosives during screening. I forget which Hawleylayer that is.

Checking IDs is not a valid security measure in this context -- especially when you bring up suicidal terrorists. [You do know that there is no such thing as successful repeat suicide attacker, and so blacklisting known dead people is quite insane. Don't forget that some actual living terrorists are also purposefully left off the blacklists.]

Furthermore, even with a real-time means of cross-referencing a database doesn't do anything. There are more ways than there are letters in the alphabet to throw off such "real time means to compare names to a database".

Wirelessly posted (Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98; PalmSource/Palm-D052; Blazer/4.5) 16;320x320)

I fly out of IAD tomorrow. I'm really torn - which ID to use:

1. My retired military ID with an expiration date of "indefinite", or,
2. My passport with a domestic destination on the BP?

Doing the no-ID experiment is not an option because I'll be carrying a couple of draft documents that screeners have no authority to read.

Will accept votes/suggestion up until 0300 EDT Tuesday.

Keep in mind there are limitations, technologically and privacy-wise, to what we can do in screening PAX (i.e., we're not doing cavity searches)!

In the absence of such, a system that red-flags suspect persons and assigns them additional security (SSSS) or, perhaps, doesn't allow them to fly at all, may have some validity.

Also (switching gears here) I'm obviously not high up enough in the TSA food chain to be privy to any top-secret information. However, I've been around the agency long enough to have observed that it usually implements new measures and/or changes gradually, not revealing its end game during the process.

I think we're inevitably headed for some kind of registered traveler program that allows individuals who complete background checks to undergo less, or perhaps no, scrutiny at the checkpoint. But the key to making this work is the person who presents himself at the checkpoint MUST be the one with the clearance! Don't think that a potential terrorist wouldn't try to exploit this huge loophole.

Now, TSA administration isn't under any illusions as to the general capabilities of its screening staff -- it knows how many fail the relatively simple tests TSOs have to take annual to maintain certification! Therefore, it would make sense to have TSOs become practiced at checking I.D. using quite specific criteria before attempting to launch any such system.

Again, this is just a hunch, folks -- I guess we'll have to wait and see if it pans out!