sort of like a missionary converting the heathens, eh?

Wow, an argument about who is a real American. Pass the popcorn, please.:p

I realize I've probably said this before ... but what the heck, I'll say it again ...

1. What makes you think that the enemy doesn't already have your playbook? Do you believe that all 50,000 TSA employees have adequately protected TSA's secrets, so that there's no possibility that someone --- deliberately or accidentally --- has made TSA's playbook available to the enemy?

And, if not ... then since the enemy already has the playbook, what value is there in continuing to pretend that the playbook is still a secret?

2. What's the harm in giving the playbook to the enemy? TSA's objective is supposed to be to secure commercial travel, not make arrests. If you tell people "this is how we're going to search for bombs", and terrorists decide not to bring bombs on-board as a result, haven't you achieved your goal?

The security of nuclear power plants are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, including the caliber of weapons the guards are carrying, physical fitness standards and tests for guards, standards for fencing construction around facilities, etc, etc.

CHAPTER I--NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED)
PART 73_PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS--Table of Contents
Sec. 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.

Also-

Domestic Safeguards Regulations, Guidance, and Communications

* Part 11 - Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear Material
* Part 25 - Access Authorization for Licensee Personnel
* Part 26 - Fitness for Duty
* Part 70.51 - Material balance, inventory, and records requirements
* Part 73 - Physical Protection of Plants and Materials
* Part 74 - Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material
* Part 76 - Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants
* Part 95 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguards of National Security Information and Restricted Data
* All current rulemakings


Last time I checked, no nuclear facilities have 'sploded. :rolleyes:

I'm always amused by this retort. :) Subjectivism is like the La Brea Tar Pits of critical thinking -- drinking from these proverbial waters you tend to fall in and sink to the muck.

The enemy, some of them, “may” have our “playbook”. “May”. Most wont, and giving it to them would be stupid beyond belief.

Giving them the play book would allow them to analyze our process and find ways around it. As I continually say, no security system is perfect. So, given that simple little fact, it would be foolish to give them our plans. Giving it to the flying public as some here want (JSmith1969 being one it seems), is just as good as sending it FedEx to OBL himself.

And you seriously think that these things contain specifics of Nuclear Power Plant security procedures? Wow, I guess one really can convince themselves of anything with enough effort. :rolleyes:

If you believe anyone needs the play book to analyze the TSA's process and to find ways around it, I guess you can convince yourself of anything.

Certainly more than the TSA ever releases, but then the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not peddle security theatre. @:-)

Oh, and how did Security Through Obscurity™ work out for the VC-25 overflight of New York City? :rolleyes:

Not to cross post the entire issue as there is a thread i started for that, i'll link the thread and ask for some feedback about what the TSA's policy is when it comes to removing a removable cast when the patient is under doctor's orders not to do so in public to reduce accidental injury.

Goalie-mom got a D-Y-W-T-F-T for not removing her cast

With respect, Ron, you're missing the point.

First of all ... it's not "may". The enemy (or "some of them", as you now say) has your "playbook" with a high degree of probability. Shall we talk again about TSA's SSI documents that have been posted to the Internet? Even if they don't have the actual documents, your enemies can certainly determine the contents of the playbook simply by performing test runs through the checkpoint and watching how they are screened.

Yes, no security system is perfect. By fully publishing the plans of your security system, you open yourself up to the possibility of your enemies trying to find ways to beat the system. You also open yourself up the possibility of your friends trying to find ways to improve the system. And you have more friends than enemies; odds are in your favor that your friends will find ways to make things better faster than your enemies will find ways to tear your down. You also remove any possibility of self-deception: believing that your rules are secret when they aren't.

I find it fascinating that the most sophisticated encryption algorithms in use today, like AES, are publicly-known algorithms. Even though all the details of AES are publicly known, the Feds use AES for all levels of encrypted communication. They aren't bothered by the fact that the enemy knows how they're sending messages. Instead, they've chosen to use a technique that is still incredibly strong, despite its public nature.

In the computer security field, this is called "security by obscurity" (look up the term) and it's well-understood that it doesn't add any security. A proper security protocol can be completely disclosed to the enemy without any diminution of security.

The more complex you make a system - any system - the less reliable it becomes and the more expensive it becomes.

As TSA adds more and more to it's screening, and as it seeks to keep true American citizens in the dark (said citizens being educated would be more aware of something that might be out of place), the more risk it adds to the system. And the less likely that the TSA will find mistakes it makes itself.

It is plausible that the reason that TSA keeps process secret is that it doesn't want to have someone expose shortcomings of the system, thereby scaring the public, having the public propose a better way, or raising demands to reduce the agency. NIH.

"true American citizens". Rhetoric at its best. :rolleyes:

Since you seem to think that you know what a "true American citizen" is, please tell me what a terrorist is, and what they look like. Please be specific, I'd hate to tag you for additional screening by mistake. :rolleyes:

Ooops, replied to wrong thread!

Are you saying you are tagging people for additional screening by how they look?

Wouldn't that be profiling and against TSA policy TSORon?